Lieutenant Colonel Richard C. Dunn USMC - Operation Corporate: Operational Artists View Of The Falkland Islands Conflict

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Text originally published in 1993 under the same title.

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OPERATION CORPORATE: OPERATIONAL ARTISTS VIEW OF THE FALKLAND

By

Richard C. Dunn Lieutenant Colonel, USMC

OPERATION CORPORATE: OPERATIONAL ARTISTS VIEW OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS CONFLICT

This paper reviews the 1982 Falkland Islands conflict between Argentina and Great Britain from the operational artists viewpoint. This paper focuses on the political considerations, strategic objectives and operational factors, including objectives, centers of gravity and forces employment. The objective is to provide the reader with lessons learned at the political, strategic and operational level and provide specific recommendations which impact at the operational level of war. This paper does not cover the long history of negotiations between the parties in dispute, U.S. involvement or the tactical aspects of the conflict. This paper does cover the political, strategic, and operational factors which are important for the operational planner. The Falklands conflict provides the U.S. planner with important lessons learned applicable for future employment of U.S. forces at the operational level of war. The Falklands conflict occurred due to both countries failure at the political and strategic level of decision making to correctly analyze their opponents reactions to diplomatic and military actions. The implications for the warfighting CINC are that he must utilize the JOPES planning system to be prepared militarily for an unexpected crisis while at the same time utilize the PPBS system to ensure his warfighting needs and shortfalls are addressed during the budgeting process. In the end, it is the politicians who must provide the CINC warfighters with the proper tools to prosecute the military campaign.

On 2 April 1982, after more than 16 years of inconclusive diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain, Argentina launched Operativo ROSARIO, a military campaign designed to take by military means what the Argentine government could not secure by political means: the Islas Malvinas or what the British and the Islanders call the Falklands. {1} As happens in many such instances, the Argentine government miscalculated the political resolve and military response of their British opponent. Refusing to accept the Argentine military action as a fait accompli, the British government responded to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands with Operation CORPORATE, a military campaign to regain her lost territory. Great Britain, a major world political power and NATO member, and Argentina, a 3rd world nation with major power aspirations, resorted to military force to resolve their political differences over the future of a small cluster of mostly uninhabited islands in the South Atlantic. Thus began the Falkland Islands conflict.

This paper will analyze the Falkland Islands conflict from the viewpoint of an operational commander. To facilitate this process, three general areas will be reviewed: (1) political considerations, (2) strategic objectives, and (3) operational factors, including objectives, centers of gravity (COGs) and employment of forces. Based on my conclusions, specific recommendations will be offered which directly impact on the operational level of war for the U.S. commander.

The Falkland Islands conflict provides an excellent case study of a major world power fighting, at the end of a long logistics line, a Third World country in a regional conflict using modern weaponry. Both countries faced a combined air, land, and sea threat and employed joint forces at the operational level of war. This conflict provides valuable lessons learned applicable today to U.S. operational commanders planning regional contingency operations in the post-Cold War world. In view of the downsizing of the U.S. Armed Forces and the ongoing evaluation of the military services roles and missions, examination of the British experience in the Falklands conflict from an operational commanders perspective has implications for future employment of U.S. force structure and lessons applicable at the operational level of war.

The fact that Britain and Argentina resorted to military force to settle a long standing dispute over a few sparsely inhabited islands in the South Atlantic seemed incomprehensible to most Americans in April 1982. However, this abject failure of diplomacy should be viewed in light of both countries domestic political situations and international conditions existing at that time.

In Argentina, the country was ruled by a military junta composed of President Galtieri (who served as Commander-in Chief of the army also), Admiral Anaya, the naval member, and Brigadier General Dozo, the air force member. As was common in many Latin American countries of that time, social, economic and political ills plagued the military junta. Domestic turmoil was fueled by massive inflation rates, falling industrial output, rising unemployment, and dropping wage rates. Repression by the military had suppressed political opposition but the junta needed an external diversion from internal problems. The Malvinas, the Argentinean islands seized forcibly by Britain in 1833 and illegally occupied by British settlers ever since, provided the one issue that could unite all Argentines. {2} This unifying political issue was coupled with international conditions that seemed favorable, as viewed by President Galtieri, to the use of limited military force to seize the Malvinas.

The total political and diplomatic miscalculation by the Argentinean government to the British reaction to the initial Argentinean military invasion action revolved around several key assumptions. President Galtieri and his most ardent supporter of military action, Admiral Anaya, felt that:

While there were some international indicators that led Argentinean government leaders to arrive at those judgments, the fact that all four of the assumptions proved wrong spelled both political and diplomatic disaster for Argentina. A study of the British domestic political situation and her view of international conditions reveals why Argentinean gunboat diplomacy failed. {3}