Troublemakers
Troublemakers
Students Rights and Racial Justice in the Long 1960s
Kathryn Schumaker
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS
New York
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS
New York
www.nyupress.org
2019 by New York University
All rights reserved
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Schumaker, Kathryn, author.
Title: Troublemakers : students rights and racial justice in the long 1960s / Kathryn Schumaker.
Description: New York : New York University Press, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2018042919 | ISBN 9781479875139 (cl : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH : StudentsCivil rightsUnited StatesHistory20th century. | Nineteen sixtiesSocial aspects.
Classification: LCC KF4150 .S36 2019 | DDC 344.73/07909046dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018042919
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Contents
Figure 1.1. Freedom school students listen to folksinger Pete Seeger at the Palmers Crossing Community Center, 1964, Hattiesburg, Mississippi.
Figure 1.2. A group sings freedom songs at the Freedom Schools Convention during Freedom Summer, 1964, Meridian, Mississippi.
Figure 2.1. Map of Denver public high schools and attendance boundaries in 1962.
Figure 2.2. Black men and women demonstrate in favor of passage of the Noel Resolution in Denver, Colorado, May 16, 1968.
Figure 2.3. Members of the Black Berets stand guard in front of Corky Gonzales as he delivers a speech during a demonstration at the Colorado State Capitol Building, Denver, on November 3, 1968.
In the late 1960s, teenagers rebelled in public schools across the United States. From the Mississippi Delta to East Los Angeles and Columbus, Ohio, young people spoke out against injustices they witnessed at school and in American society. This was also the moment in which school districts around the nation began implementing desegregation plans to comply at long last with the Supreme Courts 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, which declared laws requiring the segregation of students by race unconstitutional. Amid this ferment of social protest and educational reform, black and Latino students seized the moment to speak out against other forms of racial discrimination at school and advocate for practices and policies that would make education more equitable for students of all races and ethnicities.
High school students, however, had no right to protest at school. Until the mid-1960s, elementary and secondary students were generally not considered to be protected by the Constitution, including the First Amendment right to free expression. The constitutional claims a young person could make in a public park were entirely different from those that could be made in a public school classroom just across the street. Merely wearing a button or a T-shirt with an unpopular message could be enough to warrant suspension or expulsion in the eyes of disapproving adults. Principals suspended or expelled students for their words and actions, and state laws generally deferred to the authority of school officials to punish students at will. And students and their families had no constitutional recourse to challenge administrators or teachers who disciplined them, including cases involving the suppression of free speech.
Undeterred by suspensions and expulsions and assisted by sympathetic lawyers, the parents and guardians of some of these teenaged protesters Tinkers broad language about students and the Constitution opened the floodgates for lawsuits concerning the constitutional rights of students. In the following decade and a half, the nations high court similarly established students rights to due process of law and privacy and considered cases involving a range of other rights.
Many historians and legal scholars have written extensively on Tinker and its progeny of free speech cases, noting how the Supreme Court has since narrowed the scope of students rights to free expression.even as students secured certain constitutional rights, this litigation often did little to strengthen the ability of young people to challenge persistent racial discrimination at school through the courts.
Student protesters of the 1960s and early 1970s followed in the footsteps of previous generations of young people who participated in acts of protest against racial inequities in American public education. Even the Brown decision had roots in the political activity of young people at school. A 1951 student strike at Robert Russa Moton High School in Farmville, Virginia, which targeted the shabby conditions at the school, set off a chain of events that would end with the filing of Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, one of the three cases that were combined with Brown by the Supreme Court.
Despiteor perhaps because ofthe increased involvement of young people in social movements in the 1960s, students frequently faced resistance to the idea that their protest activity was legitimate. Condemnation came from everyone from President Nixon to legislators, mayors, school board members, teachers, parents, and other students. Many judges and some Supreme Court justices were similarly skeptical of their political activity. Nonetheless, they continued to organize and air grievances that ranged from curricula to disciplinary policies to the hiring of teachers of color. That high school students had the right to be heard was patently absurd to many and deeply disturbing to others who worried that the disruptions of the era jeopardized the ability of schools to carry out their mission to educate all young people. Their claims were frivolous, their methods crude, and their efforts the result of youthful immaturity. Why should anyone care what teenagers think?
This disregard for the political beliefs and actions of young people is rooted in a linked set of beliefs and assumptions, all of which were contested during this historical moment. The first assumption is that the ability to participate in the political sphere rests upon a person reaching the age of majority, a moment that is often accompanied by the extension of political privileges such as voting and obligations like military service. But American history is peopled with actors who participated in political activism even as they were members of groups who were denied formal participation in the political sphere, including those who were excluded owing to their status as enslaved persons, women, or immigrants. The second assumption, which distinguishes the young from other historically marginalized groups, is that young people cannot or do not have the competence to form their own political beliefs. The age of majority, which is set by state law, determines a distinct range of competencies and associated ages that reflect the judgment of legislators about when individuals are old enough to shoulder certain kinds of rights and responsibilities. The age of consent for sex or marriage, for example, often differs from the age at which a person can vote, which is distinct from the age at which a person can legally purchase alcohol. Rather, as teenagers approach the threshold of adulthood, so, too, do they gain the competency that leads to independence and justifies political participation.