John L. Offner - An Unwanted War: The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over Cuba, 1895-1898

An Unwanted War

The Diplomacy of the United States and Spain Over Cuba, 1895 - 1898

By John L. Offner

The University of North Carolina Press
Chapel Hill and London

1992 The University of
North Carolina Press
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the
United States of America

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

03 02 01 00 99 65432

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication
Data
Offner, John L.

An unwanted war: the diplomacy of the United States and Spain over Cuba, 18951898/ by John L. Offner.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8078-2038-5 (alk. paper).
ISBN 0-8078-4380-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. Spanish-American War, 1898Diplomatic history. 2. United StatesForeign relationsSpain. 3. SpainForeign relationsUnited States. 4. CubaHistoryRevolution, 18951898Diplomatic history. I. Title.

E723.044 1992
973.892dc20 9148198>

CIP
This Book Was Digitally Manufactured.

To
Vera Blinn Reber,
teacher and scholar, wife and mother

A map of Cuba will be found on page .

The Spanish-American War was inevitable. Cuban nationalism and Spanish colonialism were irreconcilable forces allowing for no compromise. The United States and Spain tried to find a peaceful resolution to the stalemated Cuban-Spanish war, but Cuban nationalists were unyielding, and powerful domestic forces propelled Washington and Madrid into a conflict.

McKinley dominated American foreign affairs. His objectives were to free Cuba and to prevent a war with Spain. His minister to Spain erred in believing that, under pressure, the Spanish government would evacuate Cuba; as a result, the White House held unfounded hopes for peace. During the intense diplomatic negotiations preceding the war, McKinley, believing that Spain was about to withdraw from Cuba, worked hard for more time to prevent war. Congressional Republicans rejected his pleas, however, and the United States entered the Cuban-Spanish war.

Legislators willingly entered a war with Spain primarily because of national politics. The Republican Party feared an election defeat in 1898. Facing the start of a critical election campaign, Republicans wanted to get out in front of the Cuban issue rather than provide an opening for Bryanites and Populists. The American people took a deep interest in the Cuban revolution. They sympathized with Cuban independence, favored the underdog, looked with horror on the numerous deaths in Cuban re-concentration camps, wanted to avenge the Maine, and by March 1898 were willing to use military force to remove Spain from Cuba. Both Republican and Democratic politicians maneuvered to enlist these sentiments in the approaching election. In the final analysis, Republicans made war on Spain in order to keep control of Washington. Expansionism, markets and investments, the sensational press, and national security interests were much less important in carrying the United States into the war.

The war altered American foreign affairs. Military victories and heightened nationalism led to expansionism. U.S. interests were moderate; when Spain was prostrate, Washington took none of Spains Atlantic, Mediterranean, or African colonies. Americas goal was to remove Spain from the Caribbean. Deweys victory aroused interest in the Pacific, but by the end of the war, the McKinley administration and the American people were undecided about the future of Spains Pacific colonies.

I base these conclusions on a multi-archival study of American and foreign documents. My approach has been to seek a balanced and sympathetic understanding of Spanish, Cuban, and American perspectives. In addition to conducting research in U.S. archives, I have examined document collections in Spain, France, England, Austria, the Vatican, Cuba, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. The European archives have provided much information about Spain but little new on the United States. Latin American archives were disappointing. Brazil took no interest in Cuba; Mexico stood aloof; and although well represented in Madrid, Argentina never was at the center of diplomatic discussions. French diplomats, closest to Spain and involved in ending the Spanish-American War, were knowledgeable and energetic. The Austrian ambassador, having a close relationship with the queen regent, was well informed about the inner workings of the Spanish government. But the Spanish cabinet and its friends on the continent were suspicious of England and its colonial interests. Nevertheless, the British government set the tone for Europes careful relations with the United States. The Vatican nuncio was a minor player, except during the month preceding the outbreak of war.

Taken as a whole, the European diplomatic archives nicely complement the historical records found in Madrid. Spains diplomatic archives are well organized and completely open. But Cuban colonial papers at the national archives are scattered and often hard to locate. And I was unable to obtain access to Spains military archives at Segovia. A valuable unpublished source of information on Spanish politics and the war is the doctoral dissertation of Thomas Hart Baker, Jr. Armed with a richer understanding of Spanish politics and diplomacy, one gains a better understanding of the diplomacy of the McKinley administration.

For the researcher, Cuba presents the problem of finding sufficient information. Although Havana has published ten volumes of correspondence for 189598, the material provides a sketchy story. And Havanas national archives hold little more than what is available in print. One looks in vain in Havana for a collection of new records that will illuminate Cuban politics and diplomacy. But some nuggets of information exist, and a visit to Havana can provide a clearer understanding of Cuban policies. For me, the puzzle was trying to understand why the Americans and the Cubans did so little to prepare for the day when Spain would be gone. McKinley initially adopted contradictory policies toward the Cubans and then hardened his position against them when the war came; staunch Cuban nationalists looked on as the American eagle threw a larger and larger shadow over the island. Inflexible to the end, the Cubans stood by as America went to war with Spain and unleashed a military attack on the island that inevitably defined the coming era in Cuban-American relations. My suggested answers to this enigma are tentative; I hope, however, that I have thrown some light on the formative months of Cuban-American relations.

I am often asked how my investigation compares with Ernest R. Mays classic contribution, Imperial Democracy, which is now three decades old. Our works differ in scope. May focused on the U.S. entry into world politics; European attitudes toward the United States and American acquisition of the Philippines were central to his account. I have emphasized Spanish-American relations and the struggle over Cuba. My monograph ends with the protocol that brought a cease-fire to Cuba rather than the Treaty of Paris, which settled the fate of the Philippines. The Cuban issue united the American people and provides insights into those things that they championed. In contrast, Philippine expansionism divided Americans and raised fundamental constitutional and democratic questions.

I have had one important advantage over May. During the last three decades there have been several excellent studies of McKinley, his presidency, and the Spanish-American War. Margaret Leech, H. Wayne Morgan, Lewis L. Gould, and David Trask have illuminated the way. Their revisionist works, solidly based on imaginative, fresh scholarship, have added a new dimension to understanding McKinley and his administration. May did not have the benefit of these changed perspectives. I hope that I have carried revisionism one step further by clarifying a portion of McKinleys foreign affairs.