FIGURES
1.1 |
7.1 |
9.1 |
9.2 |
9.3 |
10.1 |
10.2 |
12.1 |
12.2 |
13.1 |
13.2 |
17.1 |
17.2 |
17.3 |
TABLES
1.1 |
1.2 |
1.3 |
3.1 |
3.2 |
3.3 |
3.4 |
6.1 |
7.1 |
7.2 |
7.3 |
7.4 |
7.5 |
7.6 |
7.7 |
8.1 |
8.2 |
8.3 |
8.4 |
8.5 |
9.1 |
10.1 |
10.2 |
10.3 |
10.4 |
11.1 |
11.2 |
11.3 |
11.4 |
11.5 |
11.6 |
12.1 |
12.2 |
12.3 |
13.1 |
13.2 |
15.1 |
15.2 |
15.3 |
15.4 |
15.5 |
16.1 |
16.2 |
16.3 |
16.4 |
17.1 |
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am grateful to Mikey Jones, Alison Kuznets, Ragnar Lfstedt, Charlotte Russell and Rosa Stipanovic for their help in making this volume happen; to my teachers and mentors in the Detroit Public Schools, Wayne State University, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, for providing my education; to the governments and others that supported those institutions and my research; to my family for their love and support; and to all for helping me to see research as a form of public service.
EARTHSCAN RISK IN SOCIETY SERIES
Series editor: Ragnar E. Lfstedt
1. Calculating Political Risk
Catherine Althaus
2. The Citizens at Risk
From Urban Sanitation to Sustainable Cities
Gordon McGranahan, Pedro Jacobi, Jacob
Songsor, Charles Surjadi and Marianne Kjellen
3. The Earthscan Reader on Risk
Edited by Ragnar E. Lfstedt and sa Boholm
4. The Ethics of Technological Risk
Edited by Lotte Asveld and Sabine Roeser
5. Facility Siting
Risk, Power and Identity in Land-Use Planning
Edited by sa Boholm and Ragnar E. Lfstedt
6. The Feeling of Risk
New Perspectives on Risk Perception
Paul Slovic
7. Foresight in Action
The Practice of Dealing with Uncertainty in
Public Policy
Marjolein B. A. van Asselt, Susan A. van t
Klooster, Philip W. F. van Notten and Livia A.
Smits
8. Global Environmental Risk
Jeanne X. Kasperson and Roger E. Kasperson
9. Hazards, Vulnerability and
Environmental Justice
Susan L. Cutter
10. The Perception of Risk
Paul Slovic
11. Public Safety and Risk Assessment
Improving Decision Making
David J. Ball and Laurence Ball-King
12. Risk Governance
Coping with Uncertainty in a Complex World
Ortwin Renn
13. Risk Management in Post-Trust Societies
Ragnar E. Lfstedt
14. Risk, Media and Stigma
Understanding Public Challenges to Modern
Science and Technology
Edited by James Flynn, Paul Slovic and Howard
Kunreuther
15. Risk, Uncertainty and Rational Action
Carlo C. Jaeger, Ortwin Renn, Eugene A. Rosa
and Thomas Webler
16. The Social Contours of Risk
(Volumes 1 & 2)
Jeanne X. Kasperson and Roger E. Kasperson
17. Social Trust and the Management of Risk
Edited by George Cvetkovich and Ragnar E. Lfstedt
18. The Spatial Dimension of Risk
How Geography Shapes the Emergence of
Riskscapes
Detlef Mller-Mahn
19. The Tolerability of Risk
A New Framework for Risk Management
Edited by Frdric Bouder, David Slavin and
Ragnar E. Lfstedt
20. Transboundary Risk Governance
Rolf Lidskog, Linda Soneryd and Ylva Uggla
21. Transboundary Risk Management
Edited by Joanne Linnerooth-Bayer, Ragnar E.
Lfstedt and Gunnar Sjstedt
22. Trust in Cooperative Risk Management
Uncertainty and Scepticism in the Public Mind
Michael Siegrist, Timothy C. Earle and Heinz
Gutscher
23. Trust in Risk Management
Uncertainty and Scepticism in the Public Mind
Edited by Michael Siegrist, Timothy C. Earle
and Heinz Gutscher
24. Uncertainty and Risk
Multidisciplinary Perspectives
Edited by Gabriele Bammer and Michael Smithson
25. Judgment and Decision Making
Baruch Fischhoff
26. Risk Analysis and Human Behavior
Baruch Fischhoff
1
JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
Baruch Fischhoff
2010 J OHN W ILEY AND S ONS , L TD . WIRE S C OGN S CI
Abstract
The study of judgment and decision making entails three interrelated forms of research: (1) normative analysis , identifying the best courses of action, given decision makers values; (2) descriptive studies , examining actual behavior in terms comparable to the normative analyses; and (3) prescriptive interventions , helping individuals to make better choices, bridging the gap between the normative ideal and the descriptive reality. The research is grounded in analytical foundations shared by economics, psychology, philosophy, and management science. Those foundations provide a framework for accommodating affective and social factors that shape and complement the cognitive processes of decision making. The decision sciences have grown through applications requiring collaboration with subject matter experts, familiar with the substance of the choices and the opportunities for interventions. Over the past half century, the field has shifted its emphasis from predicting choices, which can be successful without theoretical insight, to understanding the processes shaping them. Those processes are often revealed through biases that suggest non-normative processes. The practical importance of these biases depends on the sensitivity of specific decisions and the support that individuals have in making them. As a result, the field offers no simple summary of individuals competence as decision makers, but a suite of theories and methods suited to capturing these sensitivities.
Introduction
Decisions are easy when decision makers know what they want and what they will get, making choices from a set of well-defined options. Such decisions could be equally easy, but reach different conclusions, for people who see the facts similarly, but have different goals, or for people who have the same values but see the facts differently, or for people who disagree about both facts and values.
Decision making can become more difficult when there is uncertainty about either what will happen or what one wants to happen. Some decisions are so sensitive to estimates of fact or value that it pays to invest in learning, before acting. Other decisions will work out just as well, for any plausible estimates.
Thus, any account of decision-making processes must consider both the decisions and the individuals making them. The field of behavioral decision research provides such accounts. It entails three forms of research: (1) normative , identifying the best possible choice, given the state of the world and decision makers values; (2) descriptive , characterizing how individuals make decisions, in terms comparable to the normative standard; and (3) prescriptive , attempting to close the gap between the normative ideal and the descriptive reality.