Toby Matthiesen - Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t

Stanford University Press

Stanford, California

2013 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University.

All rights reserved.

No part of this brief may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press.

Printed in the United States of Americaon acid-free, archival-quality paper

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Matthiesen, Toby, 1984 author.

Sectarian gulf : Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that wasnt / Toby Matthiesen.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8047-8573-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. BahrainPolitics and government21st century. 2. Saudi ArabiaPolitics and government21st century. 3. Protest movementsBahrain. 4. Protest movementsSaudi Arabia. 5. ShiahRelationsSunnites. 6. SunnitesRelationsShiah. 7. Arab Spring, 2010 8. Persian Gulf StatesPolitics and government21st century. I. Title.

DS247.B28M38 2013

953.6dc23

2013016638

ISBN 978-0-8047-8722-2 (electronic)

Typeset by Classic Typography in 10/13 Adobe Garamond

SECTARIAN GULF

Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasnt

TOBY MATTHIESEN

stanford briefs

An Imprint of Stanford University Press

Stanford, California

CONTENTS

DEDICATED TO ADA, CLAUDIA, KAI, KHADIJA, AND ULF

PREFACE

The mass protests against authoritarian rule that swept the Arab world in 2011 have changed the Middle East, and perhaps the world, forever. They contributed to the biggest global turmoil since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a wave of demonstrations, economic crises, and austerity measures with wide-ranging implications for the future. 2011 was the year of dreaming dangerously, a year in which various counter-hegemonic ideologies briefly challenged the capitalist world-system.counter-revolutionary forces quickly swept through Middle Eastern streets, trying to divide the protesters along regional, sectarian, tribal, or ideological lines.

The largest protest movements developed in the Arab republics Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, where dictators were ousted, while the Syrian uprising became more and more a civil war. In contrast, as of 2013, no ruler in an Arab monarchy had to step down because of the pressure exerted by his own people, even though a youth movement arose in Morocco and protests in Jordan grew in 2012. In general, then, the monarchies that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council, the GCCSaudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)are more often than not presented as stable, largely unchallenged by the Arab Spring protests.

Bahrain almost experienced a revolution in early 2011. And even those countries that did not see protest movements emerge were transformed by security responses in anticipation of protest movements, such as in the UAE. But Western political elites, and both the Western and pan-Arab media, are for strategic reasons often reluctant to discuss the protests and demands for political reform in the Gulf. As David Cameron paradigmatically defined the position of Western policymakers in April 2012, Bahrain is not Syria.

This book tells the story of how the Arab Spring affected these Gulf countries, above all Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman, and how Gulf regimes responded both at home and in the wider Middle East to calls for political change. It is not a comprehensive history of the Arab Spring, or of everything that has happened in the Gulf states since the start of the Arab Spring. Rather, it uses some of the examples of popular protest in the Gulf to show that the legitimacy of Gulf rulers has been challenged profoundly.

Reacting to these historical challenges and demands for democracy, a fairer distribution of resources, and the rule of law, Gulf ruling families and the regimes around them resorted to old tactics of denial, repression, economic largesse, and defamation. None of the Gulf states initiated significant domestic political reforms or managed to engage the emerging youth movements in a manner that would pave the way for a stable future. While the Gulf regimes often embraced the new politics and discourse of the Arab Spring abroad, they refused to acknowledge that this new era in Arab history also had a profound impact at home.

In response to the Arab Spring protests, the Gulf ruling families, above all the Bahraini and Saudi ruling families, have played on and strengthened sectarian divisions between Sunni and Shia to prevent a cross-sectarian opposition front, something that seemed possible in the first days of the uprising in Bahrain, thereby creating a sectarian Gulf. But while sectarianism in the Gulf owes much to regime-sponsored or approved sectarian rhetoric, and a political campaign indiscriminately targeting the Gulf Shia, other factors are at play as well.

The sectarian Gulf was encouraged by sectarian identity entrepreneurs, namely people who used sectarian identity politics to bolster their own positions. A close look at their role indicates that sectarianism was not just a government invention but the result of an amalgam of political, religious, social, and economic elites who all used sectarianism to further their personal aims.

Because the media are controlled, the sectarianism in Gulf media since 2011 can only be attributed to decisions of political elites. But once sectarianism has become a viable way of tarnishing the image of political adversaries, it moves to all levels of society and becomes as much a bottom-up as a top-down process.

My interest in the new sectarianism sweeping through the Middle East stems from my studies and travels in that region. After 9/11, key debates focused on Islam as a threat to the West, the so-called Clash of Civilizations, and whether Islam was a refutation of secularization theories and the idea that Western-style liberal democracy and capitalism would prevail unchallengedamounting, all in all, to an end of history as we knew it. And the response of the Gulf states to the Arab Spring has reinforced this situation, arguably making sectarianism in the region more important than ever before.

In February 2006 I was studying at the University of Isfahan in Iran for a few weeks to improve my Persian and to get to know this important yet often misunderstood country. Much of the splendor of Isfahans palaces and gardens stem from the sixteenth century, when Isfahan became the capital of the Safavid dynasty. Sunni and Shia split very early in the formation of Islam over the leadership of the community of Muslims after the Prophet Muhammad. The Shia do not recognize the first three caliphs, Abu Bakr, Umar, and Uthman, as successors of the Prophet Muhammad but rather see

During my studies in Iran, I had the feeling that the self-understanding of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its political problems stemmed from a number of factors: negotiating religion and politics, resisting the secular legacy of the Shah and replacing it with solidarity with the Global South and a nationalism inspired by Islam, a disdain for Israel and America, and tensions between the people and a repressive regime. All of this was in 2009 to erupt into open conflict when the Green Movement attempted to change the system through large street protests.others were the Sunnis per se. A disdain for and ritualized bashing of America and Israel seemed much more important.

However, one morning in late February 2006, as I left the guesthouse for foreign students and walked over to the language center, things had changed visibly. The day before, Sunni militants affiliated with al-Qaeda had entered the al-Askari shrine in the Iraqi city of Samarra and set off explosives, causing the massive golden dome above the shrine to collapse. The shrine is one of Shia Islams holiest sites, as it is the burial place for the tenth and eleventh imams that are revered by Twelver Shia Muslims. Twelver Shia are the mainstream of Shia Islam and honor twelve imams as successors of the Prophet Muhammad and leaders of the Muslim community after the Prophets death.