Cann - Flight plan Africa : Portuguese airpower in counterinsurgency, 1961-1974

Following the 1952 reorganization of the Portuguese Air Force from the army and naval air arms, Portugal now had an entity dedicated solely to aviation that would bring it into line with its new NATO commitment. As it proceeded to develop a competence in modern multi-engine and jet fighter aircraft for its NATO role and train a professional corps of pilots, it was suddenly confronted in 1961 with fighting insurgencies in all three of its African possessions. This development forced it to acquire an entirely new and separate air force, the African air force, to address this emerging danger. This is the story of just how Portuguese leadership anticipated and dealt with this threat, and how it assembled an air force from scratch to meet it. The aircraft available at the time were largely cast-offs from the larger, richer, and more sophisticated air forces of its NATO partners and not designed for counterinsurgency. Yet Portugal adapted them to the task and effectively crafted the appropriate strategies and tactics for their successful employment. The book explores the vicissitudes of procurement, an exercise fraught with anti-colonial political undercurrents, the imaginative modification and adaptation of the aircraft to fight in the African theaters, and the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures for their effective employment against an elusive, clever, and dangerous enemy. Advances in weaponry, such as the helicopter gunship, were the outgrowth of combat needs. The acquired logistic competences assured that the needed fuel types and lubricants, spare parts, and qualified maintenance personnel were available in even the most remote African landing sites. The advanced flying skills, such as visual reconnaissance and air-ground coordinated fire support, were honed and perfected. All of these aspects and more are explored and hold lessons in the application of airpower in any insurgency today.

John P. Cann is a Research Fellow and retired Professor of National Security Studies at Marine Corps University, a former member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, and Scholar-in-Residence at the University of Virginia. He earned his doctorate in War Studies at Kings College London in 1996, published Counterinsurgency in Africa in 1997, Memories of Portugals African Wars, 19611975 (ed.) in 1998, The Brown Waters of Africa in 2008, and numerous articles on small wars over the years. He is a retired naval captain and flight officer specializing in open ocean reconnaissance aviation and served in a variety of aviation assignments, including command. He has been awarded the Portuguese Navy Cross Medal and the Medal of Dom Afonso Henriques for his writings on conflict in Lusophone Africa.

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Published by Helion & Company 2015

Designed and typeset by Bookcraft Ltd, Stroud, Gloucestershire
Cover designed by Euan Carter, Leicester (www.euancarter.com)
Printed by Lightning Source, Milton Keynes, Buckinghamshire

Text John P. Cann 2015
Photographs as individually credited
Maps as individually credited.
Front cover top: a Sud-Aviation Puma helicopter collecting troops following
an operation in the Chana da Cameia in the east of Angola (Source: Forca Aerea
Portuguesa); bottom a North American T-6G Harvard on patrol in the north of
Angola (Source: Forca Aerea Portuguesa). Rear cover - A Sud-Aviation Alouette
III refueling at a tactical base in the Tte District of Mozambique (Source: Forca
Aerea Portuguesa).

ISBN: 978 1 909982 06 2
EPUB ISBN: 978 1 910777 54 1

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

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For my dear friend
General Jorge Manuel Brochado de Miranda

Contents

List of Photographs

List of Maps

Preface

During the research for my first book, CounterInsurgency in Africa, The Portuguese Way of War, 19611974, the door opened and revealed to me the unusual importance of airpower in the Portuguese campaigns to retain their African possessions. The air dimension, normally a support for ground forces, played more than this traditional limited role. It was indeed a key part of the equation because of its flexibility, imaginative application, and aviator courage in responding to the varied insurgent threats and ground force requirements throughout the three theaters of Angola, Guin, and Mozambique.

Normally counterinsurgency is not conducive to the centerpiece employment of airpower, as it is a labor-intensive enterprise that requires vast numbers of light infantry who are busy bringing security to the population and winning the hearts and minds competition. Yet in this case, the Portuguese Air Force was unwilling to cede the focus of the debate entirely to ground forces.

In each theater Portugal was faced with a very different enemy in his aggressiveness, imagination, competence, and size. Airpower was able to adjust and adapt to these changing battlefield mosaics and remain for Portugal more than the usual complement to ground forces. Normally insurgents operate within populations, and Portuguese Africa was no exception, so any attempt to destroy them from the air was fraught with potential repercussions. This meant that targeting had to be effective in preventing the insurgents from reaching the vulnerable populations, and here we see throughout the book examples of just how this was done. Between the piracy operations in the east of Angola and the heli-borne tactical trackers and envelopment groups in the north, the insurgents were never able to reach the targeted populations and proselytize them successfully in Angola. In Mozambique it was the armed reconnaissance missions and patient intelligence gathering that enabled targeted strikes on insurgent columns and restricted them to the border districts of the theater. In the cramped battleground of Guin, the insurgents were very aggressive, and the conflict bordered on the conventional in its violence. Yet time and again the aviators reduced insurgent forces insistent on exposing themselves. Airpower was the bane of their existence in all the theaters, and they constantly sought solutions to this persistent and dangerous threat. The industry of the insurgents and their Soviet, Chinese, and Cuban advisors in addressing the airpower scourge led to the deployment of the Strela, a Soviet-designed, heat-seeking, air-ground, hand-held missile. Despite its initial success and surprise, the Portuguese quickly developed effective countermeasures and reasserted the constant pressure of airpower.