Hendrickson Ryan C. - Obama at war : Congress and the imperial presidency

OBAMA AT WAR

OBAMA AT WAR

CONGRESS AND THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY

Ryan C. Hendrickson

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hendrickson, Ryan C., 1969

Obama at war : Congress and the imperial presidency / Ryan C. Hendrickson.

pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-8131-6094-8 (hardcover : acid-free paper)

ISBN 978-0-8131-6096-2 (PDF) ISBN 978-0-8131-6095-5 (ePub)

1. Obama, BarackMilitary leadership. 2. United StatesMilitary policy. 3. United StatesMilitary policyCase studies. 4. United StatesForeign relations2009 5. War and emergency powersUnited States. 6. United States. CongressHistory21st century. 7. Kerry, John, 1943 8. McCain, John, 1936 I. Title.

E908.3.H46 2015

973.932092dc23

2015000736

This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials.

Manufactured in the United States of America.

Member of the Association of American University Presses

For my wife, Tece

President Barack Obama faced a major foreign-policy challenge and humanitarian crisis in 2012 as civil war raged in Syria. As Syrian president Bashar al-Assad continued his slaughter of governmental insurgents, Obama attempted to show the world that his military strength and diplomatic resolve vis--vis Syria was genuine. As many commanders in chief have done since the Second World War, on August 20, 2012, Obama created his own red line for Assads behavior that would potentially result in U.S. military intervention. His message to the Syrian leader was clear: We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus. That would change my equation.

In a similar vein, on April 11, 2010, with increased concerns over Irans and North Koreas unwillingness to cooperate with the United States and the United Nations (UN) on a host of nuclear-proliferation issues, Obamas then secretary of defense Robert Gates discussed the threat that each state posed to the United States. His foreign-policy message was not difficult to decipher: Because North Korea and Iran are not in compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty for them, all bets are off. All options are on the table.

Though today it may sound normal for a president to threaten and potentially use military force abroadas the Obama presidency has done to three different countriessuch views would have been especially abhorrent to American Founding Father Elbridge Gerry from Massachusetts at the Constitutional Convention in 1787. Gerry, whose views won out over a call for an empowered commander in chief at the convention, noted that he never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.

President Obamas idea of a strong commander in chief is especially interesting given the national mood after his election to the presidency. Obama promised to give Americans a new hope in government and opportunity as well as a new future in a postpartisan world. On foreign policy, Obama promised that a new dawn of American leadership is at hand and that he would not fight wars of choice but rather only wars of necessity. Yet now with one term completed and well into his second term, at least one element of Obamas presidency has remained remarkably similar to the presidencies of George W. Bush and all of his postSecond World War predecessors. When it comes to determining if and when the United States will use force abroad, the president, as Bush argued in his own presidency, remains the decider. At the same time, Congresss senior leaders, largely in bipartisan fashion, have often actively worked to avoid their constitutional duty to check the commander in chief in substantive and legislative ways. Active deference to the commander in chief often best describes how Congress behaves when the United States mobilizes for combat abroad.

The need to study how the United States enters war remains as relevant as ever. During the Obama administration so far, the United States has expanded its military presence in Afghanistan and used new technology to increase its use of drone missile strikes across Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. The Obama administration has also faced new and unexpected

Analysis of the U.S. military is also necessary when considering the amount of financial resources devoted to the U.S. Department of Defense. In terms of absolute dollars spent, in 2011 the United States devoted more money to defense than the next thirteen top defense-spending countries combined, which includes all other permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) as well as Brazil, Germany, and India. By some measures, the United States accounts for 41 percent of all military spending across the globe. Thus, the case for ongoing study of U.S. foreign policy and the manner in which the United States decides to use its military seems as important as ever.

This book examines five cases of U.S. military action during Obamas presidency. In the process, two themes become evident. First, President Obama, much like his predecessor commanders in chief, has continued to protect what the executive branch views as its exclusive power: the power to determine if U.S. military force will be used abroad. Though this theme reveals itself in different ways, the pattern is clear in all cases.

A second theme advanced across the book is that Congresss abdication of its constitutional war powers to the president is the norm, which occurs regardless of the political party in power. Employing an argument advanced in previous research by Stephen R. Weissman, the book presents evidence indicating that Congresss leaders, regardless of political party, actively work to defer decision-making authority regarding the use of force to the president.military action abroad. These themes are even evident in the 2013 crisis involving Syria, when President Obama uncharacteristically turned to Congress to request its approval for military action. In this case, President Obama still protected the idea of a unilaterally empowered presidency, and nearly all Republican and Democratic congressional leaders actively deferred to the president.