Zeyno Baran - Citizen Islam: The Future of Muslim Integration in the West

In the present volume, Zeyno Baran has managed to shed new light on a subject of timeless importance: the dynamic relationship between religion and the state. For millennia, politics and faith have in some societies been locked in cycles of bitter conflict, while in others they have coexisted in peaceful harmony. This same opposition can be found today between countries based on the secular principle of lacit , on the one hand, and those based on fundamentalist interpretations of Islamic sharia law, on the other.

In the first group found mostly in the West the state is governed not according to religious dictates, but secular laws. Public order is maintained by these laws, leaving religion as a matter between individuals and God. The state does not ask anything from religious communities which, in turn, ask nothing from the state.

By contrast, in many majority-Muslim countries, Islam has as Baran demonstrates in these pages developed into the political ideology of Islamism, which calls for sharia law to be applied both to individuals and to the state. Mixing the eternal teachings of a religion like Islam with the volatile, changing demands of politics is a recipe for creating chaos. Political Islamism damages not only political institutions, but Islam itself.

The dangers of mixing politics and religion were highlighted by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who in 1792 wrote, Whenever theological intolerance is allowed, it is impossible for it not to have some civil effect; and once it does, the sovereign no longer is sovereign, not even over temporal affairs. Thenceforward, priests are the true masters; kings are simply officers.

The best way to handle this tension is to place religion in a separate sphere of respect, and then conduct politics outside it. This is how the Republic of Turkey has proceeded since its founding in 1924. Although a majority of its citizens are Muslims, the Republic is based on the principles of secular law. The state and religion are separated; both work together in pursuit of the common goals of progress and growth. This is a very significant revolution. Of the 55 countries with majority-Muslim populations, Turkey is uniquely distinguished by the way in which it has combined democracy, secularism, Islam and modernity.

Certainly, these are still important topics of popular debate and discussion in Turkey and elsewhere, and they will long remain so. But with this work, Zeyno Baran has strengthened the case for separating religion and politics, thus making it possible for one to hope that this debate will lead to positive outcomes for governments and for faith communities all across the world.

Suleyman Demirel

9th President of Turkey

This book explores one of the most serious strategic threats confronting the United States and Europe today: the advance of Islamism. I define Islamism as a political-religious ideology asserting that Muslims are obligated to convince other Muslims to restructure their private lives and societal norms to reflect Gods divine law, or sharia. Islamism shares the most fundamental aim of Islam and all religions to bring the world closer to God. But Islamism is an ideology with a political agenda that differentiates it from the religion of Islam. While millions of Muslims around the world believe their religion is compatible with modern society, Islamists believe all societies must adapt to the legal and social norms of sharia, and they seek political power to achieve this global transformation. Islamists thus maintain that all forms of government, including secular democracies, must at some point be replaced by Islamic theocracies based on sharia. Islamists ultimate goal is the establishment of a worldwide community of Muslims ( umma ) unified in a single Islamic state (caliphate) ruled by an Islamic leader (caliph). Islamism is therefore a utopian ideology that blends politics and religion.

Islamism is comprised of diverse strains that differ according to their adherents patience for and tolerance of diverse interpretations of sharia. The most impatient and intolerant group of Islamists are terrorists like Osama bin Laden, who use violence to speed implementation of their draconian conception of sharia, which they insist is the only correct way to interpret Gods divine law. The next most extreme faction is the Salafis, a loose grouping of Sunni Muslims who seek to reestablish the legal and social norms of seventh-century Arabia in todays world. The Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia are the most influential sect under the Salafi umbrella. A Shiite group analogous to Salafism is Khomeinism in Iran.

On the more patient end of the spectrum are organizations like Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT), which officially reject violence and strive to gain political power through a step-by-step process they hope will culminate in theocratic states leading ultimately to the caliphate. More patient still is the Muslim Brotherhood, a global organization founded and headquartered in Egypt that has a vast network across Europe and the United States; this group aims to achieve political power through elections and then use that power to restructure society according to sharias norms. At the most patient and tolerant end of the Islamist spectrum are activists like Tariq Ramadan, who use Western rhetoric on tolerance and religious freedom to allay Western concerns while consolidating Muslims in Europe and the United States into unified communities that coexist alongside mainstream society instead of integrating with it. Despite their differing tactics and levels of tolerance, all of these various types of Islamists share the same ultimate goal: to replace secular governments and the rule of secular law with sharia.

Since September 11, 2001, Western leaders have failed to differentiate Islamism , the ideology, from Islam , the religion. They have learned through trial and error that referring to Islamic terrorism is highly offensive to Muslims around the world, and have therefore avoided exploring how religion and politics fuse when Muslims commit terrorism. But terrorism, or violence in pursuit of political objectives, continues to be committed in the name of Islam. It is the ideology of Islamism that defines the terrorists political goals; they are therefore Islamist rather than Islamic terrorists. Condemning Islamist terrorism thus does not equate with attacking Islam. On the contrary, Western leaders need to make clear that they are natural partners for the vast majority of the worlds non-Islamist Muslims, who also oppose Islamist terrorism and seek to prevent Islamists from hijacking Islam in pursuit of their utopian political vision.

A great debate rages today over whether to work with nonviolent Islamists to deter impatient Islamists from committing terrorism. The fundamental argument of this book is that the West should avoid this Faustian bargain. The Wests true partners are Muslim moderates who not only reject violence but also believe in the compatibility of Islam with democracy and universal human rights. Such a partnership is essential to blunting Islamists efforts to undercut the core values of modern society. Moreover, the root causes of terrorism can never be eradicated as long as Islamist ideology continues to thrive and motivate terrorists.

For the past several decades, Islamists have misrepresented their extremist ideology in the West as mainstream Islamic thinking. Their efforts have been boosted by billions of dollars from the governments and private citizens of Saudi Arabia and several other Gulf states. This support has allowed Islamists to found a wide range of institutions aimed at establishing their political interpretation of Islam as the dominant Muslim discourse in the United States and Europe. These include imam training centers, elementary and secondary schools, youth clubs, and civic action groups. Islamist movements seek to use such institutions to advance their utopian social engineering project: to Islamize the world through a gradual, bottom-up process.