Melpomeni Vogiatzi - Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotles Rhetoric: Anonymous and Stephanus, ›In Artem Rhetoricam Commentaria‹

Melpomeni Vogiatzi

Byzantine Commentaries on Aristotle s Rhetoric

Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca et Byzantina

Quellen und Studien

Edited by

Dieter Harlfinger, Christof Rapp, Marwan Rashed, Diether R. Reinsch

Volume 8

ISBN 978-3-11-062675-9

e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-063069-5

e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-062863-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019940105

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In order to understand the context in which the two Byzantine commentaries on Aristotles Rhetoric were written, and their interpretation of the main issues raised in the Aristotelian treatise, we need to examine two sorts of sources. First, we need to present briefly (1) the circumstances under which Aristotles Rhetoric itself was composed, namely, its relation to the previous rhetorical theories, (2) the main topics discussed in the treatise, and (3) the Rhetoric s relation to other Aristotelian treatises. Second, we need to view the circumstances of the composition of the two commentaries, namely the commentators background, sources, and interests as well as to examine the identity of the two commentators.

The construction of Aristotles Rhetoric is immediately connected to the rivalry between rhetoric and philosophy, which was represented in the 4 th century BC mainly by Plato and Isocrates. The Rhetoric is in fact usually thought to be the philosophers response to the Platonic criticism of sophistic rhetoric, which one can grasp by reading the dialogues Gorgias and Phaedrus . In the Gorgias , Platos Socrates argues that rhetoric unlike philosophy is not an art, but a mere skill based on experience, since it possesses no true knowledge of the thing in question and aims at the pleasant rather than at the good. Socrates also criticises rhetorics disconnection from morality, and argues that only in connection with philosophy can rhetoric be used for the good. Rhetoric is therefore presented as mere flattery used for ones own advantage. A less strict criticism of rhetoric is expressed in the Phaedrus , where Plato focuses on a rather philosophical type of rhetoric, and hence presents properly-practiced rhetoric as being identical with philosophy. However, rhetoric as usually practiced in his time is still criticised for lacking both knowledge of the nature of the soul and an understanding of what is good for the soul. This popular conception and practice of rhetoric is therefore distinguished from philosophy in both dialogues, mainly due to the different goals the two disciplines pursue: while philosophy aims at the knowledge of what is best, rhetoric aims, according to Plato, at providing pleasure through flattery and at persuading at all costs (even at the price of untruthfulness). Moreover, rhetoric is also criticised because of the method it uses to reach this goal, namely, the sophistic method. Given that the addressees of this criticism are mainly the sophists, it is clear that Plato rejects the sophistic rhetorical practice (especially of Gorgias) due to its lack of any systematic procedure and its use of mere commonplaces aimed at arousing emotions.

In response to this criticism, Aristotles treatment of rhetoric addresses each of the above-mentioned points: on the one hand, his presentation of rhetoric makes use of concepts that turn rhetoric into a systematic tool, that is, into an art with its own principles and method, while, on the other hand, it provides the orator with a description of ethical and psychological notions necessary for understanding the components that contribute to persuasion. These issues ought to be examined in detail, since the study of Aristotles views on the relation between the rhetorical art and philosophy (or other arts and sciences) is connected with and can contribute to our understanding of the position of the Rhetoric within the Aristotelian corpus , which in turn will be relevant to our discussion of the commentators understanding of the Rhetoric .

In the Rhetoric , Aristotle explains that the art of rhetoric consists of two branches, one which is closely related to dialectics, whereas the other is an offshoot of ethical science, particularly of politics (1356a25-27). Rhetorics connection to each of them becomes clearer in the first two chapters of the treatise (I.1-2). On the one hand, rhetoric shares with political or ethical science its interest in characters and emotions. The orator, says Aristotle, must have a grasp of characters, virtues and emotions, namely, what each one of them is and in what way each comes about, so that the orator will be able to persuade the audience. However, after stating this similarity between ethics and rhetoric, Aristotle immediately makes clear that, although rhetoric resembles politics, it differs from it insofar as it does not provide any knowledge of its subject (1356a27-30). The same idea seems to underline the initial discussion of the Nicomachean Ethics I, where Aristotle introduces the topic of the treatise and states that rhetoric, among other arts, is a branch of politics (1094b1-3). Similar to the discussion in the Rhetoric , it is also implied here that the two disciplines differ with respect to their goals and precision: if the goal of ethical science is the ultimate goal of human life, that is, happiness, which is achieved through a long procedure of habituation in virtuous actions, it becomes evident that the achievement of this goal or the education of the audience with respect to this goal cannot be the task of the orator, who, as explicitly stated in the Rhetoric , aims at finding available means of persuasion (and not at educating the audience). Moreover, although a study of politics and ethics cannot be as precise as other disciplines since they concern things that are not always true, the ethical philosopher will be as precise as his subject matter allows and will try to approach the principles of his science as exactly as possible. Conversely, the rhetorician does not deal with any specific subject matter, is not looking toward the principles of any science, and can also argue indiscriminately for what is true and not true.

This last feature of rhetoric, which separates it from ethical science, is what makes it more similar to dialectic. The exact relation between the two is not clear, rhetoric is said to be either counterpart () or a part () of dialectics, but their common features are discussed in length. Besides their use of syllogismoi and topoi , which will be discussed in detail in views. As Aristotle states, neither of the two provides knowledge of the contents of any subject, but both are capacities for supplying arguments. Hence, it is fair to assume that rhetoric resembles dialectic not only with respect to its precision, but also with respect to its means of achieving its goals. Given that both aim at finding suitable arguments for reaching a certain conclusion, their difference lies in the fact that rhetoric deals only with matters of the political sphere that require deliberation, whereas dialectic has a more general application. Another difference might lie in the addressee of each discipline: rhetoric addresses a diverse audience, which would not necessarily consist of educated people, whereas dialectical discourse requires that both participants are well acquainted with the principles of argumentation. For this reason, the two additional means of persuasion discussed in the rhetoric, namely arousal of emotions and the character of the speaker, are more useful and effective in rhetorical rather than dialectical discourse.