ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS:
SOCIAL THEORY
Volume 53
POSITIVISM AND SOCIOLOGY
First published in 1982
This edition first published in 2015
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1982 Peter Halfpenny
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ISBN: 9780415727310 (Set)
eISBN: 9781315769974 (Set)
ISBN: 9781138788053 (Volume 53)
eISBN: 9781315763477 (Volume 53)
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Peter Halfpenny, 1982
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First published in 1982
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Halfpenny, Peter.
Positivism and sociology.
(Constroversies in sociology ; 13)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. SociologyHistory. 2. Positivism. 3. SociologyMethodology.
I. Title. II. Series.
HM19.H18 1982 301 8211558
ISBN 0043000843
ISBN 0043000851 (pbk.)
Set in 11 on 12 point Times by Typesetters (Birmingham) Ltd and printed in Great Britain
by Billing & Sons Ltd, London and Worcester
Contents
I have learned much from Isabel Emmett, Len Gill, Keekok Imber, Richard Whitley, Philippe Van Parijs and especially Daphne Taylorson, who all read and offered me comments on the draft, and I thank them for their time and interest. I am grateful too to Tom Bottomore and Mike Mulkay for their encouragement and advice, and to Jeanne Ashton, Tricia Pygott, Janice Hammond and Hilary Thornber for their excellent typing.
Controversy over positivism begins immediately positivism is used, for there are so many different understandings about how the term can or should be used. There are differences that depend upon whether the term is used to label oneself or ones enemies, for the positivism of positivists differs from the positivism of anti-positivists. There are differences among anti-positivists, who use the term loosely and indiscriminately to describe all sorts of disfavoured forms of inquiry. And there are differences even among positivists themselves, for they have continually developed and changed the central ideas out of which they have fashioned various forms of positivism at different historical times.
In sociology, allegiances to or accusations of positivism are made in a wealth of different ways. Sometimes, to be positivist means no more than to be scientific in some undisclosed manner, although that fails to discriminate between positivism and all the other sociologies that have claims to be scientific in perhaps different ways, such as Marxism, functionalism, structuralism, and so on. Sometimes, positivist sociology is synonymous with statistical analysis, as in many sociological research reports and methods textbooks. Sometimes, to practise positivist sociology is to seek to establish causal explanations, or to search for fundamental laws of human behaviour or historical change, or to insist upon objective empirical information systematically organised to generate or test hypotheses.
The existence of these diverse understandings of positivism, among others, reveals that the issue of what positivism is, and was, remains controversial. It is with this controversy that most of the following pages are concerned. My principal aim is to identify some of the most important uses of the term positivism, and to describe some of the different positivisms that have emerged at different times since the mid-nineteenth century. Only when different understandings of positivism have been systematically elucidated and evaluated can other related controversies be joined, such as whether and in what sense positivism is dead or alive, and whether the enormous influence of various forms of positivism over sociology has been beneficial or malign.
My discussion takes the following form. In considers changes in positivist conceptions both of what constitutes evidence the empirical base of science and of how theory is built upon or otherwise related to this base. In the Conclusion I reflect upon the different understandings of the term positivism identified in the previous chapters, and conclude with some remarks about current debates among philosophers of the natural and social sciences, and about contemporary responses to controversies over positivism in sociology.
The name positivist philosophy was originally coined by the Parisian Auguste Comte (17981857) to describe his systematic reconstruction of the history and development of scientific knowledge. His ideas were initially sketched out in essays (1822, 1824), and then presented comprehensively in a series of lectures, the Cours de philosophie positive, begun in 1826 and completed in 1829, and then published in six volumes over the years 1830 to 1842. Positivist knowledge, Comte maintained, was the inevitable outcome both of the progressive growth of the individual mind and of the historical development of human knowledge. Comte believed that in his extensive reading over the whole range of scientific disciplines he had discovered a great and fundamental historical law, his famous law of three stages. According to this law, individual thinkers in all branches of knowledge necessarily begin by accounting for phenomena theologically, by explaining mundane occurrences as willed by unfathomable gods. This is the necessary starting point of all knowledge for two reasons. First, without some theoretical guide one could not begin to make systematic observations (for there would be no way of discriminating between important or theory-relevant observations and unimportant ones), and it is, according to Comte, theological theories which arise spontaneously in the primitive human mind. Secondly, sciences in their infancy research the most intractable questions, about the essences of phenomena and their ultimate origins and destinies, to which theological answers are most appropriate.
Theology provides the attractive chimera that excites curiosity and stimulates intellectual inquiry, but this first stage of knowledge is inevitably followed by the second, metaphysical stage, where it is not spiritual agents but abstract forces, powers and essences that are posited as responsible for worldly affairs. This second stage is a necessary transitional interlude, a period of negative criticism of the first theological epoch, before the appearance of the third and final positive or scientific era. Here, unresolvable issues about ultimate origins, inaccessible powers and final purposes are relinquished in favour of the more limited but attainable end of describing relations observed to hold between phenomena. The fundamental character of the positive philosophy is to consider all phenomena as subject to invariable natural laws. The exact discovery of these laws and their reduction to the least possible number constitutes the goal of all our efforts (Comte, 1830, p. 8). The Newtonian law of gravitation is, for Comte, the paradigm case of a positive law. It provides the standard against which to measure the maturity of all fields of inquiry, and the ideal they should seek to emulate.