This volume, after a complicated few years, is finally complete. As its editor, I am delighted and grateful to all the contributors and each chapters reviewers. I am quite proud that the contributing team consists of internationally established experts, specialists, and promising young scholars from all over the world. I am satisfied that the book is comprehensive, informative, and in many ways inspiring.
Daoism and Chinese Philosophy
In a volume devoted to explaining and exploring Daoist philosophy, we should begin by briefly discussing the meaning of Daoism (a new romanization of the older Taoism). Daoism is a complex term and difficult to define clearly. The Anglicized term was coined in the 1830s by Western scholars The Laozi and a later work entitled Zhuangzi are conventionally understood to be the most representative texts of DaosimDaoist philosophy in particular. Thereafter, texts, authors, and ideas similar or related to these two texts, or elements within them, are commonly labeled Daoist. In modern academic discourse, we find that certain ideas have become recognized as standards of Daoism. Examples include taking Dao or the Way to be the source of the universe and assuming belief in the naturalistic generation of the universe, endorsing ziran (naturalness) and wuwei (non-action) in political and social life, and promoting individual freedom in personal and social life. These are commonly taken to be major elements of the Daoist tradition, hence we can use them as a working scheme from which to decide key texts and thinkers are pertinent to a book on Daoism. Of course, this practice remain will open to ongoing discussion.
The question of what Daoism is becomes more complex and uncertain when we include the historical religious movements that have been called Daoist. Because our volume is meant to introduce Daoist philosophy, we will limit our discussion of these movements to a chapter that briefly introduces Daoist religion and its relation to Daoist philosophy.
The more difficult problem concerns the discipline of Chinese philosophy. Namely, just what is Chinese philosophy and how can we study it in a more serious and consciously academic way? Obviously, this problem is of great concern to readers who want to begin or improve their study of Chinese philosophy, and Daoist thought in particular. A footnote to this concern is a debate that exploded in China a decade ago. The fuse was lit by the article The Issue of the Legitimacy of Chinese Philosophy, by the well-known Confucian scholar Z heng Jiadong, then working at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Defoort and Ge : 2033). Although the debate occurred in China, the issue of quality also deserves attention and discussion in Western circles of Chinese philosophy scholars.
Historically speaking, Chinese philosophy as an academic subject has been around for at least eight decades in China and six decades in the West. And more and more universities and colleges offer Chinese philosophy or related courses in North America today. Accordingly, an ever-increasing number of textbooks, reference works, monographs, and journals in the field are being published all over the world. This volume joins their ranks. There is no authority or basis for proclaiming Chinese philosophy, as a field, illegitimate. Nonetheless there are scholars who only consider certain philosophical approaches, for example, Anglo-American analytical practice, to be the standard of philosophy. Because Chinese thought, including the Confucian, Daoist, and Buddhist traditions, is quite different from the analytical tradition, it is not considered philosophy. But here the problem is one of different definitions, and has nothing to do with legitimacy.
Still, the debate over legitimacy did raise some meaningful issues: Namely, the questions I began withjust what is Chinese philosophy and how can we practice Chinese philosophy with correct academic consciousness? These questions deserve our reflection.
From the very beginning, the discipline of Chinese philosophy has been a marriage of modern Western philosophiesyounger strains within the European traditionand ancient Chinese thought, e.g., Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism, still in their traditional garb. This suggests two areas of inherent conflict and tension, between the Chinese and Western, and the ancient and modern. Intriguingly, this marriage seemed so natural when Chinese scholars were eager to learn from the West that few seriously took up the question: Why should and how can we maintain and improve this marriage? Caused by unconscious response to the questions, divergent approaches to the study of Chinese philosophy can be classified into general types according to their purposes and characteristics. These types will be a handy reference in our consideration of what Chinese philosophy is and how to conduct research in this field.
Two Approaches: Westernized and Indigenous
The mainstream way to study Chinese philosophy is to reinterpret or reformulate, whether consciously or unconsciously, the Chinese classics and related texts with reference to various Western philosophies, such as Marxist materialism, Kantian idealism, new realism, American pragmatism, analytical and linguistic philosophy, existentialism, and phenomenology, as well as the endless new and potentially relevant theories generated in newer fields, for example, hermeneutics, psychology, semiotics, anthropology, and mythology. Some scholars believe that through these Western lenses they have found the truth or the most accountable perspective on ancient thought, and they believe this is the only legitimate way to approach these materials. In this way, the new interpretations may be accepted as philosophical study but criticized as non-Chinese: namely, their research does not talk about Chinese thought, but uses Chinese materials to demonstrate the strength of Western theories or to fill Western theoretical boxes. F eng Youlan (18951990) was representative of this approach; he introduced neo-realism into his interpretation of Chinese philosophy (Lao : 34). We can call his approach, for convenience, a Westernized interpretation.
In reaction to the Westernized approach to doing Chinese philosophy, some scholars, especially in the past two decades, have insisted that since ancient Chinese thinkers did not speak modern Western languages and knew nothing of Western terms and theories, we should interpret ancient thought based on indigenous terms and frames. This means trying to exclude all or certain Western or modern concepts and theories, though escaping our own contemporary and Westernized frame may seem a tall order. These kinds of studies try to be more faithful to the Chinese texts and assume that ancient thought is irrelevant to the modern world. This historical and textual approach has invited criticism because it is not really doing philosophy. H u Shi (18911962) was considered a representative of this approach by L ao Siguang (19272012), despite Hus book, A History of Ancient Chinese Philosophy (Hu Lao criticized this work as consisting of historical materials interpreted only with common sense, hardly an exercise in the practice of philosophy (ibid., 12). We may call this approach indigenous interpretation.
These two contrasting approaches to interpretation focus on Western reference , whether or not one may or should use Western philosophy as necessary comparative reference for reinterpreting ancient Chinese thought. This presents a distinct difficulty in the study of Chinese philosophy: it seems that anyone who wants to conduct such research needs double expertisenamely, familiarity with both Chinese cultural traditions and Western philosophical techniques and theories. This reasonable condition brings extra complexity not only to academic research, but also to the development of the subject in major Western universities: It is difficult to find someone qualified as a specialist in both Chinese studies and Western philosophy. This is a historical and disciplinary problem, which should not be simply attributed to cultural hegemony.
