Mark Turner - The Literary Mind: The Origins of Thought and Language

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MARK TURN ER

NEW YORK OXFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1996

Oxford University Press

Oxford NewYork Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogota Bombay Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence HongKong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto

and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan

Copyright 1996 by Mark Turner

Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016

Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.

Library ofCongress CataloginginPublication Data Turner, Mark. The literary mind / Mark Turner. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0195104110 (cloth) 1. LiteraturePhilosophy. 2. Cognitive science. I. Title. PN49.T77 1996 801'.92-dc20 95-50366

135798642

Printed in the United States ofAmerica on acidfree paper

.33 PREFACE 6;.

IF YOU ARE B ROWSING this paragraph in a bookstore, glance at the people around you. They are thinking, searching, planning, deciding, watching the clock, walking to the register, buying books, talking to friends, and wondering why you are looking at them. None of this seems literary.

But to do these things, they (and you) are using principles of mind we mis- takenly classify as literarystory, projection, and porole. We notice these prin- ciples so rarely in operation, when a literary style puts them on display, that we think of them as special and separate from everyday life. On the contrary, they make everyday life possible. The literary mind is not a separate kind of mind. It is our mind. The literary mind is the fundamental mind. Although cognitive science is associated with mechanical technologies like robots and computer in- struments that seem unliterary, the central issues for cognitive science are in fact the issues of the literary mind.

Story is a basic principle of mind. Most of our experience, our knowledge, and our thinking is organized as stories. The mental scope of story is magnified by projectz'onone story helps us make sense of another. The projection of one story onto another is poroole, a basic cognitive principle that shows up every- where, from simple actions like telling time to complex literary creations like Prousts 1? la recherche du tempsperdu.

We interpret every level of our experience by means of parable. In this book, I investigate the mechanisms of parable. I explore technical details of the brain sciences and the mind sciences that cast light on our use of parable as we think, invent, plan, decide, reason, imagine, and persuade. I analyze the activity of par- able, inquire into its origin, speculate about its biological and developmental bases, and demonstrate its range. In the final chapter, I explore the possibility that lan- guage is not the source of parable but instead its complex product.

Parable is the root of the human mindof thinking, knowing, acting, cre- ating, and plausibly even of speaking. But the common view, firmly in place for

V1.6 PREFACE

two and a half millennia, sees the everyday mind as unliterary and the literary mind as optional. This book is an attempt to show how wrong the common view is and to replace it with a view of the mind that is more scientific, more accurate, more inclusive, and more interesting, a view that no longer misrepresents every- day thought and action as divorced from the literary mind.

College Park, Ma. M. T. Nowemer 1995

.33 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 6;.

THE JOHN S1MON GUGGENHEIM MEMORIAL FOUNDATION and the University of Maryland supported the writing of this book during 1992- 1993, while Iwas a visiting scholar of the Department of Cognitive Science, the Department of Linguistics, and the Center for Research in Language at the Uni- versity of California, San Diego. Their support made it possible for me to pre- pare for publication re search I had presented in public lectures during earlier years. The book was completed during my year as a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, in 1994-1995. I am grateful for financial sup- port provided during that period by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.

Scholars at the University of California, San Diego, to whom I am indebted include Seana Coulson, Jeff Lansing, Gilles Fauconnier, Adele Goldberg, Rob- ert Kluender, Ronald Langacker, Jean Mandler, and Nili Mandelblit. I am also indebted to Claudia Brugman,Jane Espenson, Charles Fillmore, MarkJohnson, Paul Kay, George Lakoff, Eve Sweetser, and Leonard Talmy.

Gilles Fauconnier and I discovered independently a range of problems in conceptual projection that convinced us of the need for a new approach. Our collaboration resulted in the theory of conceptual blending. We presented its elements at the October 1993 Cognitive Linguistics Workshop and later in a technical report and articles. I thank Gilles Fauconnier for permission to include in chapters 5 and 6 some of our results. Anyone who knows the extreme velocity of Fauconniers intellect will understand why credit for insights achieved during our collaboration cannot be partitioned (especially since many other people have been involved in the discussions), but also why I owe a net intellectual debt. I take responsibility for the version of the theoryI present here.

I am grateful to Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio, and Gerald Edelman for conversations on the relationship of the study of language to the study of the brain. I also thank Hallgjerd Aksnes, David Collier, Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr.,

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Edward Haertel, Mardi Horowitz, Suzanne Kemmer, Robert Keohane, Tanya Luhrmann, and FrancisNo'el Thomas for comments. Kathleen Much, staff editor at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, made help- ful suggestions on some of the chapters. It has been my good fortune to have Cynthia Read as my editor at Oxford University Press.

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.3) CONTENTS 9;.

Bedtime with Shahrazad Human Meaning

Body Action

Figured Tales

Creative Blends

Many Spaces

Single Lives

Language

Notes

Further Reading on Image Schemas Index

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.59 1 Ca. BEDTIME WITH SHAHRAZAD

T HERE WAS ON CE a wealthy farmer who owned many herds of cattle. He knew the languages of beasts and birds. In one of his stalls he kept an ox and a donkey. At the end of each day, the ox came to the place where the donkey was tied and found it well swept and watered; the manger filled with sifted straw and well-winnowed bar- ley; and the donkey lying at his ease, for the master seldom rode him.

It chanced that one day the farmer heard the ox say to the donkey: How fortunate you are! I am worn out with toil, while you rest here in comfort. You eat wellsifted barley and lack nothing. It is only occa- sionally that your master rides you. As for me, my life is perpetual drudg- ery at the plough and the millstone.

The donkey answered: When you go out into the field and the yoke is placed upon your neck, pretend to be ill and drop down on your belly. Do not rise even if they beat you; or if you do rise, lie down again. When they take you back and place the fodder before you, do not eat it. Ab- stain for a day or two; and thus shall you find a rest from toil.