2021 by the University Press of Kansas
All rights reserved
Published by the University Press of Kansas (Lawrence, Kansas 66045), which was organized by the Kansas Board of Regents and is operated and funded by Emporia State University, Fort Hays State University, Kansas State University, Pittsburg State University, the University of Kansas, and Wichita State University
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Smith, Timothy B., 1974 author.
Title: The Siege of Vicksburg : climax of the campaign to open the
Mississippi River, May 23July 4, 1863 / Timothy B. Smith.
Other titles: Climax of the campaign to open the Mississippi River, May 23July 4, 1863
Description: Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, 2021 |
Series: Modern war studies | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020044314
ISBN 9780700632251 (cloth)
ISBN 9780700632268 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Vicksburg (Miss.)HistorySiege, 1863. | MississippiHistoryCivil War, 18611865Campaigns. | United StatesHistoryCivil War, 18611865Campaigns. | StrategyHistory19th century.
Classification: LCC E475.27 .S694 2021 | DDC 973.7/344dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020044314.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data is available.
Printed in the United States of America
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The paper used in the print publication is acid free and meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.481992.
PREFACE
As informal siege efforts commenced at daylight on May 23, 1863, nothing but impatience, disgust, and irritation existed for almost all connected with the Vicksburg operations. Over and above the terrible loss of life the day before in the Army of the Tennessees grand assaults on fortress Vicksburg, nothing was going according to plan for anyone.
Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton and his Confederate army inside Vicksburg were perhaps the worst off, despite having just fended off two days of assaults on May 19 and 22. Still, they were shut up inside Vicksburg, with little hope of getting out of the trap by themselves. Pemberton himself was discouraged, but his and the armys morale was growing with their defense. Still, many in the army were completely unhappy with their commander, a Pennsylvania Yankee at that, feeling like it was just a matter of time before they would be sold out, perhaps literally. In the meantime, the army and civilians alike would face increasing shortages of everything from food to military resources to patience.
If Pembertons situation inside Vicksburg was critical, so also was the only possible relief for him outside the defenses: the small but growing army under General Joseph E. Johnston. But nothing suited him either. Johnston was similarly perturbed that Pemberton had disobeyed his orders (but obeyed President Jefferson Daviss) and withdrew inside Vicksburg. Johnston had ordered him to get out of the trap, but Pemberton would not listen and now was ensnared, and the unwelcome task, and legacy, of relieving Vicksburg now fell on his shoulders.
The feeling was no better in Richmond as a sick and horrified Jefferson Davis watched the events unfold at Vicksburg. Davis was agitated that so many defeats had come about in the previous few days and worried that Johnston might not give his all in trying to save Pemberton and his garrison. The negative messages from Johnston and continuous calls for more troops did not help the already negative feelings Davis harbored for him. On top of that, Davis had personal worries as well. He had immense property holdings around Vicksburg, and his brother Joseph was somewhere in the midst of all the confusion.
It would seem that the Federals had a better outlook, but a similar angst settled on many on the Union side as well. The common soldiers had just been through a massive assault that had netted nothing but death and destruction. Some blamed their commanders such as Major Generals Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman. They, in turn, blamed corps commander Major General John A. McClernand for the debacle. Despite being in a secure place with Pemberton hemmed in and a sure line of communication and supply, Grant still worried about a possible breakout and the chance of trouble from the rear.
Grant also had to worry about the mood in Washington. Having just come off the disaster at Chancellorsville and the inactivity in Tennessee, President Abraham Lincoln and his administration officials were in no mood for delay, which is what a siege portended. They let it be known, through army general in chief Henry Halleck, exactly how impatient they were with operations in Mississippi. Grant, it seemed, was on a pretty short leash.
Consequently, almost everyone was in some way disgusted as the siege at Vicksburg began in earnest. Yet, almost everyone realized exactly what was at stake. If we can hold Vicksburg I am in hopes this will be the last year of the war, wrote one Mississippian, [but] if we lose Vicksburg it will take a long time for us to gain our independence. Federal determination was as adamant if not more. We must take this town. There is no other alternative, wrote one Ohioan. Another Federal argued that there is one thing certain... the fate of the Rebellion all hangs on the Success or defeat of our army at Vixburgh. Many tied the campaigns success to the Mississippi River. One Union colonel wrote that the capture of Vicksburg will open the Mississippi and strike the death blow to the rebellion. One even argued Vicksburgs importance compared to that of the Confederate capital: Richmond is worth scarce the naming compared with Vicksburg. One Ohioan, Thomas D. White, wrote to his mother that the capture of Vicksburg and the opening of the river is of more consequence than the conquering of every acre of old Va.