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SWISS NEUTRALITY
SWISS NEUTRALITY
Its History and Meaning
EDGAR BONJOUR
TRANSLATED BY
MARY HOTTINGER
First published in 1946 by George Allen & Unwin LTD
This edition first published in 2018 by Routledge
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A Library of Congress record exists under ISBN: 46020097
ISBN 13: 978-1-138-55215-9 (hbk)
ISBN 13: 978-1-351-25356-7 (ebk)
SWISS NEUTRALITY
SWISS NEUTRALITY
Its History and Meaning
by
EDGAR BONJOUR
Professor of History
at the University of Basle
TRANSLATED BY
MARY HOTTINGER
FIRST PUBLISHED IN GREAT BRITAIN IN 1946
All rights reserved
Produced in complete conformity
with the authorised economy
standard
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
in 11-pt. Baskerville type
BY WILLMER BROS. & CO. LTD., BIRKENHEAD
CONTENTS
UP TO A generation ago, the Swiss citizen lived with a feeling of security in foreign relations which we can hardly credit today. Neutrality had come to be taken so much for granted as the fundamental principle of the Federal constitution, and had been so generally recognized in Europe, that it seemed unthreatened and even inviolable. It blended with the republican and democratic ideal to form a national myth of almost religious sanctity. As the axiom of Swiss foreign policy, it had certainly suffered attack both in theory and in fact, but since such crises had always been successfully overcome, Switzerlands faith in the inviolability of her neutrality had merely been confirmed. It was as if the country were girdled with high, protecting ramparts, behind which its people could go about their lawful occasions unmolested. It was during this period of calm in Switzerlands foreign relations that international law assiduously sought a formula for the theory of neutrality.
The outbreak of the first world war in 1914 brought a rude awakening from such illusions. Not only did the belligerents override temporary declarations of neutrality, but ancient charters of neutrality, guaranteeing its permanence, became mere scraps of paper. This was made painfully clear by the violation of Belgian neutrality. Theoretical speculation dissolved like mist in a cruel and naked reality, and all that remained was the anxious and fateful question whether neutrality could be preserved and the integrity of the native soil maintained. When, however, Switzerland had been able to preserve her neutrality intact throughout the war, when she was able to anchor her permanent neutrality in the international covenants of the League of Nations, the old feeling of security returned almost unabated. Under pressure from the great Powers, she had, it is true, been obliged to restrict her integral to a differential neutrality. Not without grave misgivings, she found herself ousted from her traditional, total neutrality, and it was only in order to avoid exclusion from the general reorganization of international law that, reluctantly enough, she agreed to surrender part of her neutrality and thenceforth to take her part in the economic sanctions of the League. As long as the covenant of world peace seemed intact, Switzerland could feel secure, but the more the ties of the new family of nations relaxed, the less the minor states could expect from its protection, and the more urgent were Switzerlands efforts to cast off the fetters of a differential neutrality and to resume the axiom of her foreign policy in its traditional form.
Not long before the outbreak of the second world war, the Confederation had regained its traditional, that is, its strict and total neutrality. With that, any possible misconception of her international attitude and international status was obviated. When the general order of peace broke down, Switzerland was in no way involved in the world struggle by treaty obligations to any power. The collapse of international law brought painfully home to her how well she had done to place no reliance on written assurances, but only on her own will and her own strength. Although the international situation has radically changed, the Swiss still uphold their belief that the neutrality and integrity of the Confederation are in the true interests of the whole of Europe and an indispensable element in international relations. But in high politics it does not matter very much what the small states regard as being, or not being, in the interests of the whole of Europe; inevitably that is the affair of the great Powers. At the outbreak of the present war, the latter gave the Federal Council their solemn assurance that Swiss neutrality would be respected. In the public opinion of the world, however, as very recent discussions have shown, the feeling for the growth and meaning of Swiss neutrality would seem to be on the decline. Unjust judgments have been passed upon it. What is often overlooked is that the old principle of Swiss policy has developed organically with the Confederation, and is at the very core of Swiss democracy. The purpose of the present essay is to contribute, by a study of historical developments, to a better insight into the connection between the two, and hence to a deeper understanding and a more dispassionate appreciation of Swiss neutrality.
The absolute neutrality of Switzerland as a political principle is generally dated from the year 1674, when the Federal Diet declared that the Confederation, as a body, would regard itself as a neutral state and intervene on neither side in the war which had just broken out. In this way the Confederation proclaimed the axiom of its foreign policy to the forum of Europe. It must not, however, be assumed that the fundamental principle of Swiss political life was then established by a single voluntary act. On the contrary, the principle of neutrality had emerged very slowly from the treaty policy of the old Confederation, and awakened only gradually to a realization of its own nature out of the limbo of international entanglements. It had taken two hundred years of painful experience for the Confederation to grasp its own vital necessities, for the policy of expansion to be abandoned and Switzerland trained in the political abstinence of neutrality. And for a long time to come it remained an elastic formula, in which the most manifold aspects of abstinence in foreign policy found what may be called a national expression.
