Massimo Pigliucci - The Quest for Character: What the Story of Socrates and Alcibiades Teaches Us about Our Search for Good Leaders

Virtue is nothing else than right reason.

S ENECA , L ETTER 66.32

C AN WE MAKE OURSELVES INTO BETTER HUMAN BEINGS? CAN we help others do the same? And can we get the leaders of our societystatesmen, generals, businesspeopleto care about the general welfare so that humanity may prosper not just economically and materially but also spiritually? These questions have been asked for over two millennia, and attempting to answer them is crucial if we want to live a better life and contribute to building a more just society.

Within the Western tradition, with which this book is concerned, the issue of becoming a better human being has often been understood in terms of virtue. Before we can sensibly ask whether and how virtue can be taught, then, we need to discuss what exactly virtue is and why we should care about it. These days the word has acquired a rather old-fashioned connotation, as our thoughts are likely to wander toward Christian conceptions of virtues such as purity and chastity. The term has, accordingly, fallen into disuse. Google Ngram shows a pretty steady decline from 1800 on, plateauing for the past half century or so.

Thats unfortunate, and it is a trend that we need to reverse, not because the old-fashioned notion is one to cling to but because an even more ancient conception still offers us much valid guidance on how to live today. The ancient Greco-Romans focused on four so-called cardinal virtues, understood as character traits, or behavioral inclinations, that ought to be cultivated and used as a moral compass to navigate our lives.

Plato is the earliest source to articulate the virtues, They are

Prudence (sometimes called practical wisdom), the ability to navigate complex situations in the best way possible.

Justice, understood as acting fairly toward others and respecting them as human beings.

Fortitude (or courage), encompassing endurance and the ability to confront our fears.

Temperance, the ability to practice self-restraint and to act in right measure.

A modern study coauthored by psychologist Katherine Dahlsgaard and colleagues found that these same cardinal virtues are near-universal across human cultures, though they are sometimes accompanied by additional valued character traits, such as a sense of human connection and a sense of transcendence. We will return to this point near the end of the book. For now, it is easy to see why the four Platonic virtues are highly regarded across traditions: a person who acts prudently, justly, courageously, and with temperance is the kind of person we often see as a role model for ourselves and our children.

While the word virtue comes from the Latin virtus, meaning specifically moral strength, the original Greek term was arete, which meant that which is good or, more succinctly, excellence. Not just moral excellence but excellence of any sort. For instance, an excellent athlete would be one who won many competitions at Olympia. And arete does not apply just to human beings. An excellent lioness is one skilled at catching antelopes and other prey so that she and her offspring can survive. This concept even applies to objects: an excellent knife, for example, is one characterized by a sharp blade that cuts cleanly. In general, arete has to do with the proper function of a thing and how well that function is carried out. The function of a knife is to cut; the function of a lioness is to produce and feed her offspring; the function of an athlete is to win competitions.

But what is the arete of a human being? Here opinions varied among the Greco-Romans, just as they vary today among both philosophers and scientists. But not, in either case, as much as one might imagine.

The Epicureans, for instance, thought that human beings naturally seek pleasure and, especially, avoid pain. So an excellent human life is one that is devoted to minimizing pain and maximizing pleasure. Although these conceptions appear divergent, both the Epicureans and the Stoics agreed that we should act virtuously because doing so helps us live in accordance with nature, meaning our nature as a particular biological species.

Modern scientists such as comparative primatologist Frans de Waalcharacterized by our use of reason to solve problems as well as by the unusually high degree of sociality particular to our species. Indeed, de Waal thinks that what we call morality evolved in Homo sapiens from preexisting building blocks found in other social primates. Morality, then, has a clear and important biological function: to regulate communal living so that individuals within a group can survive and flourish.

It is interesting to note that the modern terms ethics and morality have revealing roots in this respect: the first one comes from the Greek thos, a word related to our idea of character; the second one is from the Latin moralis, which has to do with habits and customs. Ethics or morality, in the ancient Greco-Roman sense, then, is what we do in order to live well togetherthe same problem faced by our primate cousins.

In order to live a good life, we need a society where people act virtuously, a goal that was not that difficult to achieve within the small social groups that characterized much of the history of humanity and continue to mark other species of primates as well. In that sort of society, everyone knows and is likely related to everyone else. Under such circumstances, it is relatively easy to make sure that individuals act virtuously because if they dont, the other members of the group will know and will exert physical punishment or enforce ostracism on those who do not comply. Explicit ethical teachings are not necessary for the task, and both early humans and other primates could rely on their evolutionary instincts.