Major Timothy F. Lindemann - Joint Operations Case Study. Weserübung Nord Germanys Invasion Of Norway, 1940

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JOINT OPERATIONS CASE STUDY

WESERBUNG NORD: GERMANYS INVASION OF NORWAY, 1940

by

Major Timothy F. Lindemann

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER

Weserbung Nord , the German invasion of Norway in 1940, is one of the most thoroughly investigated campaigns of the Second World War due to its noteworthy standing as the first modern campaign jointly planned and executed by ground, sea, and air forces. Unfortunately, the more balanced and well-documented accounts of Weserbung Nord available in English tend to be too detailed and lengthy for instructional use. The intent of this paper is to provide a balanced account of more manageable size, sufficiently documented to facilitate the search for additional information on significant events or positions.

This examination of Weserbung Nord will be primarily, but not exclusively, descriptive. Events and issues have been carefully selected both to provide adequate information for the reader to form judgments of decisions and actions taken and to highlight issues that contributed to or detracted from the success of the campaign.

In the history of modern warfare, Weserbung Nord , the German invasion of Norway in 1940, occupies a distinguished station as the first campaign jointly planned and executed by ground, sea, and air forces. This paper examines the origins, concept, and planning of Weserbung Nord , as well as the execution of the landings. Brief attention is given to the defense of the landings against Allied counterstrokes and to issues associated with unified planning and direction. The origins of the campaign are found in the German naval experience in the First World War, interwar naval strategy debates, and the persona of Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, who was determined to secure a decisive role for the German Navy in the Second World War. Raeder capitalized on the fortuitous opportunities the Russo-Finnish War and the Norwegian traitor Vidkun Quisling presented to win Hitler over to his naval plans. Raeder and the Navy heavily influenced the concept development and planning of the campaign in concert with the High Command of the (German) Armed Forces, which also had a vested organizational interest in a military solution of the Norwegian issue. In executing Weserbung Nord , the German Armed Forces encountered major problems only at Oslo and Narvik. However, the operational- level success of the campaign tends to draw attention away from fundamental problems regarding unified planning and direction which emerged during the preparation and execution of the campaign.

When the first [German] mountain troops in parachutes were dropped behind Narvik, it occurred that one fell directly in the water. The General [Dietl] came up to him as a petty officer was pulling him out of the water.

So soldier, how do you end up here?

With the help of the three branches of the Armed Forces, Herr General, shouted the man quick-wittedly, the Army sent me up here, the Air Force transported me, and the Navy pulled me out of the water. General Dietl: das Leben eines Soldaten

The Chief of the Naval Staff [Grand Admiral Raeder] considers it necessary to acquaint the Fhrer, as soon as possible, with the possibilities for expanding naval operations to the north. It is should be examined, whether under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany, the possibility of acquiring bases in Norway exists, with the goal of a fundamental improvement in our strategic and operational situation. War Diary of the Naval Staff 3 October 1939 {1}

By the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, none of the individual German military service staffs or the High Command of the Armed Forces ( OKW ) had developed operational plans for military action directed against Norway. In fact, the Army High Command ( OKH ) and High Command of the Air Force ( OKL ) eschewed any discussion of the concept of operations in this northern theater of war. The officers within the Naval High Command ( OKM ) and its predecessors, however, had been debating the necessity of operations against Norway and the importance of Norwegian bases for German maritime strategy in professional journals and war games intermittently since 1906. {2}

In the interwar years, the debate concerning Norwegian naval bases took on a new significance based on the experiences of the First World War. Influential but controversial German naval strategists maintained, had the German Fleet been able to operate from bases outside of the confined North Sea, the war at sea would have turned out differently. Bases on the west coast of Norway, specifically at Trondheim, would have been ideal for offensive operations against the Royal Navy and for commerce raiding in the Atlantic. Additionally, senior naval officers who had served in the German Navy ( Kriegsmarine ) during the First World could not forget Norways inability to maintain its neutrality steadfastly and Norways reluctant yet significant role in the economic blockade of Germany. {3}

As German rearmament began in the mid-thirties, the German Naval Staff ( Seekriegsleitung, SKL ) quickly recognized the criticality of Norwegian neutrality in a future conflict with Britain. With the loss of the iron ore mines in Lorraine after the First World War, Germany had become absolutely dependent on iron ore from the Kiruna-Gllivare fields in northern Sweden. Sweden shipped ore to Germany through the Swedish port of Lule on the Gulf of Bothnia when Lule harbor was ice free, and by rail through the Norwegian port at Narvik when ice closed Lule and the Baltic ports (January through April). Approximately half of the Swedish iron ore bound for Germany passed through Narvik, and the Royal Navy could interrupt this traffic without actually occupying Norway. {4} The Royal Navy could mine the channels (leads) along Norways western coast, forcing German shipping which moved through the leads out into the open sea where vessels could be intercepted.

More threatening would be a British occupation of Norway. From naval and air bases in Norway Britain would be able to challenge German naval supremacy in the Baltic and exert pressure on Sweden to cease all exports to Germany. {5} Air bases in Norway would also facilitate the strategic bombing of Germany proper, although little thought was given to this danger at the time. {6}