• Complain

Susana Nuccetelli (ed.) - Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics

Here you can read online Susana Nuccetelli (ed.) - Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics full text of the book (entire story) in english for free. Download pdf and epub, get meaning, cover and reviews about this ebook. year: 2007, publisher: Rowman & Littlefield, genre: Romance novel. Description of the work, (preface) as well as reviews are available. Best literature library LitArk.com created for fans of good reading and offers a wide selection of genres:

Romance novel Science fiction Adventure Detective Science History Home and family Prose Art Politics Computer Non-fiction Religion Business Children Humor

Choose a favorite category and find really read worthwhile books. Enjoy immersion in the world of imagination, feel the emotions of the characters or learn something new for yourself, make an fascinating discovery.

Susana Nuccetelli (ed.) Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics

Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics: summary, description and annotation

We offer to read an annotation, description, summary or preface (depends on what the author of the book "Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics" wrote himself). If you haven't found the necessary information about the book — write in the comments, we will try to find it.

This collection of classic and contemporary essays in philosophy of language offers a concise introduction to the field for students in graduate and upper-division undergraduate courses. It contains some of the most important basic sources in philosophy of language, including a number of classic essays by philosophers such as Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Kripke, Grice, Davidson, Strawson, Austin, and Putnam, as well as more recent contributions by scholars including John McDowell, Stephen Neale, Ruth Millikan, Stephen Schiffer, Paul Horwich, and Anthony Brueckner, among others, who are on the leading edge of innovation in this increasingly influential area of philosophy. The result is a lively mix of readings, together with the editors discussions of the material, which provides a rigorous introduction to the subject.

Susana Nuccetelli (ed.): author's other books


Who wrote Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics? Find out the surname, the name of the author of the book and a list of all author's works by series.

Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics — read online for free the complete book (whole text) full work

Below is the text of the book, divided by pages. System saving the place of the last page read, allows you to conveniently read the book "Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics" online for free, without having to search again every time where you left off. Put a bookmark, and you can go to the page where you finished reading at any time.

Light

Font size:

Reset

Interval:

Bookmark:

Make
Table of Contents APPENDIX A WHO CAN SAY WHAT DAVID KAPLAN Who Can - photo 1
Table of Contents

APPENDIX A
WHO CAN SAY WHAT?

DAVID KAPLAN

Who Can Say What?

To complete my afterthoughts regarding the semantics of direct reference, I must address certain issues on the border between metasemantics and epistemology. But it prompted thoughts on the more controversial issue of constraints on what an agent in a particular epistemological situation can express.

What We Cant Do with Words: The Autonomy of Apprehension

As I understand Frege and Russell, both believed that the realm of propositions accessible to thought, i.e., those capable of being apprehended, is independent of and epistemologically prior to the acquisition of language. In using language we merely encode what was already thinkable.

I see this view of the autonomy of apprehension in Russells claim that

in every proposition that we can apprehend (i.e., not only in those whose truth and falsity we can judge of, but in all that we can think about), all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance.

Perhaps it accounts for the feeling one has in reading Russell on logically proper names, and even more so in reading Frege, that, like Humpty Dumpty, everyone runs their own language. When we speak, we assign meanings to our words; the words themselves do not have meanings. These assignments are, in theory, unconstrained (except by whatever limitations our epistemic situation places on what we can apprehend). In practice, it may be prudent to try to coordinate with the meanings others have assigned, but this is only a practical matter.

Subjectivist Semantics

We may term this view, subjectivist semantics. Although the entities which serve as possible meanings may be regarded as objective, in the sense that the same possible meanings are accessible to more than one person, the assignment of meanings is subjective, and thus the semantics is subjective. Since each individual user must assign meanings rather than receiving them with the words, each users semantics is autonomous. What the language community does make available to each of its members is a syntax, an empty syntax to which each user must add his own semantics.

The individual can express only those propositions that were already available to him as thoughts before receiving the benefits of linguistic communion. We cannot enlarge the stock of possible meanings that are available to us by drawing on the total stock of meanings extant in the language community. In this sense there is no semantic sharing. What each user can express is independent of the resources of other members of the language community, and in this sense what each user can express is independent of language.

There are differences between Frege and Russell in the way in which ones epistemic situation is seen to influence the propositions one can apprehend. Frege suggests that all mankind has access to the same thoughts. Thus that differences in our experience, our location in space and time, our culture (including in particular our linguistic community), do not affect what propositions we can apprehend.

Russells view was plainly different. He believed that our idiosyncratic experiences do affect what propositions we can apprehend. For Russell one can apprehend a proposition containing an individual x as a component if and only if one is directly acquainted with x. And it is clear that what one is directly acquainted with is a function of ones experience.

A fixed point of all such Russellian theories is that we may be so situated as to be able to describe a certain individual x but not to apprehend it; whereas a friend may be able to apprehend that selfsame individual. The friend can dub x with a logically proper name n, and try to communicate his thought using n. No use. We cannot just accept n with his meaning, we must assign it our own meaning, and in this case his meaning (namely, x ) is not available to use for assignment. Sigh!

Consumerist Semantics

Contrast the view of subjectivist semantics with the view that we are, for the most part, language consumers. Words come to us prepackaged with a semantic value. If we are to use those words, the words we have received, the words of our linguistic community, then we must defer to their meaning. Otherwise we play the role of language creators .

There are two senses of naming: dubbing and referring. To the consumerist, subjectivist semanticists have not adequately distinguished them.

To some, subjectivist semantics will seem a right and proper conservatism: Practice self-reliancethere is no such thing as a free thought! But it should be recognized that the view is incompatible with one of the most important contributions of contemporary theory of reference: the historical chain picture of the reference of names.

The notion of a historical chain of acquisition by which a name is passed from user to user, was first used to facilitate abandonment of the classical, description theory of proper names found in Frege and Russell. The notion of a historical chain does this by offering an alternative explanation of how a name in local use can be connected with a remote referent, an explanation that does not require that the mechanism of reference is already in the head of the local user in the form of a self-assigned description. In determining the referent of the name Aristotle, we need not look to the biographys text, instead we look to its bibliography.

A Role for Language in Thought: Vocabulary Power as an Epistemological Enhancement

There is another, possibly more fundamental, use of the notion: to tilt our perspective on the epistemology of language away from the subjectivist views of Frege and Russell and toward a more communitarian outlook. The notion that a referent can be carried by a name from early past to present suggests that the language itself carries meanings, and thus that we can acquire meanings through the instrument of language. This frees us from the constraints of subjectivist semantics and provides the opportunity for an instrumental use of language to broaden the realm of what can be expressed and to broaden the horizons of thought itself.

On my view, our connection with a linguistic community in which names and other meaning-bearing elements are passed down to us enables us to entertain thoughts through the language that would not otherwise be accessible to us. Call this the Instrumental Thesis .

The Instrumental Thesis seems to me a quite important, though often tacit, feature of contemporary theories of reference, and one that distinguishes them from many earlier views. It urges us to see language, and in particular semantics, as more autonomous, more independent of the thought of individual users, and to see our powers of apprehension as less autonomous and more dependent on our vocabulary.

Contrary to Russell, I think we succeed in thinking about things in the world not only through the mental residue of that which we ourselves experience, but also vicariously, through the symbolic resources that come to us through our language. It is the latter vocabulary power that gives us our apprehensive advantage over the nonlinguistic animals. My dog, being color-blind, cannot entertain the thought that I am wearing a red shirt. But my color-blind colleague can entertain even the thought that Aristotle wore a red shirt.

One need not fall in love to speak of love. One need not have grieved to speak of grief. The poet who has never felt or observed love may yet speak of it if he has heard of it. The fact that the language to speak of it and to enable us to have heard of it exists may show that someone once felt love. But it need not be the poet. And as with love, so with Samarkand (and red, and Aristotle). Our own individual experience may play a dominant role in providing the conceptual resources with which we address the world, but it does not play the whole role.

Next page
Light

Font size:

Reset

Interval:

Bookmark:

Make

Similar books «Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics»

Look at similar books to Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics. We have selected literature similar in name and meaning in the hope of providing readers with more options to find new, interesting, not yet read works.


Reviews about «Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics»

Discussion, reviews of the book Philosophy of Language: The Central Topics and just readers' own opinions. Leave your comments, write what you think about the work, its meaning or the main characters. Specify what exactly you liked and what you didn't like, and why you think so.