1.1 About this Book
During the research that lead to this book, I focused on three topics that I found pivotal for shaping human reasoning: the mechanisms underlying the development of scientific modeling, the distributions of knowledge in the environment amounting to cognitive niche construction, and the epistemic immunizations that, compared with higher regimes of rationality such as the ones displayed by science and logic, produce what is defined as irrationality. The structure of the book consists in three parts, each devoted to one of the main topics, for a total of twelve specific chapters, plus an Introductionwhich you are readingand some Concluding Remarks.
The first part concerns the analysis of scientific rationality carried out through a study of scientific modeling and experimentation , developing a perspective rooted in the so called eco-cognitive (ecological/cognitive) tradition. The intent is to frame scientific endeavor within a naturalistic and pragmatic outlook: the first objective is to spell out a conceptual line connecting the use of rudimentary mental models in natural cognition to the use of models characterizing modern and contemporary science; the second goal is to demonstrate how scientific experimentation can be seen as aiming at two different possible targets, one is the increase of scientific knowledge, and the other one the dissemination of precedent results in a given social context.
The second part deals with the distribution of knowledge onto the environment operated by human agents (a phenomenon that can be described as cognitive niche construction), and also with how this distribution, seen as a collective effort, affects and is affected by social cognition . Albeit the interdisciplinary theory of cognitive niche construction robustly accounts for human advancements (including the possibility of science itself), I will tackle the pivotal need to understand the social mechanisms , for instance the simple fact of supporting group living, allowing the coordinated effort of constructing and managing such niches: I will illustrate how this knowledge is also necessary to understand the crises impacting cognitive niches when new technological structures significantly change basic social dynamics within the niche itself, especially when these structures mediate established forms of communication and decision-making.
The third part, connecting with the first two ones in a kind of dialectic opposition, focuses on what is commonly labeled as irrational by contrasting the standard ecological and social inferences analyzed so far (that is those usually employed to cope with the environment and other human beings) with another inferential regime characterized as an epistemic, or cognitive, immunizations. The epistemological and cognitive interest will lie in the analysis of religious and magical thinking , in order to uncover other regimes of rationality that allow agents relying on them to cope in a different way with the demands of ecological-cognitive problem solving , both in past and contemporary/technological cognitive niches.
The global aim of this book is to achieve a coherent and unitary perspective on human rationality out of the three thematic chores. The outlook is not diachronic, as the interest is not to draw the emergence of a progress in reasoning. Instead, I will provide arguments, and examples, showing that it can be fruitful to engage in a research that, sampling out certain features of scientific rationality such as the necessity to cope with constraints of the surrounding environment (both social and ecological), highlights the recurrence of similar inferential patterns in forms of cognition rationally characterized as less demanding (i.e. as social, and religious cognition), thus legitimizing original conceptual connections and theoretical speculations.
1.2 About the Subdivision
As explained by the title, Science and Strategic Cognition , the first part frames epistemology in an ecological and cognitive perspective. The two first chapters focus on the nature and use of models, while the third on the operationalization of models through experimentation: this is coherent with Hackings philosophical milestone Representing and Intervening (Hacking ): the result of this research is the theoretical subdivision of experimentation in two broad areas, namely generative and demonstrative experiments, each with its own epistemological and cognitive characterization.
The second part of this book, entitled Cognitive Niches and Social Cognition: Using Knowledge as a Tool , will analyze cognitive niche construction and, in particular, the social/collaborative grounding of such activities. After an introduction on the theory of cognitive niche construction (5), I will shift my attention on how a collectivity can select techniques for enriching and maintaining cognitive niches (6), stressing how the selection of the best curation method is a non-monotonic activity and indeed depends on the original condition of the cognitive niche itself. The two subsequent chapters will be devoted to the analysis of gossip (epistemological in Chap. introduces the notion of terminator niche , a techno-cognitive niche in which the modifications introduces to foster improvements backfire, and become the direct cause of diminished welfare, impoverishment and potential collapse of the niche itself.
The third and last part The Eco-Cognitive Epistemology of Counterfactual Beliefs deals with the limits or, so to say, with the twilight zone of my epistemological approach to human cognition, starting from the models of epistemic immunization proposed by logician John Woods in the form of the epistemic bubble (Woods focuses on religious pragmatics and deals with two dense philosophical topics: forgiveness (in a perspective that merges anthropological and cognitive studies) and (self-)sacrifice, analyzed through the lenses of epistemic violence, Girardian studies and some icons of popular culture.
1.3 About the Theoretical Framework
1.3.1 Eco-Cognitive Epistemology
As stated at the beginning of this Introduction, this book and the research it comprehends belong to what can be defined as eco-cognitive epistemology , a mode of epistemology introduced, pursued and advocated by Lorenzo Magnani (). The two keywords defining this approach to epistemology are ecological and cognitive .
Ecological : We try to avoid as much as possible the abstraction of agents out of their environmental constraints, and we are suspicious about the use of idealized agents. All processes that are viable for an epistemological analysis are, in our view, goal-oriented and nested in a particular environment, upon which the epistemic agent relies in order to achieve her goaland which may hinder at the same time the agents efforts. Any epistemological enquiry must, according to this view, face this issues as a starting point and not as a future or occasional care.
Cognitive : We put forward an ideal of epistemology that must not be cognition-blind. As we are interested in the epistemic processes enacted by real agents, firstly our hypotheses must be in accordance with the evidence offered by the cognitive sciences, and secondly our epistemological attitude welcomes results and insights from cognitive science as a primary source for reflection.