Jelinek Nadja - Autonomy and the self
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- Book:Autonomy and the self
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This volume addresses the complex interplay between the conditions of an agents personal autonomy and the constitution of her self in light of two influential background assumptions: a libertarian thesis according to which it is essential for personal autonomy to be able to choose freely how ones self is shaped, on the one hand, and a line of thought following especially the seminal work of Harry Frankfurt according to which personal autonomy necessarily rests on an already sufficiently shaped self, on the other hand. Given this conceptual framework, a number of influential aspects within current debate can be addressed in a new and illuminating light: accordingly, the volumes contributions range from 1) discussing fundamental conceptual interconnections between personal autonomy and freedom of the will, 2) addressing the exact role and understanding of different personal traits, e.g. Frankfurts notion of volitional necessities, commitments to norms and ideals, emotions, the phenomenon of weakness of will, and psychocorporeal aspects, 3) and finally taking into account social influences, which are discussed in terms of their ability to buttress, to weaken, or even to serve as necessary preconditions of personal autonomy and the forming of ones self. The volume thus provides readers with an extensive and most up-to-date discussion of various influential strands of current philosophical debate on the topic. It is of equal interest to all those already engaged in the debate as well as to readers trying to get an up-to-date overview or looking for a textbook to use in courses. Read more...
Abstract: This volume addresses the complex interplay between the conditions of an agents personal autonomy and the constitution of itself. It includes an instructive confrontation between subjective and intersubjective approaches to personal autonomy. Read more...
Abstract: This volume addresses the complex interplay between the conditions of an agents personal autonomy and the constitution of itself. It includes an instructive confrontation between subjective and intersubjective approaches to personal autonomy. Read more...
Jelinek Nadja: author's other books
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Jelinek Nadja
Gloria D. Fondren
A.Harry Lesser
Steven C. Roach
Paul Barry Clarke
Marina A. L. Oshana (editor)
Ken Gemes
Andrew Sneddon
Keith Ward
Bruce N. Waller
Phillip E. Hammond
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Part 1
Autonomy and Free Will
Autonomy and Free Will
Michael Khler and Nadja Jelinek (eds.) Philosophical Studies Series Autonomy and the Self 2013 10.1007/978-94-007-4789-0_1 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Freedom Without Choice?
Gottfried Seeba 1
(1)
Department of Philosophy, University of Konstanz, Konstanz, Germany
Gottfried Seeba
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Abstract
The paper addresses a fundamental issue in clarifying the concept of autonomy, namely its relation to the concept of freedom, and argues for an analysis within a libertarian framework. Starting with a brief clarification of the concept of freedom in general, based mainly on the idea of being unhindered, this general idea is explored further by discussing two main dimensions: 1) freedom as openness to alternatives (possibility criterion) and 2) freedom in the sense of an available option being natural or essential to the agent in question (criterion of naturalness). In subsequently discussing the title-giving question directly, it is asked whether invoking only the second dimension while disregarding the firstgenerally done by compatibilistscan provide us with plausible cases of freedom without choice. In analyzing various relevant cases of personal freedom, covering freedom of action as well as freedom of will, the answer is then mostly negative. Apart from cases like theoretical rationality or language, all cases of personal freedom mattering most for personal autonomy rely on the first criterion as well, i.e. the agent has to be able to choose between different alternatives. Only then can we understand ourselves as free and autonomous persons.
Introducing the Problem
Freedoms a marvellous name. Thats why youre so anxious to make use of it. You think that, if you call imprisonment true freedom, people will be attracted to the prison. And the worst of it is youre quite right. The name counts more with most people than the thing. Theyll follow the man who repeats it most often and in the loudest voice. This quotation from a novel by Aldous Huxley castigates an extreme form of verbicide that has been well-known for long, though in a less extreme form, from religious, political or economic propaganda. Realizing that freedom is considered highly valuable by almost everyone, various authoritative persons and institutions try to insinuate that men are really free only if they are bound by certain goals or ways of life, even if this implies a severe restriction of personal options and choices. The critical point is not the existence of restrictions as such . Obviously, human beings are subject to all sorts of restrictions physical as well as mental, natural as well as cultural which are not harmful or relevant to their freedom at all. The critical point is that even severe restrictions normally thought to be harmful, or paradigm cases of deprived freedom, are proclaimed to be utterly insignificant to or even necessary for real freedom.
Undoubtedly, this is a misuse of words in many cases. But is it a misuse generally? Couldnt it be the case that certain restrictions, even severe restrictions of options and choices, or bare necessities, are not harmful to us in the least, but rather highly valuable and conducive to or, at the very least, reconciled easily with personal freedom? Apparently, it is not always a benefit to be confronted with a multitude of alternative options. The wider the choice, the greater the trouble is a well known proverb in German. More radical still is the diagnosis made by Dostoevskis Grand Inquisitor.
Of course, escaping from freedom into restraint is not the same thing as being free in spite of, or even because of, being restricted. Still, there are many writers ready to apply the very concept of freedom even to cases where choice is restricted severely. Many philosophers (e.g., those who are convinced theoretically that determinism is true, or might well be true) continue to talk of freedom in practical matters despite the fact that, by that hypothesis, there are no alternative options at all which could be chosen objectively. Are we to say that all of this is a misuse of words? Or is freedom without choice a real, respectable possibility or even, on closer inspection, the only kind of freedom accessible to, or advisable for, human beings at all?
The Concept of Freedom
To tackle this question, one has to look first at the concept of freedom. Here I will take a shortcut, drawing from the results of my extended earlier research on these matters.) that overlap partly with what we would call freedom of will . Freedom of will is another special case branching again into various subcases, all of which are cases of being unhindered in forming ones will.
However, central to all forms of freedom is the concept of hindrance itself. Clearly, this is a very general notion to be specified best by the questions of what is hindered in what and by what . A river that is not hindered in its flow by dams or embankments is said to flow freely. A paralyzed or tied man is unfree because he is hindered to move as he wants to move by abnormal (internal or external) impediments. The hindrance need not extend to every part or aspect and need not be absolute. Still, it must be significant. Common to all subcases is the idea that something or somebody is restrained severely from evolving, living, or existing in ways which are natural or essential to it, or to him or her, and therefore should not be eliminated. Hence, whether, in what respects, and to what degree something is free or unfree has to be judged with reference to two dimensions: (1) the relevant standards of naturalness and (2) the relevant realm of theoretical possibilities that are actually closed or open.
Roughly, the greater the number of open possibilities, the lesser the hindrance and the greater the freedom. However, possibilities that do not touch on the relevant nature can be ruled out as inessential. Most of the infinite number of actions I might envision but actually cannot do are irrelevant to my freedom as I do not and will never care about them in the least. Having decided spontaneously and on my own to go to a concert tonight, for example, I do not feel restricted in the least by the fact that, in doing so, I am able no longer to watch to the 80th episode of a trivial soap opera on television. Conversely, the fact that my TV set offers 80 programs to me today instead of the 2 programs I used to have does not enhance my freedom 40-fold if I do not care about the 78 additional programs. Thus freedom implies open possibilities but only possibilities essential or natural to the person in question.
Cutting the Possibilities Criterion
Now, if the range of alternatives actually open is diminished severely, or even reduced to one in the determinist case, the possibilities criterion appears to fail. Hence, it is doubtful whether the concept of freedom makes any sense in these cases. In an attempt to evade this unwanted conclusion, some writers have taken the radical course of dismissing the criterion completely. Theologians such as Origen and Molina contrived an argument, revived in 1969 by Harry Frankfurt, which is intended to show that the inexistence of open alternatives is not detrimental to freedom.
Other writers have taken a less radical course. Acknowledging the significance of the possibilities criterion as such, they try to show that this criterion can be assigned a meaning weak enough to be compatible with a severe reduction in, or even the complete inexistence of, objective alternatives. Some authors have argued that meaningful talk of personal freedom is confined to the idea of possibilities open in a merely subjective or epistemic sense. they try to show that this can be reduced to the conditional analysis of practical possibility which does not rely, allegedly, on the premise, or tacit presupposition, that alternative courses of acting and forming the will are open in fact but refers to such alternatives only in a hypothetical or (in the determinist case) counterfactual sense.
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