Works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte
Table of Contents
Characteristics of the Present Age
Johann Gottlieb Fichte
Characteristics of the Present Age
Published in 1806
Translated by William Smith
Table
Translators note
Lecture I
Idea of Universal History
Lecture II
General Delineation of the Third Age
Lecture III
The Life According to Reason
Lecture IV
The Life According to Reason continued
Lecture V
Farther Delineation of the Third Age
Lecture VI
Scientific Condition of the Third Age
Lecture VII
Earlier Condition of the Scientific or Literary World, and its Ideal Condition
Lecture VIII
Mysticism as a Phenomenon of the Third Age
Lecture IX
The Origin and Limits of History
Lecture X
The Absolute Form of the State
Lecture XI
Farther Definition of the Idea of the State
Lecture XII
Historical Development of the State
Lecture XIII
Influence of Christianity on the State
Lecture XIV
Development of the State in Modern Europe
Lecture XV
Public Morality of the Present Age
Lecture XVI
Public Religion of the Present Age
Lecture XVII
Conclusion
Translator's note
The reader will do well to bear in mind that the 'Present Age' characterized in these lectures was the great transition period of Modern Europe,the Age of Voltaire, Rousseau, Diderot and the Encyclopaedists on the one hand, and of Lessing, Kant, Goethe and Schiller on the other.
William Smith
Lecture I
Idea of Universal History
The End of the Life of Mankind on Earth is this,that in this Life they may order all their relations with Freedom according to Reason. This Earthly Life may be divided into Five Principal Epochs.
WE now enter upon a series of meditations which, nevertheless, at bottom contains only a single thought, constituting of itself one organic whole. If I could at once communicate to you this single thought in the same clearness with which it must necessarily be present to my own mind before I begin my undertaking, and with which it must guide me in every word which I have now to address to you, then from the first step of our progress, perfect light would overspread the whole path which we have to pursue together. But I am compelled gradually, and in your own sight, to build up this single thought out of its several parts, disengaging it at the same time from various modifying elements: this is the necessary condition of every communication of thought, and only by this its fundamental law does that which in itself is but one single thought become expanded and broken up into a series of thoughts and meditations.
Such being the case, and especially as I am not here to repeat what has been already known of old, but to put forth new views of things,I must request of you at the outset not to be surprised if our subject does not at first manifest that clearness which, according to the laws of all communication of thought, it can acquire only through subsequent development; and I must entreat you to look for perfect light only at our conclusion, when a complete survey of the whole shall have become possible. Nevertheless it is the duty of every man who undertakes to propound any subject whatever, to take care that each separate thought shall assume its proper place in his arrangement, and be produced there with all the distinctness which it is possible to throw around it in that place, at least for those who can appreciate distinct language, and are capable of following a connected discourse; and I shall use my most earnest efforts to fulfil this duty.
With this first and only premonition, let us now, without farther delay, proceed to our subject.
A philosophical picture of the Present Age is what we have promised in these lectures. But that view only can be called philosophical which refers back the multiform phenomena which lie before us in experience to the unity of one common principle, and, on the other hand, from that one principle can deduce and completely explain those phenomena. The mere Empiricist who should undertake a description of the Age would seize upon some of its most striking phenomena, just as they presented themselves to casual observation, and recount these, without having any assured conviction that he had understood them all, and without being able to point out any other connexion between them than their coexistence in one and the same time. The Philosopher who should propose to himself the task of such a description would, independently of all experience, seek out an Idea of the Age (which indeed in its own form,as Idea,cannot be apparent in experience), and exhibit the mode in which this Idea would reveal itself under the forms of the necessary phenomena of the Age; and in so doing he would distinctly exhaust the circle of these phenomena, and bring them forth in necessary connexion with each other, through the common Idea which lies at the bottom of them all. The first would be the Chronicler of the Age; the second would have made a History of it a possible thing.
In the first place, if the Philosopher must deduce from the unity of his presupposed principle all the possible phenomena of experience, it is obvious that in the fulfilment of this purpose he does not require the aid of experience; that in following it out he proceeds merely as a Philosopher, confining himself strictly within the limits which that character imposes upon him, paying no respect whatever to experience, and thus absolutely a priori, as this method is termed in scientific phraseology;and in respect to our own subject it is clear that he must be able a priori to describe Time as a whole, and all its possible Epochs. It is an entirely different question whether the present time be actually characterized by the phenomena that are deduced from the principle which he may lay down, and thus whether the Age so pictured by the speaker be really the Present Age,should he maintain such a position, as we, for example, shall maintain it. On this part of the subject every man must consult for himself the experience of his life, and compare it with the history of the Past, as well as with his anticipations of the Future; for here the business of the Philosopher is at an end, and that of the Observer of the world and of men begins. We, for our part, intend to be no more than philosophers in this place, and have bound ourselves to nothing more; and thus the final judgment, so soon as you are in a position to pass such a judgment, must devolve upon you. It is now our business, in the first place, strictly to settle and define our theme.
Thus then: Every particular Epoch of Time, as we have already hinted above, is the fundamental Idea of a particular Age. These Epochs and fundamental Ideas of particular Ages, however, can only be thoroughly understood by and through each other, and by means of their relation to Universal Time. Hence it is clear that the Philosopher, in order to be able rightly to characterize any individual Ageand, if he will, his ownmust first have understood a priori and thoroughly penetrated into the signification of Universal Time and all its possible Epochs.
This comprehension of Universal Time, like all philosophical comprehension, again presupposes a fundamental Idea of Time; an Idea of a fore-ordered, although only gradually unfolding, accomplishment of Time, in which each successive period is determined by the preceding; or, to express this more shortly and in more common phraseology,it presupposes a World-plan, which, in its primitive unity, may be clearly comprehended, and from which may be correctly deduced all the great Epochs of human life on Earth, so that they may be distinctly understood both in their origin, and in their connexion with each other. The former,the World-plan,is the fundamental Idea of the entire life of Man on Earth; the latter,the chief Epochs of this life,are the fundamental Ideas of particular Ages of which we have spoken, from which again the phenomena of these Ages are to be deduced.
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