Steven E. Schier - How Trump Happened: A System Shock Decades in the Making

Steven E. Schier is Dorothy H. and Edward C. Congdon Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Carleton College, where he taught for thirty-six years. Twelve times he directed the Carleton in Washington program, an off-campus term of study he founded in 1983. Dr. Schier is the author, co-author, or editor of twenty-two books. His most recent titles for Rowman & Littlefield are The Trump Presidency: Outsider in the Oval Office (2017), coauthored with Todd E. Eberly; Debating the Obama Presidency (2016), an edited volume; and Polarized: The Rise of Ideology in US Politics (2016), also coauthored with Todd E. Eberly.

Todd E. Eberly is professor of political science and public policy at St. Marys College of Maryland. He specializes in contemporary American politics with a focus on the effect of polarization on voters, government, and governing. Professor Eberly has written four books with Steven Schier of Carleton College. Their first book, American Government and Popular Discontent was released in June 2013. Their second book, The Rise of Ideology in America, was released in 2015. Their third book, The Trump Presidency: Outsider in the Oval Office was published in September 2017. Professor Eberly is an advisor to Project Vote Smart and his analysis and commentary have been featured in the Washington Post, the Baltimore Sun, CNBC, and public radio/television. He has served as an expert witness in cases challenging gerrymandered congressional districts and has consulted with the centrist organization Third Way. He was named one of the most influential voices in Maryland politics by Campaigns and Elections magazine and the St. Marys College Student Government Association honored him with the Faculty Student Life Award. He lives in Southern, Maryland, with his wife and two daughters.

H ow did a billionaire and reality TV star with no political experience and a campaign in a seeming state of constant chaos defeat one of the most experienced, well-known, and well-funded political dynasties in America (two dynasties if you include his defeat of Jeb Bush in the GOP primary)? Though there is no shortage of theories, including racism, sexism, and Russian interference, it is worth considering the possibility that the outcome of the election was predictable. Though stunning, the 2016 election of Donald Trump to the presidency was decades in the making.

Three trends since the 1960s created the conditions for his triumph. First, a growing popular discontent with government, long evident in public opinion surveys, created a widespread distrust of established leaders and institutions. Second, America underwent the rise of professional government. Governing professionals are an elite built on merit through occupational accomplishment. They now dominate interest groups, the bureaucracy, courts, institutional presidency, and Congress. Many government professionals perceive little need to mobilize the public in the way parties did in previous eras. This has furthered the sense of disconnect among the public and created a self-reinforcing chain. Third, political parties and governing institutions are now polarized around rival teams of ideological, partisan elites. Democrats are increasingly uniformly progressive and Republicans uniformly conservative. The intense battles between these polarized teams often result in government gridlock.

The three trends are mutually reinforcing. Distant government professionals help to fuel popular discontent. Polarized political warfare among political activists and governmental officials and the gridlock it produces spurs popular disgust with the squabbling and empowers professional governmental employees when elected officials create polarized paralysis.

Recent decades have witnessed a collapse in confidence, or trust, in government and the rise of negative partisanship driven not by loyalty to party but rather opposition to the other party. A driving force behind both is voter anger. That anger produces an environment ripe for populist candidates as well as recurrent populist uprisings among the electorate. As such, its important to establish what each means.

Since the 1960s, trust in government has declined and remained at low levels. Along with declining party identification, low trust is an indicator of greater public disaffection with the political system. A widely studied measure of trust comes from the University of Michigans National Election Studies (NES). Since 1964, the NES has computed a Trust Index of responses to four questions: (1) How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is rightjust about always, most of the time, or only some of the time? (2) Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or dont waste very much of it? (3) Would you say that government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? (4) Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?

The Trust Index score ranges from 0100. A low score indicates a lack of trust while a higher score is indicative of greater public trust in government. In 1966 the Trust Index score was 61, but within a decade it fell to 30. Though there were occasional upticks in the score, it hovered near 30 for most of the 1970s until 2008 before falling to 17 in 2016.

What caused the collapse of the Trust Index score? Researchers have identified many possible explanations: economic difficulties, crime rates, child poverty, citizens evaluations of incumbents and institutions, political scandals and negative media coverage of politics. The Trust Index fell during decades that witnessed a divisive Vietnam War, a civil rights revolution, the impeachment of two presidents, a presidential resignation and pardon, severe recessions and stagflation, periods of high unemployment, and the rise of polarized politics.

Additionally, the rise of more professionalism among governing elites has contributed to a dissatisfied and unhappy public. Those in various professional occupations now dominate American government due to the rise in education levels since the 1950s and the need for informed policy experts to carry out the ever-growing responsibilities of government. Even at the state level, there has been an increase in the number of professional legislatures since the 1960s. Governing professionals are an elite built on merit through occupational accomplishment. They now populate interest groups, the bureaucracy, courts, the institutional presidency, and Congress.

Many governing professionals perceive little need to mobilize the public broadly the way political parties did in previous eras. Three examples illustrate this. First, candidates now narrowly target their appeals to likely voters. Second, unelected judges increasingly engage in policymaking behavior previously the province of elected legislatures. Third, the great growth in professional interest group activity since 1970 has produced a proliferation of elite advocacy strategies. In an era of professional advocacy, policymaking need not involve the successful channeling of mass preferences.

Changing behavior in national institutions transformed governance as well. Congressional incumbents electoral security improved considerablyduring the 1960s and 1970s and that security contributed to legislative professionalism. In 1960, the total individual staff for Representatives was 2,444 or an average of nearly 6 staff members per legislator. Comparable increases occurred in staff for Senators. Committee and subcommittee staff increased as well. Total committee staff numbered 394 in 1960 and grew to over 1,200 by 2005. By 1974 the number of staff had more than doubled to 5,109 or 12 staff members per legislator. In the Senate, committee staff rose from 433 in 1960 to 883 in 2005.