Nicholas Humphrey - A History of the Mind: Evolution and the Birth of Consciousness

SIMON & SCHUSTER

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Copyright 1992 by Nicholas Humphrey

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Originally published in Great Britain by Chatto & Windus Ltd.

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Humphrey, Nicholas.

A history of the mind / Nicholas Humphrey.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. ConsciousnessHistory. 2. Mind and bodyHistory. 3. Senses and sensationHistory. 4. Genetic psychology.

I. Title.

BF311.H777 1992

128.2dc20 92-18734

CIP

ISBN: 0-671-68644-5

F OR A YLA

CONTENTS

An introduction to the problemthe apparent incommensurability of mind and brainsolutions and nonsolutionsa hopeless task?Leibnizs milllevels of descriptionthe promise of functionalism.

The difficulty of saying just what one meanshow words convey too much or too littlespeaking about consciousness.

A world without phenomenalifestuff and the importance of bodily boundariesme and not-methe primacy of affectthe evolution of sensitivityrepresentations and action planswhat is happening to me versus what is happening out theresensory signs and perceptual signifiedsthe dual track of mental evolution.

Thomas Reid on the crucial distinction between sensation and perceptionStarbuck on intimate and defining sensesproblems with wordsthe question of how the two modes of representation are relatedserial or parallel channels in the brain?

Vision as a test case of the distinctionthe embarrassment of philosophers who fail to appreciate ithow vision evolved from a skin-senseskin becomes eyeeye remains skinthe persistence of visual intimacy.

Intimate responses to the touch of colored light in human beingsthe aesthetics of colorexaggerated reactions in illnessManfred Clynes on sentic responses.

The culture of sensationPlatonic prejudices against sensory intimacyRomantic reactionsImpressionist paintingKant and Czanne on the subjectivity of beautysensation in pure contemplationAldous Huxley on the intensification of sensation from consciousness-expanding drugs.

The possibility of attending selectively to one or other channelmonkeys give evidence of switching between modesperceptual interest versus sensory pleasureRoger Fry on a parallel distinction in peoples response to art.

9 IT MUST LOOK QUEER!

Why so much of mental philosophy must be guided by sensory psychologynothing is in the mind that was not first in the senseswhat is at issue for a theory of consciousnessLocke and Wittgenstein on the inverted spectrumDiderot on the need for real experimental data.

Experiments to prove that sensation and perception can go their own waysupside-down vision: perceptual adaptation without sensory changeskin-vision: visual perception with persistent tactile sensation.

Clinical evidence for parallel sensory and perceptual channels in the brainsensation without perception?the visual agnosiasperception without sensation?subliminal perceptionblindsight after damage to the visual cortex.

What is blindsight like?the case of Helen, a monkey who just knew what is out therehuman parallelsblindsight as visual perception that has nothing to do with methe role of sensation in sanctioning perception.

The difference between just knowing and feelingimagination and memorythe sensory thinness of imagesa hypothetical case of hearing oneself hearevolutionary considerationsthe bareness of imagination marks off imagery from realityliving in the subjective present of sensationthe in-between status of images.

14 HE THOUGHT HE SAW AN ELEPHANT

Toward a theory of imagerysensation as copying, perception as storytellingthe need to catch perceptual errorsechoing back to the sourcewhere does the comparison take place?evidence that it involves the sensory channelillusions and phenomenal regression to the real objecta specific hypothesissensory-perceptual rivalrydreams as a limiting caseevidence from neurophysiology.

To be conscious is essentially to have sensationsI feel, therefore I ameight assertions that follow.

What consciousness means and why the word is neededetymological considerationstransitive and intransitive consciousnessthe having of sensations as a natural concepta childs-eye viewhow the word consciousness is learnedhow it is actually usedconsciousness and affectwhy theories that fail to address sensation sidestep the real problem.

What is it to have sensations?five characteristic properties that distinguish sensations from perceptionsbelonging to the subjectbeing tied to a particular site in the bodyhaving a modality-specific qualitybeing present-tense, existing entitiesbeing self-characterizing in all these respectshow can these features of sensations be related to a plausible mechanism in the brain?

18 THE PROBLEM OF OWNERSHIP (A TACK TO STARBOARD)

What does it mean to say my sensations are my own?the problem of ownership in generalthe primacy of owning ones own bodyhow bodily ownership originates with the experience of control over ones limbsI as the source of voluntary agencycorroborative evidence from Siamese twins and cases of paralysisownership in general as de facto controlI as the author of my own sensations?the possibility that sensations are a form of bodily activity I undertake.

Further analogies between sensations and bodily activitiesthe nature of indexicals and a strong argument that followsthe only way of indicating the here and now of an event is to create a physical disturbance at a relevant location: hence the activity of sensing must reach out to do something at the very place where the sensation is felt.

The evolutionary pedigree of sensory activityhow sensory representations began as affective responses at the body surfacethe sensory epithelium was also the responsive epitheliumthe sensory loop lengthened while the response continued to reach back to the body surfaceeven human sensory responses are descended from what were originally amoeboid wriggles of acceptance or rejection.

The problem of what constitutes sensory qualityhow could such wriggles (or sentiments) underlie the full range of human sensations?sentiments at the body surface have an adverbial stylemodal quality is determined by the structure of the epithelium, submodal quality by the function of the affective responsea musical analogy.

22 SPECIFIC NERVE ENERGIES?

More about sensory qualitythe traditional theory of specific nerve energies and why it doesnt workputting the emphasis on output rather than inputmodes of bodily acting as an analogy for modes of sensingthe possibility of an objective phenomenology.

Only mental things are real?evidence against the involvement of the real body surface in sensationsphantom limbs, the visual blind spotthe need for a Mark-2 theoryan inner model as a substitute for the real body?how this inner model could have evolved at the cortex through the short-circuiting of the sensory loopcerebral sentiments as opposed to corporeal oneswhat are cerebral sentiments now doing?

What is meant by the claim that to feel a sensation is to issue appropriate instructions for sentiments?why more has to be said about the nature of instructionsinstructions are intentional and must have an anticipated outcome, but a train of nerve impulses