Christopher Lawless - Forensic Science: A Sociological Introduction

Sociology has applied itself, with significant fruitfulness, to the topic of science and technology. Sociologists of science and technology study the ways in which scientific knowledge shapes and becomes embedded in social identities, institutions, structures, representations and discourses. Their work has given rise to a field of study which has grown to be highly interdisciplinary, drawing upon sociological, anthropological, philosophical, historical, economic and other approaches to understand the relationship between science, technology and society. This field is often referred to by the term Science and Technology Studies (STS).

STS research regards scientific knowledge as a topic rather than a resource. STS has explored the social processes which generate scientific knowledge claims (and their subsequent social impacts), regardless of where they originate (Bloor 1976). It makes no a priori assumptions about the status of particular scientific claims or the precise position they occupy in social contexts. STS has indicated that a wide range of factors influence the construction of scientific knowledge. Scientific claims may be controversial and contested, and some may perceive risks to the public in applications of science and technology. Numerous examples, such as the BSE crisis and controversies over genetically modified organisms, highlight the potential for tensions to exist between science and society at large. In such cases, a range of actors, including non-scientists, may find themselves drawn into debates over the risks and social impact of science. This too applies to forensic science.

Social research on forensic science raises a number of questions of epistemological significance, namely how knowledge is created and belief is justified when science meets law. Among other insights, STS research has highlighted the complications inherent in establishing testable scientific evidence in legal environments, and the problems of maintaining the balance between two interdependent but distinctly different forms of authority (Jasanoff 2008). STS research on forensic science has studied how law and science maintain a balance between the contingency of legal decision-making, involving highly specific sets of circumstances, and the scientific ambitions of universality and transcendence (Jasanoff 1998). Lawscience interactions have sometimes been framed as involving process (law) contending with progress (science) (Goldberg 1994; Aronson 2007).

Conveying scientific claims in the courtroom presents complexities. Here, scientific expert witnesses are exposed to the scrutiny of legal professionals who have very different training and knowledge bases. Specific legal procedures have to be followed. In adversarial courts, expert witnesses are subject to questioning and cross-examination. Sociologists have noted that the lines of questioning employed by lawyers conducting cross-examination may not necessarily be intended to rigorously investigate knowledge claims in the manner of scientific peer review (Jasanoff 1995; Lynch 1998). Instead, lawyers, acting in the vested interests of prosecution or defence positions, may simply seek to catch a witness out or sow uncertainty in the minds of jurors.

STS regards forensic evidence as something which is shaped by both science and law, operating interdependently but with outcomes which may not be fully intentional or foreseen. Related research has captured the interplay and tensions between communities involved in the shaping of scientific knowledge presented for the purposes of legal decision-making (Jasanoff 1998; Lynch 2004). These groups may themselves encompass scientists (or those who claim to be scientists), and avowedly non-scientific actors, including politicians, publics, lawyers and other professional actors. One challenge for these groups concerns the contingent nature of criminal cases. Truth may often be stranger than fiction when it comes to establishing a particular set of circumstances during which a crime may have occurred. Reaching some kind of resolution over a criminal case may require quite esoteric forms of knowledge to be considered, and some claims to expertise which may not have a fully established or agreed scientific basis. Given these circumstances, lawyers and other participants in criminal justice systems may contribute to the shaping of particular instances of forensic scientific knowledge as much as expert witnesses. Some researchers, such as Gary Edmond (2001), have asserted that this kind of knowledge cannot be reduced to the level of producing scientific knowledge in laboratories alone, nor, however, can it be totally ascribed to the effects of legal procedure (Edmond 2001). Instead, Edmond uses the term law-set to describe the collectives of lawyers, scientists and other actors who may not share the same epistemological backgrounds, but together shape certain framings of forensic knowledge in courtroom proceedings. The nature and functioning of law-sets may vary from case to case.

If, as Edmond suggests, discussions over forensic science conflate law, science and other societal framings, how then can we determine whether a specific form of knowledge is scientific or not? This echoes a key problem which has challenged philosophers of science, namely the issue of distinguishing science from non-science, often referred to as the demarcation problem (Popper 1965). Law is still faced with the task of ensuring that legal decision-making is based on knowledge which can be regarded as valid and reliable. Determining the scientific status of forensic evidence is still an important part of establishing the admissibility of evidence in the eyes of courts. If the overlapping authorities of science and law both participate in the shaping of forensic knowledge, how may courts draw the lines between scientific and non-scientific knowledge to help them make decisions concerning admissibility? Some sociologists have responded to this and the philosophical problem of demarcation by questioning the notion that prescriptive rules can be developed to distinguish science from non-science. Instead, they suggest that the demarcation of science should be regarded as a matter of empirical study (see, for example, Gieryn 1983; Lynch and McNally 2003).