Alexander Lanoszka - Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation
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Do alliances curb efforts by states to develop nuclear weapons? Atomic Assurance looks at what makes alliances sufficiently credible to prevent nuclear proliferation; how alliances can break down and so encourage nuclear proliferation; and whether security guarantors like the United States can use alliance ties to end the nuclear efforts of their allies.Alexander Lanoszka finds that military alliances are less useful in preventing allies from acquiring nuclear weapons than conventional wisdom suggests. Through intensive case studies of West Germany, Japan, and South Korea, as well as a series of smaller cases on Great Britain, France, Norway, Australia, and Taiwan, Atomic Assurance shows that it is easier to prevent an ally from initiating a nuclear program than to stop an ally that has already started one; in-theater conventional forces are crucial in making American nuclear guarantees credible; the American coercion of allies who started, or were tempted to start, a nuclear weapons program has played less of a role in forestalling nuclear proliferation than analysts have assumed; and the economic or technological reliance of a security-dependent ally on the United States works better to reverse or to halt that allys nuclear bid than anything else.Crossing diplomatic history, international relations, foreign policy, grand strategy, and nuclear strategy, Lanoszkas book reworks our understanding of the power and importance of alliances in stopping nuclear proliferation.
Alexander Lanoszka: author's other books
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Alexander Lanoszka
Mark Fitzpatrick
Benjamin Frankel
Jeffrey W. Knopf
Stephen J. Cimbala
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Atomic Assurance
The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation
ALEXANDER LANOSZKA
Cornell University Press
Ithaca and London
To my parents
Contents
Acknowledgments
It took many years for this book to come together. At Princeton University, John Ikenberry was especially helpful and generous; he never let me lose sight of the big picture. Tom Christensen, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and David Carter provided extensive and varied feedback. Aaron Friedberg provided useful commentary and supportthrough the Bradley Foundationat a critical juncture when this project was still in its infancy. I also benefited immensely from fellowships at the Security Studies Program and the Dickey Center for International Understanding at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Dartmouth College, respectively. At MIT, where I was a Stanton Fellow, I am grateful for the mentorship I received from Barry Posen and Frank Gavin. Indeed, Frank has been a wonderful ally over the years. I learned much from Owen Cot, Vipin Narang, and Jim Walsh as well as Henrik Hiim and Julia Macdonald. The Stanton Foundation contributed funding to this project. At Dartmouth, I held a manuscript workshop that saw the participation of Bill Wohlforth, Steve Brooks, Ben Valentino, Jeff Friedman, Brian Greenhill, Joshua Shifrinson, and Katy Powers. Tim Crawford drove up from Boston and took the lead at that workshop, providing me with a new vision for the manuscript.
I have many other friends and colleagues to thank, whether for the support they provided or for the feedback they gave when I was working on this book. They include Alexander Alden, Dan Altman, Danny Bessner, Matthew Fuhrmann, Kiichi Fujiwara, Kate Gheoghegan, Mauro Gilli, Andrea Gilli, Tsuyoshi Goroku, Brendan Green, Kristen Harkness, Matthew Kroenig, Raymond Kuo, Akira Kurosaki, Christine Leah, Andreas Lutsch, Rupal Mehta, Rohan Mukherjee, Leah Sarson, Jonas Schneider, Luis Simn, Henry Sokolski, Jeffrey Taliaferro, Nobuhiko Tamaki, and Simon Toner. Michael Hunzeker, in particular, read numerous drafts over the years. I could not have asked for a better friend. Sandy Hager, Leonie Fleischmann, Iosif Kovras, Ronen Palan, Inderjeet Parmar, and Madura Rasaratnam are among the many scholars and friends who have made City, University of London a wonderful place to work. I apologize to those whom I forgot to mention. I also thank Roger Haydon, for his superb assistance, and the staff at Cornell University Press. They are all consummate professionalsit was a pleasure to have the opportunity to work with them. Robert Art and the reviewers gave terrific feedback that helped me to clarify and to improve key parts of the book.
Emmanuelle Richez entered my life when this book was already under review. She has been a tremendous source of love and comfort, motivating me always to see the bright side of things and to power through the work that needed to be done when this project was in its final stages. I am very grateful to have her support.
Finally, I want to thank my family. I have treasured their emotional support and encouragement. Some of the issues raised by this book acquired a personal significance for my relatives and me, as we have become alarmed by the geopolitical developments in Polands region that began in 2014. I especially thank Danusia, Kasia, Rafa, and my grandparents Marianna and Tadeusz. Most of all, I thank my parents, Anna and Marek, to whom I dedicate this book. Their love and unconditional support were never in doubt.
Introduction
The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation
Tensions were high on the Korean Peninsula. Fears of nuclear proliferation were rife, and a newly elected American president had gone on record saying unflattering things about the South Korean government. Such was the context in mid-1977 when the American ambassador in Seoul met with various government officials and scientists, in part to discuss what could be done to prevent South Korea from undertaking nuclear weapons activities. During that meeting, a nuclear scientist proposed that one solution would involve the United States extending the same nuclear umbrella policy to South Korea as that given already to Japan. This proposal struck the ambassador as nonsensical. After all, South Korea benefited from a nuclear umbrella thanks to its treaty alliance with the United States and the tactical nuclear weapons that American forces had stationed on its territory. The only change to the alliance was the full withdrawal of American ground forces from South Koreaa policy for which President Jimmy Carter had advocated during his presidential campaign. And so the ambassador wrote back to the State Department in Washington, decrying the evidence of ignorance at very senior government levels of either costs or risks [sic] involved in the weapons development program over and above seriously adverse impact on US relationship [sic].
Carter ultimately decided against his planned troop withdrawal, and South Korea did not acquire a nuclear weapons capability, but the episode raises important questions that continue to resonate into the twenty-first century. Why did the alliance break down so as to create proliferation risks? And to what extent was the alliance responsible for restraining South Koreas nuclear ambitions? These questions in turn speak to a much larger concern: what is the relationship between alliances and nuclear proliferation?
Ever since the United States forged its alliances with partners around the world at the beginning of the Cold War, many experts agree that alliances have yielded important strategic benefits. Alliances enable the United States to manage local conflicts, to prevent arms races, and to reassure partners that the United States will defend them in a military crisis that involves a shared adversary. The result is that recipients of these security guarantees feel less need to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Even when allies have pursued nuclear weapons development, the United States would coerce them into halting their ambitions. Such is the emerging narrative of the American experience of the nuclear era: that alliances are effective nonproliferation tools and that the Cold War is largely a story of American nonproliferation success. This nonproliferation mission could become more challenging to undertake if predictions of American decline are true and allies are growing in power relative to the United States.
This book challenges this emerging narrative by making two related claims. The first claim is that military alliances are important tools for thwarting nuclear proliferation, but they are more susceptible to breakdown and credibility concerns than some accounts in the international relations literature presume. Indeed, why alliances should ever be a viable solution for nuclear proliferation is puzzling, since international agreements ought to be fundamentally unbelievable in the absence of a world government that can enforce them. Even if we accept that strong commitments are possible, those very commitments risk emboldening those allies to undertake aggressive foreign policies that are contrary to the interests of the United States.
The second claim is that although the United States has played a key role in enforcing the nuclear nonproliferation regime, we should be careful not to attribute too much success to the United States. It encountered severe difficulties in curbing suspect nuclear behaviors of key allies like West Germany and Japan, to say nothing of Great Britain and Franceallies that feared American abandonment yet succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons. South Korea often serves as an example of the effectiveness of American coercion, but the state of its nuclear program made South Korea an easy target at a time when the United States wanted to demonstrate its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, the proliferation scare that took place during Jimmy Carters presidency happened after the United States had seemingly shut down South Koreas nuclear weapons program and strong-armed Seoul into ratifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). That nonproliferation campaign took place between 1974 and 1976. Safeguard violations persisted into the early 1980s. Put together, from the perspective of Washington, deterring nuclear weapons interest is easier than eliminating it once it has become activated. This is the main message of this book.
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