Re-evaluating Irish national security policy
To my wife Fidelma Hawes and children Alexandra and Harry for whom the words husband and father have too often merged into one: work.
Re-evaluating Irish national security policy
Affordable threats?
Michael Mulqueen
Copyright Michael Mulqueen 2009
The right of Michael Mulqueen to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
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ISBN 978 0 7190 8027 2
First published 2009
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Contents
Abbreviations
ACOUSINT | acoustic intelligence |
ARW | Army Ranger Wing |
ATCP | Aid to the Civil Power |
C3 | Forerunner to CSB |
CSB | Crime and Security Branch |
DDIS/FE | Danish Defence Intelligence Service/Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste |
DF | Defence Forces |
EEZ | European Exclusive Economic Zone |
ESDP | European Security and Defence Policy |
FARC | Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia |
FCA | Frsa Cosanta itiuil (forerunner to the Irish Army Reserve) |
G2 | Irish military intelligence service |
HUMINT | human intelligence |
MAR-INFO | Maritime Information Group |
NSC | National Security Committee |
ODCE | Office of the Director of Corporate Enforcement |
OEP | Office of Emergency Planning |
OSINT | open source intelligence |
PDF | Permanent Defence Forces |
PET | Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (Danish national security intelligence service) |
PfP NATOs | Partnership for Peace |
PRSTV | Proportional Representation by Single Transferable Vote |
PULSE | Police Using Leading edge Systems Effectively |
RT | Radio Telefs ireann |
SPO | Skerhetspolisen (Swedish domestic intelligence agency) |
SDU | Special Detective Unit |
SIGINT | Signals Intelligence |
SIS/MI6 | UK Secret Intelligence Service |
Preface
This book examines how national security policy may prevent but also unwittingly facilitate terrorist attacks. September 11 2001 provides an obvious starting point. The immense public tragedy of that day confirmed the folly of assuming that state organisations even those responsible for our security could readily set aside their histories, bureaucracies and politics and prepare objectively against a shared threat. A striking conclusion to emerge from the investigations after the attack was the scale of the inter- and intra-organisational wrangling and the ensuing gaps in security.
Questions of policy and the organisational coherence it is meant to underpin are applied here in a theoretically informed analysis of the Irish national security response to transnational terrorism. The book closely examines Irelands national security apparatus, about which little is known despite international interest in Irish political violence and the Northern Ireland Peace Process. Crime and Security Branch (CSB), the internal security agency operating within An Garda Sochna; G2, the military intelligence organisation; and the National Security Committee of senior officials and officers which advises the Irish Government on security matters, receive particular attention. The investigation begins with the Irish governments initial security policy response to the attack of 9/11 and ends with an assessment of where policy stands in mid-2008. Two sets of conclusions emerge. The first concerns theory and the second, policy.
Firstly on the theoretical foundations of security policy study, a historical approach is called for. Public policy-makers prefer to remain on reliable paths and so few junctures of fundamental change occur. In the Irish case political and public unity in the weeks after 9/11 combined into pressure for a complete reappraisal of the States low-profile, low-cost national security policy. In a short time, however, the departments and agencies concerned managed matters such that they were able to revert to pre-defined patterns. What developments occurred carried with them a high degree of organisational familiarity, reflecting especially the structures, policies and traditions built up during almost forty years of violent conflict in Northern Ireland.
The Irish case also suggests that the period of confusion between the committal of an attack and the unveiling of a multi-faceted policy response can last but a matter of days owing, not least, to the pressure of public outcry for action. The scope for decision-making mistakes is obvious but the need to be seen to do something is greater. Bureaucratic politics provides a means to underpin analysis of this period, during which the policy community is cut loose from its familiar traffic rules yet must take a decisive course. It may be one of the most established conceptual approaches in modern political enquiry but, as this study finds, it is well suited to the task of analysing the decisions of national security policy managers under severe political pressure.
Conceptual tools to identify the dynamics of policy decision-making must be accompanied by a model which helps assess the likely effectiveness of the policy itself. Key here, in the context of transnational terrorism in a new media age, is a model that can evaluate policy not only in terms of the traditional concerns of protecting the territory and institutional expression of the state, but also as it pertains to the idea that binds state and society. Such a model should as is done here consider the direct or indirect nature of the threat, the distance of threat and the probability and consequence of it manifesting into an attack.