Putins Russia: Really Back?
Edited by Aldo Ferrari
2016 Ledizioni LediPublishing
Via Alamanni, 11 20141 Milano Italy
www.ledizioni.it
Putins Russia: Really Back? Edited by Aldo Ferrari
First edition: July 2016
Print ISBN 9788867054817
ePub ISBN 9788867054824
Pdf ISBN 9788867054992
DOI 10.14672/67054992
ISPI. Via Clerici, 5
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The Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) is an independent think tank dedicated to being a resource for government officials, business executives, journalists, civil servants, students and the public at large wishing to better understand international issues. It monitors geopolitical areas as well as major trends in international affairs. Founded in Milan in 1934, ISPI is the only Italian Institute and one of the few in Europe to place research activities side by side to training, organization of international conferences, and the analysis of the international environment for businesses. Comprehensive interdisciplinary analysis is achieved through close collaboration with experts (academics and non-academics alike) in political, economic, legal, historical and strategic studies and through an evergrowing network of think tanks, research centers and Universities in Europe and beyond.
Introduction
In 2014, with annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and pro-Russian demonstrations in the Donbass area of Ukraine, which first escalated into an open conflict and then into de facto secession, Moscows international behavior entered a new phase.
This assertiveness, more reactive to events than part of an active, well defined strategy beyond the advancement of Russias objective to recuperate recognition as an indispensable player in world affairs, has received mixed assessments as to its effectiveness.
It resulted in sanctions against Moscow (targeting sectoral cooperation and trade as well as suspension from the Group of Eight-G8), thus aggravating the countrys economic crisis (mostly due to low energy prices). It produced a rethinking of NATOs stance in Eastern Europe. As a consequence, various Western analysts did not rule out Russias further marginalization in world affairs.
However, Russias ability to reaffirm its role in regional contexts particularly the Mediterranean/Middle East despite a stagnating economy at home, forced many scholars and observers to reconsider their previous positions.
The attempts made by Washington and Brussels to influence or constrain Moscow have not produced the expected results. Thanks to its crucial role in mediating the Iranian nuclear agreement, Moscow gained the reputation of an effective and, to some extent, trustworthy international partner, a circumstance that even Obama was obliged to acknowledge. The military intervention in the Syrian conflict demonstrated that Moscow was still capable of resolute and game changing initiatives. It has become clear that no settlement in Syria will be possible without taking Russian interests into account.
No doubt, Putins recovered assertiveness takes advantage of the uncertain leadership of the West. Today Moscows activism in international politics stands out as ambitious and able to project Russian influence, also in contexts where Western interests overlap.
Nonetheless, we should investigate for how long and to what extent Russia will be able to pursue its international objectives.
The Syrian crisis provides a perfect example of the complex challenges confronting Moscow. At a time when US strategy against ISIS was proving quite ineffective, Russias intervention was a game changer, gaining time for Assads regime and consolidating Moscows foothold in the country and the region. The Kremlin was shrewdly exploited this at the global level to convey the image of a decisive Russia, amplified by the spectacular images of the Marynsky Orchestra playing amid Palmyras ruins. Nevertheless, within a success story, lies a series of not-so-successful results. Russian military operations in northern Syria have caused a strain in the relations with Ankara (especially after the shooting down of the Russian Sukhoi bomber aircraft), even if now apparently absorbed. Support for Assad, alongside Tehran and Hezbollah, could be a complicating factor in relations between Moscow and the wider Muslim world, without forgetting the feelings of its own Sunni population.
If, at the moment, the priority of fighting ISIS has toned down the disagreement with the US over the future of Syria, the confrontation with the West and the Sunni regional powers is likely to resume.
Furthermore, Putins role in Syria, as well as his contribution to the nuclear deal with Iran, were unable to convince the West to soften its position on the frozen crisis with Kiev.
In other words, Moscow has not been able, up to now, to link the different issues in order to maximize its advantage.
The Syrian and Ukrainian cases show that Russia under Putin is ready to react forcefully to developments it considers detrimental to its interests, but they dont tell the whole story of Moscows current international ambitions and strategy. Indeed, the Kremlin is involved in wider geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics that may be less detectable but speak volumes about Russias revived ambitions at the global level. The Eurasian Economic Union seems to be advancing, although the Ukrainian crisis could to undermine it. Moscow is also carefully outlining a strategy aimed at scaling-up its relations with China. Aware of its key interests in the East, Russia wishes to be a bridge between China and Europe. If anything, for its geographical position.
Building upon these assumptions, it is worth asking whether this strategy is adequately supported by the necessary means and is sustainable, given also that it carries risks and costs. And how is it going to affect relations with the US and the European Union?
This report aims at highlighting Russias overall current foreign policy strategy and its ability to translate it into concrete results. Therefore, attention is also devoted to the resources that Moscow can tap to support its ambitions. In this context, it will focus on the controversial Russian economic and political pivot towards Asia, with particular attention to China, and its never-ending confrontation with the US. In addition, it attempts to shed light on Russian policies in the Middle East, from the attitude towards the Libyan revolution to the decision to intervene in Syria. The report will also take into account the evolution of Moscows foreign policy towards other post-Soviet countries, in Europe (particularly vis--vis Ukraine) and in the Caucasus and Central Asia, especially with regard to the Eurasian Economic Union.
In his opening chapter, Philip Hanson addresses the economic sustainability of global Russian strategy and how the political and economic ambitions of Moscow interact. While Russias objectives in terms of foreign policy seem to have been generally attained, the Kremlin cannot be equally satisfied with the countrys economic performance over the last years. Economic constraints are forcing a pause in military spending. This might concretely limit Russias political ambitions as well. Only economic growth in the next few years would be compatible with a growth in defence spending, without resorting to further cuts in consumption.