Alexey Malashenko - The Fight for Influence: Russia in Central Asia

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Russia has lost much of the power and influence that the Soviet Union once enjoyed. Moscows efforts to position itself as a leader among its neighboring states and to hold on to the remnants of the post-Soviet space have largely failed. Central Asia, once firmly in the Soviet Unions sphere, is increasingly out of the Kremlins reach, and the United States and China have filled the void as Russian influence has faded.

Yet, Central Asia remains integral to Russias national interests, and Moscow wants to strengthen its position there. For the Kremlin, the region is the last best hope for restoring Russias status as a global political actor. Moscow agrees with many of the Central Asian regimes policies, and the region provides important transit routes for Russias energy resources. And by elevating its position in Central Asia, the Kremlin aims to contain the influence of outsiders and to strive for balance between the East and the West.

Will Russia be able to establish itself as the dominant power in Central Asia? Alexey Malashenko, a seasoned Central Asia expert, offers some answers. Russia in Central Asia, the culmination of years of research, offers unique insights into Russias interests and actions in the region.

Malashenko argues that Russia has sufficient economic and political potential to maintain some influence. But it cannot bring the entire region under its umbrella and will have to accept the fact that its power in Central Asia is declining. Instead of attempting to rebuild the vestiges of Soviet power, it must focus on solving real problems and crafting a cohesive strategic approach to the region.

According to Malashenkos analysis, it is clear that this adjustment will require Moscow to recognize that it is dealing not with post-Soviet republics but with new and independent states. That means Moscow will have to build partnerships based on mutual interests with each individual country rather than relying on common ideology.

Russia needs to develop a modern, dynamic Central Asia policy. This is a qualitatively new age of politics in the former Soviet space. It will soon be clear whether Russias ruling establishment is capable of understanding this new landscape and acting accordingly.

Dmitri Trenin
Director
Carnegie Moscow Center

Central Asia can hardly be called one of Russias greater foreign policy priorities, all the more so with Russian influence in the region on the decline. Russia still faces its old strategic dilemma of choosing between West and East, but if what constitutes the West is clear enough, East seems a rather vague concept. East could perhaps better be defined in Russian strategic terms as non-West, a notion that at once embraces China, the Asia-Pacific region and India, and even to some extent the entire BRIC group. This sort of choice between two global political, economic, and cultural directions is always relative rather than absolute in nature, and it is never a clear-cut and unconditional choice of strictly one or the other. At the same time, however, one cannot clearly define ones place in regional politics without first settling on ones role globally.

The post-Soviet space has been drawn into this bipolar choice: it is not the East in the fullest sense of the term, but it is also definitely not the West. This accounts for Central Asias auxiliary and even secondary status as part of both the East and the post-Soviet space, which applies throughout the entire post-Soviet territory. Russias activities in the region have centered on ways to integrate relations with it into Russian-European, Russian-Chinese, or Russian-Muslim relations. Economically, the region is of importance only in terms of providing energy transit routes. At the psychological level, however, the region is the last remaining part of an ecumenical sphere where the Kremlin still enjoys the feeling of being a political leader, albeit ever more rarely and with ever greater reservations. Moscow seriously believes the view that a suite of satellites elevates its status as a global political actor in the eyes of both East and West.

Kazakhstan has its own privileged position. Unlike the rest of the Central Asian region, it is self-sufficient, even prosperous. Its stability was shaken after deadly riots in Zhanaozen in 2011, which became emblematic of the countrys overall social and economic deterioration and failures of its political system. Still, while not immune from the general Islamization trend, Kazakhstan has managed to escape social and religious turmoil and avoid internal religious conflicts. Moreover, it enjoys particularly close relations with Russia. The two countries have similar economic and political systems, and the Kazakh presidents friendly attitude toward Vladimir Putin, initially the prime minister and then once again (since 2012) the Russian president, has strengthened the ties. In fact, Putins efforts to establish the Eurasian Union and the Common Economic Area (CEA) were based primarily on relations between Russia and Kazakhstan. Belarus, being totally financially dependent upon Moscow, has had little choice but to go along with and participate in these organizations; the same could be said of Kyrgyzstan. However, the establishment of these two institutions will not likely radically change Russias standing in Central Asia.

As Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote at the end of the last century, although Russia is too weak politically to completely close the region to outside forces, it is too poor economically to develop the region on its own. The start of the twenty-first century has brought nothing new to this: Russia still lacks the strength and the means to establish an economic or political monopoly in the region.

What has defined and shaped Russian interests in Central Asia? Or, to put it more simply, what does Russia want from the region?

First, Russia wants to retain its influence as part of its plan to strive to keep the remnants of the post-Soviet space under its own supervision.

Second, it wants to protect the authoritarian regimes in the region, which are similar in outlook and perception to the regime in Russia itself.

Third, it wants to minimize potential losses from the shift of energy resource transit routes away from its own territory.

Fourth, it wants to stem the trafficking of narcotics, insofar as this is possible.

Fifth, it wants to contain outsiders in the region (above all China and the United States) and to strive for balance between competition and partnership with them, while simultaneously doing what it can to keep them out of the region.