ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book began as a series of hand-written notes scrawled in the margins of my heavily worn copy of Thucydides The Peloponnesian War. I had been induced to read some unfamiliar passages in preparation for a discussion of the Battle of Salamis, hosted by the Liberty Fund of Indianapolis. The conversation was lively and well-informed, and I was privileged to be surrounded by a diverse group of intellectuals from many different backgrounds.
I couldnt help shake the sense that our contemporary policies could learn much from the Athenians experience. Although Greek history makes only a passing appearance in this manuscript, the ideas that I struggled withincluding the purpose and limitations of military power, the role of allies in starting or preventing wars, and the moral obligations of a government to its people, and of a people of one place to the people of anotherare not so different than those with which Pericles and Alcibiades, Cleon and Nicias, and Thucydides himself, wrestled nearly 2,500 years ago.
Thucydides likely toiled alone. I, by contrast, am fortunate to have been assisted in this project by many friends and colleagues.
To my compatriots at the Cato Institute, I have many debts to discharge. My colleagues in the Defense and Foreign Policy Department were instrumental. Justin Logan and Ted Galen Carpenter read all of the chapters, in most cases several drafts of the same chapters, and provided essential feedback every time. My newest colleague, Ben Friedman, read several chapters, and was a crucial sounding board for some of my ideas pertaining to force structure. Malou Innocent, Ionut Popescu, and Charles Zakaib provided invaluable research assistance at various stages, as well as insightful commentary on several of the chapters. Gene Healy provided detailed feedback on the entire manuscript in his never-ending quest to make me a better writer. I am also grateful to Stanley Kober, Peter Van Doren, Jagadeesh Gokhale, Jerry Taylor, and Cato Chairman Bill Niskanen for their comments and suggestions.
We have an outstanding intern program at Cato (full disclosure: I began my career in public policy many years ago as a Cato intern), and it has been my privilege to work with a number of these promising young people, including Kaylin Wainwright, Kevin Ross, Charles Rice, Brian Garst, and Jonathan Winegar-Mendez. My special thanks go out to Paul Meinshausen and Jessica Wright for their hard work and thoughtful contributions in the final weeks that enabled me to finish the manuscript on time.
I wish to thank Ed Crane and David Boaz, who have provided steady leadership at Cato for nearly three decades. In a city that treats non-conformity with utter disdain, Cato has managed to maintain its independence and creativity, and those of us who are fortunate enough to work there are all better off for it. Ed and David deserve much of the credit for making the Institute what it is today.
Many others assisted me along the way, including Doug Bandow, Winslow Wheeler, Steve Teles, Steve Klemencic, Brian Goodhart, Chris Leavitt, and Fred Sheehy. I am grateful for the patient encouragement of my Mom and Dad. Special thanks go out to J. D. Wooten for volunteering his valuable time to help out, especially with chapter 1, and to Eric Lupfer for his help in turning my idea into a proposal. Barry Posen invited me to discuss the themes contained within this book, and he and the rest of the staff at MITs Security Studies Program provided instant feedback that helped me to hone some of my arguments.
I am grateful to Robert Art, Robert Jervis, and Steve Walt, the editors of the Studies in Security Affairs series, and to Roger Haydon at Cornell University Press. I have long admired the quality of Cornell books, now I know first-hand why the press has such a stellar reputation. I am grateful to Roger for his interest in this book from the outset, and for his timely and insightful comments on early chapter drafts that had more than their fair share of rough edges. Bob Jervis offered a number of crucial suggestions that I strived to incorporate into the final manuscript. Thanks also go out to Karen Laun and Irina Burns for their copyediting, and to Judith Kip for preparing the index.
I cannot begin to thank, so I will only begin to do so, my wife Krista. She is my best friend, my trusted partner, and the love of my life. I have always benefited from her steady encouragement. Her perceptive questions and gentle criticisms have helped me to sharpen my arguments over the years. I am particularly grateful for her willingness to take on added responsibilities at home, despite her already very busy schedule. This additional help while I was writing the book allowed me to get the ideas on paper, and to do so under deadline.
Speaking of responsibilities at home, and of loving family, there are my childrenmy son Alex, and my daughter Katelynto whom this book is dedicated. As I was finishing the manuscript, we told my daughterwho was just learning to readthat someday, if she continued to pay attention to her homework, she might be able to read Daddys book. She was characteristically blunt: Why would I want to read Daddys book? Heres hoping that someday shell want to.
INTRODUCTION
This book is about U.S. power, specifically U.S. military power: what it is, how it is measured, and how it should be used. It considers how much that power costs, and what benefits we as Americans derive from it. It ponders why our power sometimes doesnt work, why our power has not contributed to our strength as a nation, and why in some cases it has actually undermined us. It explores how our possession of great power, and our willingness to use it in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, has prompted others to appeal for us to intervene in Liberia, Darfur, Burma, and Georgia.
Such calls for us to use our power persist despite its obvious shortcomings. Our enormous power did not deter or intimidate the 9/11 attackers. Saddam Hussein did not capitulate to our demands. North Korea repeatedly ignored U.S. warnings to cease and desist with its nuclear weapons production; our threats against Iran have been unavailing.
Some see our current predicament, with the United States held in low regard around the world, and with Americans deeply dissatisfied with the direction of our foreign policies, as essentially a marketing problem. They believe that if we more neatly package what we are doing, if we bind ourselves to multilateral institutions, if we pay more heed to the wishes of others, then Americans and non-Americans alike will again welcome the use of U.S. military power in more places around the world.
This book takes a very different view. We cannot convincingly tame our power such that some others will not fear us, resent us, and, in extreme cases, resist us. Meanwhile, we dont have nearly enough power to run rough-shod over others, dominating the world by threat and intimidation as past empires did. Indeed, we shouldnt want to, even if we could. In our quest to achieve and sustain global dominance, we would distort our sense of self, that which makes us Americans.