Published in the United States
by Routledge
The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2001
First published February 2001 by Routledge
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Transferred to Digital Printing 2005
Director John Chipman
Editor Mats R. Berdal
Project Manager, Design and Production Mark Taylor
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data
ISBN 0-19-850971-5
ISSN 0567-932X
Introduction
Over the last decade Turkey has been the focus of more international, particularly Western, attention than at any time in the republics history. The new security environment has enhanced, rather than diminished, Turkeys economic and strategic importance to the US. While the increasingly close relationship between the EU and Ankara, which culminated in December 1999 in Turkeys inclusion in the list of candidates for accession, has focused European attention not only on the countrys foreign relations but on whether its domestic policies comply with the Copenhagen criteria for EU membership.
To most proponents of the Western model of liberal representative democracy, the continued domination of Turkish politics by the countrys military appears to be an anomalous anachronism, even an anathema. As a result, discussions of civilmilitary relations often become coloured by moral judgments as military involvement in politics is seen as not only undesirable but almost an affront to a natural order. The purpose of this paper is neither to condemn nor to justify the Turkish militarys involvement in politics; merely to try to understand and explain. It attempts to answer three basic questions:
Why does the military exercise such influence in Turkey?
How does the military exercise such influence?
What are the implications of the militarys influence for Turkeys domestic and foreign security policies both now and into the future?
The paper argues that the role of the military in Turkey is rooted in Turkish society, history and culture. The military has always lain at the heart of how Turks define themselves; and most still regard the institution of the military as the embodiment of the highest virtues of the nation.
The resultant high public esteem in which the military is held has been enhanced, rather than eroded, by the Turkish experience of multi-party democracy. Even its detractors admit that the Turkish military is not only the most efficient institution in Turkey but has remained relatively free of the corruption that has become endemic in both the government and the civil service. Even given the low standing of politicians worldwide, Turkish politicians have a poor reputation, being almost universally regarded as venal, incompetent, unprincipled and self-serving. On several occasions in recent Turkish history, political infighting has brought the machinery of government close to collapse. In such situations it has been to the military that the Turkish public has tended to turn, either to intervene directly or to provide leadership in applying pressure to the government.
Yet the public mandate for an interventionist role in politics does not extend to support for military rule. Few Turks have pleasant memories of the two occasions when the military has taken over the government of the country.
The Turkish militarys role as a moderating power,
But what makes the Turkish military unique is that it sees itself as having an almost sacred duty to protect an indigenous ideology, namely Kemalism, the principles laid down by the founder of the Turkish republic, Kemal Ataturk. This ideological dimension to the militarys perception of its role has meant that its definition of security extends beyond public order and Turkeys political or economic interests to include threats to the countrys Kemalist legacy.
Kemalism is enshrined in the Turkish constitution and includes a rigorous commitment to secularism, territorial integrity and cultural homogeneity. Over the last 30 years Kemalism has been taught with an increasing intensity in both civilian schools and military academies, initially in an attempt to create an ideological bulwark against communism, but more recently to counter the two most dynamic ideological forces of the post-Cold War world, radical Islam and fissiparous nationalism, which in Turkey has meant Kurdish separatism. It was in response to these perceived threats to Kemalism that the Turkish military returned to the political arena during the 1990s.
Yet the militarys influence on policy is neither uniform nor total. It only attempts to exert influence in areas with, by its own definition, a security dimension. For example, it has shown little interest in economic policy.
Military influence over policy also depends on the degree to which it differs with the government over a specific issue. For example, it is unusual for there to be a divergence of opinion over foreign affairs, which tend to be seen as state rather than government or party policy. As a result, although the military closely monitors foreign policy, it has less need to intervene to try to influence it.
When it does attempt to influence policy, the military depends on its informal authority, based on a combination of its historical role and its public prestige, rather than any officially defined legislative or executive powers. In theory, the military is not only subject to civilian control it is subordinate to the prime ministry but the main platform on which it attempts to exercise influence, the National Security Council (NSC), is merely an advisory body which reports to the Council of Ministers.
In practice, however, the militarys informal authority is such that, when it expresses an opinion, civilian governments rarely try to implement a policy which contradicts it. Yet the military has proved less successful in persuading governments actively to initiate policy. The result is a system in which civilian authority is primary, rather than supreme, and where the military is able to prevent policy from straying outside specific parameters, rather than making things happen within them.