Copyright 2014 by The University Press of Kentucky
Scholarly publisher for the Commonwealth, serving Bellarmine University, Berea College, Centre College of Kentucky, Eastern Kentucky University, The Filson Historical Society, Georgetown College, Kentucky Historical Society, Kentucky State University, Morehead State University, Murray State University, Northern Kentucky University, Transylvania University, University of Kentucky, University of Louisville, and Western Kentucky University. All rights reserved.
Editorial and Sales Offices: The University Press of Kentucky
663 South Limestone Street, Lexington, Kentucky 405084008
www.kentuckypress.com
18 17 16 15 14 5 4 3 2 1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Pash, Sidney.
The currents of war : a new history of American-Japanese relations, 18991941 / Sidney Pash.
pages cm. (Studies in conflict, diplomacy, and peace)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 9780-81314423-8 (hardcover : acid-free paper) --
ISBN 9780-81314425-2 (pdf) -- ISBN 9780-81314424-5 (epub)
1. United StatesForeign relationsJapan. 2. JapanForeign relationsUnited States. 3. Pacific AreaStrategic aspectsHistory20th century. 4. World War, 19391945Causes. I. Title.
E183.8.J3P35 2014
327.730520904dc23 2013041233
This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials.
Manufactured in the United States of America.
| Member of the Association of American University Presses |
Preface
Admiral Yamamoto knew that the Japanese Empire's future rested on the opening battle of the war. His task force had to sail undetected over a vast sea and destroy the enemy fleet in port. If Japan's opponent detected his ships or set a trap, all would be lost. A smashing victory in the war's early hours could lead to a negotiated settlement but not victory, for the enemy possessed a true two-ocean navy, and Japan's European ally had not proved that it could prevent the redeployment of this second, more powerful armada. Compared to its opponent, whose people numbered over 100 million and whose territory spanned a continent, Japan was a second-rate power.
The roots of the fast-approaching war stretched back to the last century and centered on competition over China. Japan's rival across the sea, driven by economic and security concerns, supported Chinese resistance to Japanese territorial and commercial expansion and in doing so made a fundamental solution to Sino-Japanese difficulties all but impossible. Successive cabinets attempted to reconcile competition over China and stabilize Japan's position on the Asian mainland, and, when these attempts failed, Tokyo sought a great-power alliance. While the prime minister, Taro Katsura, believed that an alliance would ease Japanese security concerns, make the empire's rivals more tractable, and pave the way for the fulfillment of Japanese ambitions in Asia, events soon proved him wrong.
Japan's alliance with Europe's strongest power did nothing to deter its rival. Thousands of miles from Tokyo, at the edge of a great continent, in the capital named for its legendary leader, the empire's adversary pursued a complicated strategy designed to contain Japanese expansion. This policy was predicated in part on the belief that Japan would never wage a war it could not hope to win, and, while race no doubt played a part in this calculation, so too did numbers. Population, industry, wealth, and military power all weighed heavily against Japan. The empire did have a small advantage in that any conflict would take place near the home islands, but the enemy could easily offset this limited tactical edge with a redeployment of men and matriel to the Far East. Tokyo's rival was a continental power, yet with its great naval base standing astride Japan it projected military might to the very heart of the empire.
In the months leading up to war, Japan's rival celebrated the success of its strategy as desultory negotiations bought time for the deployment of tens of thousands of soldiers and scores of warships to Asia. Yet this policy may have been too successful, for in the final autumn of peace the conviction that Japan would never fight had spread to friend and foe alike, thus undercutting any impetus to reach a successful agreement. On the eve of war, both the British and the Russian ambassadors doubted that Japan would fight, and, given this conviction, how could a great power make concessions to a second-tier nation? Moreover, might Japan interpret an eleventh-hour compromise as a sign of weakness? The commander of the Pacific Fleet thought so and warned: Concession to Japan will lead us to a more certain break.
In Japan, meanwhile, the government at last cast the dice for war. Japan's last prewar prime minister, Katsura, a stubborn opponent of the coming conflict, maintained that the enemy gave the empire little choice. There is no question, he argued, but that[our opponent's] aim was from the start to increase her military and naval forces and then reject Japan's demands. Given this policy, he noted, if Japan does not now go to war and defend her threatened interests, she will eventually have to kowtow. The decision to wage war, however, could not mask fatalism akin to desperation. Another former prime minister and onetime general, Aritomo Yamagatahardly a rarity for interwar Japanneatly summarized his nation's position: Although we cannot foretell victory or defeat, we must enter the battle confident of victory. If we should by any chance fail, it would be an immeasurable catastrophe. With no better option available, Japan's senior leaders opted to gamble all on a war that the country would not likely survive. One day after the imperial conference endorsed the cabinet's decision for war, Admiral Gonnohyoe Yamamoto, the navy minister, ordered Admiral Heihachiro Togo to attack the Pacific Fleet at Port Arthur.
Russian containment had failed.
Japan's victory over Russia in the ensuing Russo-Japanese War fundamentally reshaped the Far Eastern strategic landscape as well as Japanese-American relations. Before 1904, Americans saw Japan as the Open Door's champion. By the end of 1905, Tokyo replaced St. Petersburg as the greatest threat to China, and for the next thirty-six years successive American administrations worked to safeguard the Open Door and contain Japanese expansion on the Asian mainland.
The Open Door, which supported commercial equality in China as well as China's territorial and administrative integrity, defined American foreign policy in the Far East for nearly half a century. Every president sought to guarantee equal access to the China market for American business, and, while military strategists differed as to the importance of the Open Door, preserving that country's territorial integrity remained a critical objective of US foreign policy.