• Complain

Seth Jacobs - The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos

Here you can read online Seth Jacobs - The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos full text of the book (entire story) in english for free. Download pdf and epub, get meaning, cover and reviews about this ebook. year: 2012, publisher: Cornell University Press, genre: Science. Description of the work, (preface) as well as reviews are available. Best literature library LitArk.com created for fans of good reading and offers a wide selection of genres:

Romance novel Science fiction Adventure Detective Science History Home and family Prose Art Politics Computer Non-fiction Religion Business Children Humor

Choose a favorite category and find really read worthwhile books. Enjoy immersion in the world of imagination, feel the emotions of the characters or learn something new for yourself, make an fascinating discovery.

Seth Jacobs The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos
  • Book:
    The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos
  • Author:
  • Publisher:
    Cornell University Press
  • Genre:
  • Year:
    2012
  • Rating:
    3 / 5
  • Favourites:
    Add to favourites
  • Your mark:
    • 60
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
    • 4
    • 5

The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos: summary, description and annotation

We offer to read an annotation, description, summary or preface (depends on what the author of the book "The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos" wrote himself). If you haven't found the necessary information about the book — write in the comments, we will try to find it.

During the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, Laos was positioned to become a major front in the Cold War. Yet American policymakers ultimately chose to resist communism in neighboring South Vietnam instead. Two generations of historians have explained this decision by citing logistical considerations. Laoss landlocked, mountainous terrain, they hold, made the kingdom an unpropitious place to fight, while South Vietnam-possessing a long coastline, navigable rivers, and all-weather roads-better accommodated Americas military forces. The Universe Unraveling is a provocative reinterpretation of U.S.-Laos relations in the years leading up to the Vietnam War. Seth Jacobs argues that Laos boasted several advantages over South Vietnam as a battlefield, notably its thousand-mile border with Thailand, whose leader was willing to allow Washington to use his nation as a base from which to attack the communist Pathet Lao.

More significant in determining U.S. policy in Southeast Asia than strategic appraisals of the Laotian landscape were cultural perceptions of the Lao people. Jacobs contends that U.S. policy toward Laos under Eisenhower and Kennedy cannot be understood apart from the traits Americans ascribed to their Lao allies. Drawing on diplomatic correspondence and the work of iconic figures like celebrity saint Tom Dooley, Jacobs finds that the characteristics American statesmen and the American media attributed to the Lao-laziness, immaturity, and cowardice-differed from the traits assigned the South Vietnamese, making Lao chances of withstanding communist aggression appear dubious. The Universe Unraveling combines diplomatic, cultural, and military history to provide a new perspective on how prejudice can shape policy decisions and even the course of history.

Seth Jacobs: author's other books


Who wrote The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos? Find out the surname, the name of the author of the book and a list of all author's works by series.

The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos — read online for free the complete book (whole text) full work

Below is the text of the book, divided by pages. System saving the place of the last page read, allows you to conveniently read the book "The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos" online for free, without having to search again every time where you left off. Put a bookmark, and you can go to the page where you finished reading at any time.

Light

Font size:

Reset

Interval:

Bookmark:

Make
THE UNIVERSE UNRAVELING
American Foreign Policy
in Cold War Laos
Seth Jacobs
Cornell University Press
Ithaca and London
For my father and mother
If you want to get a sense of the universe unraveling, come to Laos.
Norman Cousins, Saturday Review , 1961
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. A Long Country Inhabited by Lotus Eaters: Washington Encounters Laos
2. A Soft Buffer: Laos in the Eisenhower Administrations Grand Strategy
3. Help the Seemingly Unhelpable: Little America and the U.S. Aid Program in Laos
4. Foreigners Who Want to Enslave the Country: American Neocolonialism, Lao Defiance
5. Doctor Tom and Mister Pop: American Icons in Laos
6. Retarded Children: Laos in the American Popular Imagination
7. No Place to Fight a War: Washington Backs Away from Laos
Epilogue
Notes
Acknowledgments
There is always a tension in this part of a books front matter between the need to be brief and the desire to thank everyone. I choose to err on the side of brevity. Apologies to those friends and mentors unacknowledged by name. You know who you are.
My colleagues at Boston College were supportive and empathetic throughout the five years it took to complete this project. Lynn Lyerly in particular furnished extensive feedback and lent her talents to the thankless task of editing my adjective-laden, oft-digressive prose. Courteous professionals staffed all the archives I visited, with Stephen Plotkin and John Waide deserving special mention. Michael McGandy, Ange Romeo-Hall, and Sarah Grossman of Cornell University Press were essential in getting the manuscript into publishable form. Mark Bradley and Andrew Rotter helped me expand and clarify my argument and saved me from numerous errors.
I am indebted to Howard Buell, who allowed me to peruse his fathers correspondence and who, along with his wife, Bonnie, hosted me during my stay in Hamilton, Indiana. Jeff Buell was a priceless source of information and anecdote. Charles Stevenson, who wrote his dissertation on U.S.-Lao relations over forty years ago and interviewed dozens of policymakers for that work, kindly supplied me with transcripts and other relevant materials. As for Joel Halpernthis book would not have been possible without him. Making his acquaintance was the luckiest break of my career. He knows more about Laos than anyone else on earth, and his letters and field notes from the late 1950s were my eyes on the ground for several key events addressed herein. Thank you, Joel.
As always, my deepest thanks are reserved for my family. My wife, Devora, and daughters Miranda and Sophie provided encouragement, loving companionship, andespecially in Sophies casecomic relief when I needed it most. I am dedicating this book to my parents, Max and Helen Jacobs, whose unshakable belief in me and many sacrifices on my behalf I have only just begun to appreciate. My debt to them goes beyond words and can never be repaid.
Laos 19541962 Introduction John F Kennedy inherited a powder keg The - photo 1
Laos, 19541962
Introduction
John F. Kennedy inherited a powder keg. The presidential transition from Dwight Eisenhower to Kennedy occurred during one of the tensest periods in the history of American foreign policy. Crises simmered and blazed all over the globe: Fidel Castro had established a communist beachhead ninety miles from Florida, rebels in the Dominican Republic seemed poised to turn that nation into another Cuba, Washington and Moscow clashed over a UN-sponsored peacekeeping mission to the Congo, and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev was threatening to force the Western allies out of Berlin. Most distressing was the situation in South Vietnam, where Americas ally Ngo Dinh Diem had just survived a coup attempt that exposed the precariousness of the Saigon government despite six years of unstinting U.S. aid.
Yet Eisenhower and Kennedy did not talk much about Cuba, the Dominican Republic, the Congo, Berlin, or Vietnam when the outgoing American president briefed his successor on January 19, 1961, the eve of Kennedys inauguration. Instead, the two men, accompanied by their principal national security advisers, discussed Laos. A three-sided civil war in that country between the U.S.-backed Royal Lao Government (RLG), the communist Pathet Lao, and a neutralist front appeared about to conclude with the reds on topan outcome that, Eisenhower warned, would mean more than the communization of one country. [T]he loss of Laos would be the loss of the cork in the bottle, Eisenhower declared, and the beginning of the loss of most of the Far East.
Kennedy had great respect for Eisenhowers judgment, especially in military matters, and did not challenge the older mans contention that it was imperative to defend Laos. Rather, the president-elect observed that the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union had an advantage in this military situation because of their proximity to Laos, a point Eisenhower conceded. The president did not think, however, that Beijing wanted to provoke a major war, and Secretary of State Christian Herter questioned the extent to which the Soviets would wish to get publicly involved.
Herter was more concerned about another obstacle America faced in Laos. The factor disturbing us most, he said, was the unwillingness of the armed forces of the recognized government to fight. Royal Lao troop morale was not good, Herter noted, and this made waging proxy war in Laos difficult for us because the forces opposing communism were so undependable. Eisenhower then raised a point that, in retrospect, deserved more consideration than it received. He said he did not understand why the communist soldiers in such countries always seem to have better morale than the soldiers representing the democratic forces. Perhaps, the president ventured, there was something about the communist philosophy that gave its adherents a certain inspiration. Kennedy remarked that he was aware of the weakness of the troops of the government of Laos.
Just what Eisenhower counseled Kennedy to do about Laos is unclear. Clark Clifford, a Kennedy aide who took notes during the briefing, recorded the president advising that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) take charge of the controversy. Unfortunately, two of SEATOs members, Britain and France, were opposed to intervening in Laos, and Eisenhower found their proposals for a coalition government with Pathet Lao participation nave. [E]xperience shows that any time you permit communists to have a part in the government, Eisenhower declared, they end up in control. Since a political settlement in Laos acceptable to Washington seemed unlikely, the incoming Kennedy administration would have to weigh military options. According to Cliffords memorandum, Eisenhower stated that he considered Laos of such importance that if... we could not persuade others to act with us, then he would be willing, as a last desperate hope, to intervene unilaterally. Yet Secretary of Defense-designate Robert McNamara, who also attended the transition talks, submitted a memo to Kennedy five days later in which he claimed, President Eisenhower advised against unilateral action by the United States with respect to Laos. Kennedys own aide-mmoire, dictated hours after he spoke to Eisenhower, did not recount the presidents advice but concluded that the Eisenhower administration would support interventionthey felt it was preferable to a communist success in Laos.
Discrepancies in these first-person accounts notwithstanding, what is beyond dispute is that Eisenhower and Kennedy spent the lions share of their conference focused on Laos, that both men considered conditions there the most important business facing the new administration, and that other cold-war hornets nests like Vietnam barely registered as immediate concerns. Kennedy later remarked to Deputy National Security Adviser Walt Rostow, Eisenhower never mentioned the word Vietnam to me. That was untrueEisenhower had referred to Vietnam in passingbut Laos topped his agenda. McNamara recalled, We were left... with the ominous prediction that if Laos were lost, all of Southeast Asia would fall.... The meeting made a deep impression on Kennedy and us all. It heavily influenced our subsequent approach to Southeast Asia.
Next page
Light

Font size:

Reset

Interval:

Bookmark:

Make

Similar books «The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos»

Look at similar books to The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos. We have selected literature similar in name and meaning in the hope of providing readers with more options to find new, interesting, not yet read works.


Reviews about «The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos»

Discussion, reviews of the book The Universe Unraveling: American foreign policy in Cold War Laos and just readers' own opinions. Leave your comments, write what you think about the work, its meaning or the main characters. Specify what exactly you liked and what you didn't like, and why you think so.