Table of Contents
THE MARKET POWER
OF TECHNOLOGY
THE MARKET POWER
OF TECHNOLOGY
Understanding the Second Gilded Age
MORDE CAI KURZ
Columbia University Press
New York
Columbia University Press
Publishers Since 1893
New YorkChichester, West Sussex
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EISBN 978-0-231-55652-1
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Kurz, Mordecai, author.
Title: The Market power of technology : understanding the second gilded age
/ Mordecai Kurz.
Description: New York : Columbia University Press, [2022] | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022006546 (print) | LCCN 2022006547 (ebook) | ISBN
9780231206532 (paperback) | ISBN 9780231206525 (hardback) | ISBN
9780231556521 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Technological innovations-Economic aspects-United States.
| Monopolies-United States. | Corporate power-United States. |
Capitalism-United States. | Wealth-United States.
Classification: LCC HC110.T4 K87 2022 (print) | LCC HC110.T4 (ebook) |
DDC 338/.0640973-dc23/eng/20220623
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022006546
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022006547
A Columbia University Press E-book.
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Cover design: Elliott S. Cairns
To Linda
Contents
I nequality and its social and political consequences are among the central problems of our time, and these have attracted a substantial amount of research in the past two decades. Although I have always had a keen interest in income and wealth inequality, and much of my early work on economic growth was motivated by income distribution problems, it was only in 2012 that I decided to return to the subject and devote my full time to it. By 2015, many of the ideas developed in this book took shape and I wrote about some of them in a Stanford working paper that was later circulated under the title On the Formation of Capital and Wealth. Talking to colleagues about these ideas revealed the intense but diverse opinions about the subject and how to approach it. When discussing it over lunch with Ken Arrow, he told me that Bob Solow was also very interested in the subject, and I sought his advice as well. He was gracious in giving me detailed comments on my draft, but he advised me not to sit on the work for too long. I did not take his advice because the problems involved cannot be resolved in a single paper, utilizing a cleverly designed model to address all the relevant issues adequately. The problem has several dimensions, and its solution requires the tools of theory, empirical analysis, and policy analysis, and this can only be accomplished in a book. By 20162017, it became clear that I was working on such a project.
The book is composed of three parts. The first consists of , discusses the policy implications.
The reader may benefit from my explanation of the key turning points in my own thinking during the six years of research. Ever since my graduate studies at Yale, the quest for a better understanding of the process of economic growth has been an important part of my research. Much of the work on economic growth in the postwar period was conducted under the assumption of perfect competition. Paul Romer was among those who demonstrated that one cannot study economic growth and technological innovations within the framework of a competitive model of an economy. This observation led him to concentrate on the effects of R&D and intentional inventions on the rate of growth, but my conclusion was different. It led me to the first, central theme of this book: once technological inventions are introduced, firms with different technological knowledge have different market positions and the vision of small, equal-opportunity, firms is not applicable. Technological market power becomes the dominant feature of the market.
With that insight, I proceeded to explore how durable such market power is, and I discovered an almost unanimous view among scholars: that a monopolist is considered a formidable incumbent whose replacement occurs only very rarely. But then, over time, successive innovations plant new seeds of added technological market power. In most cases, later innovations are designed to enable the expansions and consolidations of market power gained from earlier innovations. Thus, in a capitalist market economy, successive innovations and technology acquisitions by leading firms result in the consolidation of technological market power in the hands of a few large firms, in decreasing relative shares of labor and capital in value added, in rising income and wealth inequality, and in the emergence of a plutocracy. These conclusions are supported by the simple fact that todays biggest and most powerful firms derive their extraordinary profit marginsoften exceeding 50%and their high degree of market power from the accumulation of proprietary technologies that they either develop on their own or acquire. My conclusion, that market power is a durable feature of a technologically growing economy, leads one to the inference that a free-market economy contains a fundamental dynamic force that eliminates competition and threatens the foundations of democracy. It also leads to the observation that capital and wealth are two different concepts, and the difference between them can be very large. I call this difference monopoly wealth, which, in equilibrium, is the present value of expected monopoly profits derived from a firms proprietary technology. Many scholars ignore this distinction and estimate the size of the capital stock by using firms stock prices, leading them to erroneous conclusions. The ideas outlined here are the foundations of the theory developed in .
These conclusions lead to a sharp perspective that raises many questions, and in this book, I try to answer as many of them as possible. One of the more essential questions arises with respect to the nature and timing of the mechanism described in the previous paragraph. Firms do die and new firms are born, so it is natural to ask, When does the process of building market power begin and when does it end? What are the exact features of technological competition that give rise to the emergence of the large superstar firm? I address these questions mostly in .
In seeking to explain, in , the U.S. economic record since the 1980s, my theory proposes this performance is the consequence of the dynamics of a free-market economy outlined above. In the absence of public policy, it leads to the emergence of a few dominant firms and results in extreme inequality of income and wealth. This is what took place in the First Gilded Age, at the turn of the twentieth century, and it has taken place again since the 1980s, which is why I define this period as the Second Gilded Age. These two periods in American history are similar in two essential ways. In both periods, economic growth was propelled by a rapid rate of innovations created by the GPTs of the time, combined with passive, laissez-faire public policy that allowed the mechanism of growing market power to operate without restraint. Government policy permitted the rising market power of firms, revoked old regulations and avoided issuing new ones, kept tax rates low, and tolerated the sharp rise in inequality.