Peter Lamarque - Work and Object

Work and Object

Explorations in the Metaphysics of Art

Peter Lamarque

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in this volume Peter Lamarque 2010

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First published 2010

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This is a selection of papers of mine on a tightly-knit cluster of issues regarding the metaphysics and ontology of art. Most, although not all, of the papers have been published before but I have reworked them all to a greater or lesser extent. I have tried to remove repetition but some points inevitably come up more than once, fitting into slightly different contexts. Also by tolerating a degree of repetition I have made it possible for each paper to be reasonably free-standing and readable independently of the others. Although I have given some care to the order in which the papers are presented (it is not the order in which they were written) so as to allow the arguments to develop, there is no harm in dipping into the volume at any point to reflect on specific topics.

Several themes weave through the papers and it might be helpful to give a brief overview of these so as to form a general picture of the areas covered. Here are some of the issues addressed:

On the face of it pictures, novels, poems, symphonies, improvisedjazz, sculptures, buildings, ballets, improvised dance, movies, conceptual art, photographs, and multi-media installations are a motley, ontologically speaking. Much philosophical ingenuity has been invested in finding unity here, notably through appeal to traditional categories like physical particulars, universals, mental entities, actions, and so forth. A central theme of the book is that such uniformity as there is lies in the idea of a work, while allowing that works can be particulars or types. The nature and ontology of works as cultural artefacts is explored, e.g. set against the realist paradigm of mind-independent objects; as are relations between works and mere objects, works and other kinds of artefacts (e.g. those defined through their functionsuch as tools or machines), and works and natural objects. Key theses defended on the ontology of works are: that works (including musical, pictorial, literary, sculptural, etc. works) are cultural artefacts among whose essential properties are intentional or relational properties (i.e. what they are as works is partially dependent on how they are taken to be by qualified observers); that works are distinct from the objects that constitute them; that they are underdetermined by physical or notational properties; but that they are nonetheless real (not merely ideal) entities, among the furniture of the world (though not of course natural), publicly perceivable, and objectively characterizable.

No attempt is made to define art and only tentative suggestions offered about how works of art can be delimited from the wider class of works (e.g. in relation to values). But some core issues in aesthetics are addressed: what aesthetic properties are (how they relate to non-aesthetic properties, how far they are intrinsically evaluative), the role they play in the identity conditions of works, the nature of forgeries and parodies, and the status of copies, performances, and variations. Key theses on aesthetic properties are: that some works possess some aesthetic properties essentially; that aesthetic properties are relational, resting partially on responses of qualified observers; that their relation to non-aesthetic properties is probably not best characterized as supervenience; that objects per se, including those that constitute works, do not possess aesthetic properties essentially; and that a case for aesthetic realism can be made.

The idea that works, perhaps all cultural artefacts, have essential properties that include intentional and relational properties is explained and defended. Works owe their existence to human acts and their continued survival to human attitudes; they have a beginning (i.e. they are not eternal, even those that are types) and they cease to exist when their essential intentional and relational properties, including generic and work-specific properties, are lost; the objects that constitute them might survive even though they (the works) do not. Epistemological questions are raised. What is it to perceive, experience, and understand works as described? What are the criteria for a qualified observer on whom norms of perception, experience, and understanding are dependent? What is it to experience a work as a work? How, for example in the case of a painting, does that experience relate to the experience (perception) of the physical basis of the work (i.e. the paint, canvas, colours, etc.)? Does it make sense to suppose that observers might be deeply mistaken about the properties of a work (in a way that they perhaps could be with natural objects)?

Mere objects have no intrinsic meaning; such meaning as they have they acquire through human activity and intentionality. Works, in contrast, given their essential properties, are intrinsically bearers of meaning or significance. In virtue of what? Do their meanings change as contexts of reception change or is their meaning tied to their identity? Meaning properties include what works are of or about but only some meaning properties are subject to interpretation. Key theses on these issues are: that the nature and methods of interpretation are relative to the objects of interpretation; that the debate between realists and constructivists on interpretation (whether or not interpretation can partially create the objects of interpretation) gains clarity in the light of the distinction between works, in the sense defined, and objects; that a robust, non-relativistic, view of interpretation can allow for a degree of construction.