Phil Williams - Russian Organized Crime

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ISBN 0-7146-4763-2 (hb)
ISBN 0-7146-4312-2

This group of studies first appeared in a Special Issue on Russian Organized Crime in Transnational Organized Crime, Vol.2, Nos.2/3, published by Routledge

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PHIL WILLIAMS

During the 1990s transnational criminal organizations of all kinds have received increased scrutiny from law enforcement agencies, intelligence analysts, and academic researchers. While there are many differences of both interpretation and assessment regarding a whole range of issues, divisions are particularly acute in the area of Russian organized crime. Assessments of the seriousness of the challenge from Russian organized crime diverge remarkably. At one end of the spectrum are those who consider Russian organized crime a dangerous successor to the threat posed to Western values and Western societies by the Soviet Union. Adherents of this view provide what is, in effect, a worst case estimate of the Russian organized crime threat. At the other end of the spectrum are those who not only believe that the threat from Russian organized crime is greatly exaggerated in many Russian and Western commentaries, but also argue that, in present circumstances, organized crime has certain positive functions in Russian society and the economy. Members of this group, providing what is in essence a best case analysis, contend that Russian organized crime has attained considerable prominence only because of the particular set of economic and political conditions that currently exist throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States. The corollary is that as these conditions change then organized crime is likely to diminish in importance.

In some respects these contrasting assessments can be understood as the new variant of the Cold War debate between hawks and doves. As in this previous debate, however, neither the worst case nor the best case assessment is wholly compelling. Many proponents of the worst case assessment tend to be more concerned with highlighting and publicizing what they see as a new threat to Western security rather than with a systematic analysis of the phenomenon of organized crime in Russia; while those at the other end of the spectrum depreciate the seriousness of the challenge posed by Russian organized crime either to transition processes in Russia or to other states. The problem with the worst case assessment is partly one of exaggeration a tendency to draw facile conclusions from partial evidence but even more one of over-simplification. Not only do the members of this group tend to seize on particular aspects of the problem and give them a salience that is unwarranted, but they describe the issue in terms such as crimefest and kleptocracy that have maximum emotional impact but minimum analytical utility or rigor.

On the other side, those who believe that the problem has been greatly exaggerated are generally much more analytical in their approach. Partly in an effort to redress the balance in a debate that, at the popular level at least, tends to be dominated by the worst case assessment, the best case advocates downplay the adverse consequences of Russian organized crime. The argument here, however, is that both approaches have serious shortcomings. The worst case thinkers are too mesmerized by the threat from Russian organized crime to assess it critically; while the best case analysts are too enamored of the free market economy to accept its limitations. Moreover, there is a central irony in this debate: the worst case assessment may be more accurate but not for the reasons that its proponents suggest; the best case perspective is less compelling but, because of its more analytical approach, highlights the need to go beyond rhetorical slogans and engage in a systematic and rigorous analysis. This introduction to what is an eclectic and extremely useful set of articles aims to provide such an analysis. Although it arrives at conclusions that are close to the worst case assessment these conclusions are related in part to weaknesses in the arguments provided by those at the other end of the spectrum. While accepting the best case assessment that organized crime has certain benefits in contemporary Russia, the analysis here suggests that these are outweighed by the costs and negative consequences. It also suggests that these adverse consequences are likely to be more far more enduring than the best case assessment acknowledges. This is a conclusion that is shared by several although by no means all the contributors to this collection of essays.

The next part of the analysis attempts to crystallize the key elements in the position enunciated by the worst case and best case advocates. The third section elucidates the complexities and the limitations of Russian organized crime. It presents the major features of Russian organized crime with particular emphasis on its scope or dimensions and its importance in the Russian economy. In essence, it attempts to offer a dispassionate analysis that neither simplifies nor downplays the threat posed by Russian criminal organizations. The final section of the paper uses the empirical analysis to offer a critique of both the worst case and the best case positions, while also assessing the challenge Russian organized crime poses to the transition process in the Former Soviet Union and to other societies in which Russian criminal organizations have also become active. This section also offers a brief prognosis for the future. It identifies contrasting models of the ways in which organized crime might evolve, drawing on the experience of other countries such as the United States and Italy and taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of those who argue that Russian organized crime is or is not a major threat.

The worst case assessment of Russian organized crime can be seen as the direct heir to the conservative assessment of the Soviet Union threat during the Cold War. For those who still cling to the belief that the Soviet collapse was a ruse, Russian organized crime is an enormously convenient if very natural target. There are several features of Russian organized crime that are emphasized in the worst case approach: