Brian Cloughley - A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections

Copyright 2016 by Brian Cloughley

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available on file.

Cover design by Rain Saukas

Cover photo credit Associated Press

Interior photographs provided by the Directorate of Inter Services Public Relations, the Pakistan Army, and the author. Those of the 1965 and 1971 wars were selected by Major General Syed Ali Hamid.

ISBN: 978-1-63144-038-0

Ebook ISBN: 978-1-63144-039-7

Printed in the United States of America

To the memory of

Lieutenant Colonel Nawabzada Azmat Khan

CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF GRAPHS

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION

THE ARMY OF PAKISTAN 19472015

The Pakistan Army was formed from the British Indian Army that ceased to exist at midnight on 14 August 1947 when the nations of Pakistan and India were created. Partition of the subcontinent and the dawn of freedom for five hundred million people involved many problems, not the least of which was division of the army on religious lines between the new countries. The Muslims went to Pakistan; the Hindus and Sikhs, and most of the religious minorities, to India.

The splitting up of the regiments was poignant beyond words. All over India Sikhs and Hindus were giving farewell parties to their departing Muslim comrades, seeing them off at the station with garlands round their necks and tears pouring down their faces; and in Pakistan, vice versa. Throughout, the emphasis was on the splitting perforce of a family, but the preservation of the Regiment.

The Indian Army and the Kings Enemies
Charles Chenevix-Trench

T he armies of India and Pakistan maintain the tradition of the regiment, to which loyalty is an essential part of their creed; indeed it is the cornerstone of discipline; the building block of military professionalism. Soldiers who may have only the shakiest notion of the cause for which their country commits them to action will perform heroic deeds for the sake of the honour of their units. The combination of good leadership and proud units (which usually, but not always, go together) can be an important factor in winning battles.

The splitting of regiments in 1947 was a serious business, as was apportionment of units to one country or the other. The outward signs of regimental traditionthe battle honours, the badges, the ceremonial minutiaeare important to soldiers. To many, these things might seem petty, trivial, inconsequential and even irrelevant to modern life. However, this feeling among soldiers of pride for their units continues as strong is it was in 1947, and after partition both armies have continued to build on their regimental traditions.

This book describes development of the army of Pakistan in the years since formation as a separate entity in 1947. Down the years there have been many political changes in the country, from democracy through various types of military rule, and back to democracy. The army has played many roles and, contrary to the wishes of many of its members, on occasions became involved in the imposition and enforcement of martial law. These distasteful periods have been relegated to history by the army, which does not care to be reminded of the part it was required to play in suppression of democracy; there are no battle honours to be won by tapping politicians telephones, and no regimental pride is ever enhanced by a soldier sitting in judgement on fellow countrymen. The fact remains that the army was involved in political manoeuvring and in restricting the rights of the citizens of Pakistan. It also conducted operations involving considerable brutality in suppressing separatists in the Eastern Wing of the country in the period before the 1971 war between India and Pakistan that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. These excesses cannot be glossed over, nor are they in this book; but there is confidence that the army is unlikely ever again to be so committed.

* * *

My involvement with the Pakistan Army dates back to 1980. I spent two years as deputy head of the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and conceived the highest regard for the professionalism of both the Indian and Pakistani armies. President Zia invited me to visit Pakistan in 1985, when I renewed my acquaintance with many senior officers. Thereafter I served as Australian defence attach from 1988 to 1994. During the latter period and in later years I was encouraged by successive army chiefs to broaden my knowledge by attending many military exercises; travelling extensively to improve my understanding of the country and to visit headquarters and units. I am most grateful to them, and to other officers, serving and retired, for the advice and co-operation that enabled me to write this book. Others whose assistance is much valued are noted in the text.

Brian Cloughley

France

September 2015

1 THE BEGINNINGS

P akistan and India have fought on three occasions since partition in 1947. The first, undeclared, war began almost at once, when the Hindu maharaja of the predominately Muslim region of Jammu and Kashmir decided his state should accede to India rather than Pakistan. The rights and wrongs of the Kashmir dispute are relevant to the development of the army of Pakistan, and will be mentioned in context. An excellent description of the disagreement is contained in Alistair Lambs Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy . Other references of great value are Manoj Joshis The Lost Rebellion , and Victoria Schofields Kashmir in the Crossfire .

Division of the British Indian army between Pakistan and India had been planned before independence, but could only begin a few weeks before sectarian killings increased and partition gave rise to the problem of Kashmir. The War Department had been split on 19 July, and many units had begun the task of moving components to one or the other side of the border. Numbers involved were large: the British Indian Army was about 400,000 strong.

In spite of the capabilities of Indian (i.e. Indian and Pakistani) officers, they lacked expertise in logistics and the skills associated with managing (as distinct from leading) an army. These had in the main been provided by their British colleagues, although a major force on the civil side was Sir Chandulal Madhavlal Trivedi, Secretary of the War Department in the government of India from 19426. Mountbatten described him as the only Indian who had any idea of high level defence organisation. Trivedi was to apply his energy to ensuring India retained large quantities of military materiel after partition.

Pakistan received a fair share of officers, but not enough to fill all the vacancies in the establishment. The requirement was for about 4,000, of whom half were already serving. The shortfall was made up by retention of five hundred British officers who elected to remain (including the commander-in-chief and his deputy), and the commissioning of the balance from the ranks and, in some instances, in the technical corps, direct from civilian life. There were only fifty-six senior Pakistani officers, ranked from colonel to major general. Although there were cases of over-rapid promotions and unsuitability, Pakistani and British officers worked hard to establish a basis for expansion, but problems came later when some officers, unwilling to accept the fact that promotion had to depend on competence rather than seniorityor even connections and influenceindulged in intrigue.