James M. Scott - Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb

BLACK SNOW

Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb

JAMES M. SCOTT

For Isa and Grigs, I pray you never experience such destruction.

There will be no distinction any longer between soldiers and civilians.

GEN. GIULIO DOUHET

THE COMMAND OF THE AIR, 1921

The B-29, with a tail the height of a three-story building, was Americas largest and most sophisticated bomber during World War II.

been anything that has come which has changed war the way the advent of air power has.

BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM BILLY MITCHELL FEBRUARY 5, 1926

in the United States and Americans all over the world will rejoice in the fact that today Tokyo is being bombed.

TIM LEIMERT, CBS CORRESPONDENT NOVEMBER 24, 1944

that the B-29, the newest bomber in Americas arsenal, was easily the best plane that never left the ground.

, he once wrote, of killing thousands of men, women and children was basically repugnant to American mores.

, one intelligence report stated, no more important target in the Jap aircraft industry than the Nakajima engine plant at Musashino.

America had invested heavily to arrive at this pivotal moment. feeling deep in your stomach when you see somebody die like that, remembered sailor Leonard Bock, especially women and young kids, babies even.

Six days after the June 15, 1944, invasion, the first aviation engineers had waded ashore, tasked with turning the forty-eight-square-mile island into Hansells airbase. The job was herculean. Not only had the battle reduced Saipans towns and villages to rubble, but the islands few roads could handle little more than bullock carts. Crews labored twenty-four hours a day, breaking only to watch the bombardment of neighboring Tinian, just three miles across the water. the equipment continued to turn, one report noted. Sometimes it appeared that only faith and hope kept the wheels turning, but the earth and coral continued to move.

Rogue Japanese snipers heightened the challenge, targeting laborers, trucks, and planes in an effort to disrupt progress. Marines picked off an of ordinary ten-penny nails, one army report noted, were at a greater premium on the island of Saipan than a handful of rubies.

On October 12, Hansell arrived aboard the first B-29, the Joltin Josie, the Pacific Pioneer, bringing bulldozers and earthmovers to a sudden standstill. Workers shielded their eyes from the bright sun to watch the silver bomber circle and touch down. , Hansell wrote, put up borrowed tents in what was certainly one of the most disorderly military encampments of the war.

Work on the Tinian airfields lagged far behind schedule while the bases on Guam that would serve as the future headquarters of Hansells 21st Bomber Command had not even been laid out. But construction setbacks were only part of Hansells challenge. The B-29 remained a troublesome new airplane. Engines erupted in flames, and gun-sighting blisters fogged or even blew out at high altitudes, all perilous threats on a mission that required pilots to fly several thousand miles over hostile ocean. Hansell likewise depended on callow crews. None had more than one hundred hours of flying experience in B-29s. Few had even a fraction of that in the high-altitude formation flying that the general envisioned for his crews over Tokyo. To help train them, he had requested that B-29s reporting to Saipan practice flying in formation. To his surprise, the air force refused, stating that the B-29s did not have the range to fly 2,400 miles from Sacramento to Hawaii in formation. Hansell was stunned. If his superiors didnt think his planes could cover that distance, how did they ever expect them to make it to Tokyo and back?

Another challenge Hansell discovered was a lack of target data for Japan, even though his mission was to take the air war home to the empire. , Hansell wrote, was required to trace its photo map, mark landmarks and target runs, and then redraw them from memoryover and over.

But Hansells worries ran far deeper.

Army Air Forces commander Gen. Henry Hap Arnold, the father of the B-29, was anxious for Hansell to justify Americas gamble on the pricey bombers. More important, if Hansells bombers could crush Japan and prevent a bloody invasion, it would at last demonstrate the need for an independent air force, a cause Arnold had championed for decades. To accomplish this goal, Arnold had established the 20th Air Force, a brand-new command under his direct control and with only one objective: destroy Japan. This guarded setup was designed to insulate his fledgling B-29 force from other Pacific commanders, like Gen. Douglas MacArthur in Australia and Adm. Chester Nimitz in Hawaii, all of whom were hot to steal his bombers for other missions. Arnolds new air force included the 20th Bomber Command under Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay, tasked with flying missions out of China against southern Japan. But the prize of Arnolds new air force was Hansells 21st Bomber Command. Far closer to Japan, the Marianas guaranteed that not just Tokyo but all of the enemys critical industrial cities would soon be viewed through a bombardiers eyepiece.

Beyond Arnold, Hansell felt pressure from other leaders as well as the war-weary public, ready for a speedy end to a conflict that devoured ninety-six cents of every federal dollar spent. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall made that clear in a meeting when he pressed Hansell for an answer as to how long it would take to begin strikes against Japan.

the first operation by six weeks after we get there, Hansell replied.

Whats going to take so long? Marshall bluntly demanded.

Other senior officers had questioned whether Hansell, viewed largely as an academic and a planner, had the right temperament for such a demanding combat job. That was true of Lt. Gen. Barney Giles, who served as deputy commander of the Army Air Forces and chief of the Air Staff.

everything works fine for you, Giles had told him. You have an awfully tough job to do. General Arnold is going to be very impatient.

Each week, it seemed, had only brought more setbacks.

The navy had originally planned to launch carrier strikes on Tokyo in the days leading up to the raid, which Hansell had welcomed since the attacks would draw enemy fighters away from his bombers. But the navy, with its flattops tied up in the Philippines, had suggested Hansell abort or at least postpone the mission. Hansell knew that wasnt an option. By acquiescing, he would send a message that his bombers could not operate independently of the navy, which ran counter to Arnolds purpose in setting up the 20th Air Force.

More disturbing news had arrived while , he later wrote, was chilling.

But Kenney wasnt the only one to doubt the mission.