David R. Higgins - The Roer River Battles: Germanys Stand at the Westwall, 1944-45

Published in the United States of America in 2010 by

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and in the United Kingdom by

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17 Cheap Street, Newbury, Berkshire, RG14 5DD

2010 by David R. Higgins

ISBN 978-1-935149-29-3/ eISBN 978-1-935149-59-0

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CONTENTS

EnterKampfgruppe Wegelein

For Walter and Agnes

The period between Allies Operation Market Garden in September 1944 and the Germans Ardennes Offensive in DecemberJanuary 1945 remains an underreported period in military history. With history being written by the victors this may be understandable. Following the Allied breakout from Normandy, the heady race across France had given both soldiers and civilians hope that the war would be over by Christmas. Once its hard crust had been penetrated at Normandy, the German Army in the West appeared to be on the verge of total collapse as it streamed back to the border of the Reich. When the situation suddenly changed in the autumn of 1944, American, British, and Commonwealth forces were presented with a reinvigorated Westheer that had been given time to reorganize, was closer to its sources of supply, and was now directly fighting to keep an invading enemy from its homeland.

In attempting to depict the events between the US and British forces coming to a strategic stop before the Westwall, and their eventual crossing of the Roer River five months later in February 1945, I have employed several elements to help illustrate and simplify an often complex situation.

Army Groups, Armies, Corps, and Divisions are written as: i.e., 12th Army Group, Second Army (spelled out); XXX Corps (roman numerals); and 2nd Armored Division (ordinal).

German formations are italicized to visually differentiate them from Allied formations.

German designations are equivalent and partially anglicized to preserve flavor, while keeping it easily understood (i.e.I.SS Panzer-Korps beingI SS Panzer Corps).

The designation of German infantry was changed to grenadier in 1942 on Hitlers order to honor the infantry arm (i.e. grenadier regiment).

Except in certain cases, formation names have been spelled out to lessen confusion.

A formations TO&E is described only once (coinciding with its first mention in the text), and structures above division are generally omitted to save space, as corps and army attachments would have been too numerous, complex, and likely not addressed in the text.

Because most of the Roer battles involved the Allies in offensive operations I chose to structure sections based on actions rather than reactions.

Any errors or omissions in this work were certainly unintended, and for which I alone bear responsibility.

I would like to thank the following individuals for their kind support, without which this book, and my other military history endeavors, might not have been possible. Joseph Miranda, editor-in-chief (Strategy & Tactics magazine); Colonel (ret.) Jerry D. Morelock, PhD, editor-inchief (Armchair General magazine); Captain (ret.) William F. Atwater, PhD, former director (US Army Ordnance Museum); David Fletcher, curator (Bovington Tank Museum); Charles Lemons, curator (Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor); Colonel (ret.) David M. Glantz; Alan Wakefield, curator (Photograph Archive, Imperial War Museum); Oberleutnant der Reserve Otto Carius; Thomas Jentz, for taking the time to talk with me atop an Aberdeen Jagdpanther; the armor restoration crew at Richardson Motor Park in Ft. Knox, Ky.; 3rd Armored Division veterans and their spouses for welcoming me to their 2009 annual reunion; Troy and Lorie Dalrymple; Gilbert and Vi Lamb; F.W. and Lois Meine; Heinz and Klara Meine; Erin and Chris Bouten; my mom, and intrepid historian and geocacher, Carin; and my wife, Dianaespecially for putting up with me while I wrote this.

Chapter 1

Strategic Overview

(Summer 1944)

For several weeks after their landings at Normandy on June 6, 1944, Allied forces struggled first to expand and then break out of their beachhead. To best organize this multinational command, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) bisected the lodgment between Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges US First Army and General Sir Bernard Montgomerys British Second Army to its east. The integration of differing national customs, doctrines, and aerial elements under SHAEF control was greater than previous Allied undertakings in North Africa and Italy, and under General Dwight D. Eisenhower, misunderstandings, diversions of effort, and internal friction were considerably reduced. Had this unifying command not been realized, it would have been necessary to coordinate the various national staffs along parallel, probably independent lines (as the Free French under General Charles de Gaulle had threatened before Paris), without overall guidance or arbitration.

With the British occupying eastern Normandy, supplies and reinforcements were shuttled in by ship from across the English Channel. The terrain in their sector was predominantly dry, open ground, but their commander, and that of the overall landing until the buildup became sufficiently stabilized, Montgomery, implemented his trademark cautious, casualty-minimizing strategy to the detriment of progress. Britain had been at war for the last four years and suffered from a chronic lack of replacements that could ill afford to be expended without results. With one eye on the political front, Montgomery would do what he could to avoid repeating the mistakes of criminally incompetent generalship of the previous war, when tens of thousands of British soldiers were sacrificed for negligible gains at places such as the Somme and Ypres.

In contrast, US forces had not experienced significant defeat at the hands of the Germans, save for Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in February 1943. After 16 months of marching across North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, the Americans were confident in their ability to quickly win the war. Historically over-supplied during wartime, the US ground elements in Normandy were no different, with most materiel arriving directly from the United States via the port of Cherbourg at the northern end of the Cotentin Peninsula. Progress remained slow due to the regions bocage farmland, with its numerous hedgerows, hills, streams, and woods that compartmentalized the battlefield and restricted movement and firepower. This force multiplier that favored the German defenders, and an initial lack of combat experience for many of the American formations, added to Allied difficulties.