Gian Gentile - Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency

Wrong Turn

Also by Gian Gentile

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Wrong Turn

Americas Deadly Embrace

of Counterinsurgency

COLONEL GIAN GENTILE

NEW YORK

LONDON

The views expressed in this book are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Copyright 2013 by Gian Gentile

All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced, in any form, without written permission from the publisher.

Requests for permission to reproduce selections from this book
should be mailed to: Permissions Department,
The New Press, 38 Greene Street, New York, NY 10013.

Published in the United States by The New Press, New York, 2013

Distributed by Perseus Distribution

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Gentile, Gian P.

Wrong turn : Americas deadly embrace of counterinsurgency / ColonelGia nGe ntile.

pages m

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN978-1-59558-896-8 (e-book) 1. CounterinsurgencyGovernment policyUnited States. 2. CounterinsurgencyCase studies. 3. CounterinsurgencyMalayaHistory20th century. 4. CounterinsurgencyVietnamHistory20th century. 5. CounterinsurgencyIraqHistory21st century. 6. CounterinsurgencyAfghanistanHistory21st century. I. Title.

U241.G46 2013

355.02'180973dc23

2012049114

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For Gee Won

CONTENTS

This book represents an intellectual journey by me to understand the recent American war in Iraq and the ongoing American war in Afghanistan. In many ways this book is dedicated to the men and women of Eighth Squadron, Tenth Cavalry, and that very hard and bloody year we spent doing counterinsurgency operations in western Baghdad in 2006. This book is also a historians journey into the past via primary evidence to understand how history has been used and abused to explain these current wars.

I am indebted to the West Point history department senior leadership, namely Colonels Lance Betros and Matthew Moten, for the support, advice, and thoughtful criticism that they have given me. Other colleagues at West Point have been instrumental in the writing of this book. Colonel (retired) Kevin Farrell, a former combat battalion commander in Iraq, was a key source of intellectual inspiration and encouragement for the book. In addition to providing a most useful critique of my Vietnam chapter, Colonel Gregory Daddis has been a constant sounding board for ideas; the warp and woof of the book has been shaped by our many discussions. Robert Citino read an earlier version of the book and gave it a needed spark when the embers were starting to cool; he has also been a good friend and intellectual mentor. So too has Roger Spiller from the days when I was his student at the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) up to the present. Other West Point faculty members, past and current, have influenced my thinking greatly: Steve Barry, Wynne Beers, Paul Belmont, JP Clark, Chip Dawson, Casey Doss, Robert Doughty, Jonathan Due, Greg Fontenot, Joe Glatthaar, Ben Greene, Matthew Hardman, George Herring, Jennie Kiesling, Dwight Mears, Paul Miles, Dave Musick, William Nance, Clifford Rogers, Pilar Ryan, Seanegan Sculley, Ty Seidule, John Stapleton, William Taylor, Greg Tomlin, Steve Waddell, Keith Walters, Jason Warren, Sam Watson, Jackie Whitt, and Gail Yoshitani.

Douglas Macgregor, Carl Prine, and Celeste Ward-Gventer have had a huge influence on my thinking. This book would have never come about without their ideas, encouragement, and friendship.

I deeply appreciate the people who took the time to read either the entire manuscript or individual chapters. Michael Few and Robert Mihara read the entire manuscript, provided thoughtful comments, and have helped me think through problems of American strategy. Lawrence Kaplan read an earlier version of the book and helped me recast certain parts of it for the better. Celeste Ward-Gventer read my personal note and introduction and gave me some helpful suggestions to refine and tighten both portions. Karl Hack took a needed wire brush to my Malaya chapter, and Huw Bennett also gave me some important ideas for improvement on it. Joe Glatthaar, George Herring, Brian Linn, Peter Maslowski, and Roger Spiller read earlier versions of the Vietnam chapter. Kelly Peyton Howard and Austin Long read the Iraq chapter and provided some very important suggestions and additions. The Afghanistan chapter received some very helpful and critical readings by Lloyd Gardner, Peter Maslowski, and Paul Miles. Any mistakes or flaws in the book are of course my own.

When I first began writing the book in the fall of 2010, Eric Lupfer of the William Morris Agency provided some key guidance on how to frame and structure the book and worked on it with me during the early stages.

The benefit of being a history teacher is students. I am especially indebted to my history major students at West Point who have helped me to refine my thinking and arguments: Julian Allison, Josh Clevenger, Leo Fischer, Baker Flagg, Nate Martel, Stephan Murphy, Nate Peterson, Charlie Phelps, and Joseph Putnam.

I am grateful to the faculty and students at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for allowing me to speak each quarter for the past four years on counterinsurgency and strategy. I also owe a lot to Dave Dilegge and the participants of the Small Wars Journal blog. Many of the ideas and arguments of this book have been forged in the fire of discussions and debate in these two forums. Douglas Porch has been a kindred spirit; his historical writings and arguments on imperial military history have been a guidepost for me. The work of Andrew Bacevich has influenced my thinking greatly. Brian Linn and Conrad Crane have provided important advice and guidance to me over the years.

I am indebted to West Points Dean of the Academic Board and the Bradley Foundation for grants that helped pay for research trips. I also appreciate the administrative assistance of Melissa Mills of the history department.

I owe a special debt of gratitude to Stephen Biddle for introducing me to the Council on Foreign Relations and to James Lindsay and Richard Haass for giving me the opportunity to spend a year at the council. That year I learned a great deal from colleagues at the council: Amy Baker, Dan Barker, Les Gelb, Randy George, Jason Mangone, Seth Meyer, Amity Shlaes, Dan Yoo, and Micah Zenko.

Thanks to Daniel Weggeland and James Russell for providing me with numerous documents from their own research on Afghanistan and Iraq.

Other individuals over the past five years have helped me think through problems of history and strategy, two themes that underpin this book: Kevin Benson, Robert Brigham, Paula Broadwell, Caleb Cage, Phillip Carter, George W. Casey, Sandy Cochran, Michael Cohen, Danny Davis, Andrew Exum, Joshua Foust, Lloyd Gardner, David Johnson, Lawrence Kaplan, Austin Long, Anne Marlowe, Peter Munson, Kelly Peyton Howard, Bing West, James Willbanks, Don Vandergriff, and Marilyn Young.