Gerhard Engel - At the Heart of the Reich: The Secret Diary of Hitlers Army Adjutant

Original British Copyright 2005 by Greenhill Books

Copyright 2016 by Skyhorse Publishing

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available on file.

Cover design by Rain Saukas

Print ISBN: 978-1-5107-1155-6

Ebook ISBN: 978-1-5107-1156-3

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

Maps

German Attacks on the Eastern Front, June-November 1942

Preface

Gerhard Engel occupied a very privileged position in the Third Reich during the period 1938-43. As Hitlers Army Adjutant, not only did he act as a liaison officer between the Reichs Chancellery and the German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres OKH) but, as a member of Hitlers inner circle, he was also privy to some of the Fhrers innermost thoughts and concerns. His diary therefore provides valuable insights into the way Hitler thought and operated, as well as on the frictions that developed between him and the German Army.

Indeed, the Engel diary more than complements the account by Nicolaus von Below, Hitlers Luftwaffe Adjutant during 1937-45, which has already been published in English (At Hitlers Side, Greenhill, 2001). This is especially since Belows work was written many years after 1945. In contrast, even though, as Hildegard von Kotzes introduction points out, text was added by the author after 1945, Engels diary has an immediacy which makes it a valuable historical document. True, the diary is fragmentary, with often several days and even weeks and months between entries in many ways it reads like a series of snapshots. Part of the reason for this may simply have been lack of time. As von Below pointed out, being an adjutant to Hitler was very demanding and often entailed a 16-hour day. It may also simply have been because Engel did not consider that anything had happened which was of particular note. There are also entries, probably written some time after the event, in which dates and other detail are questionable. In this respect, the reader needs to exercise a degree of caution, although these anomalies do not have a significant bearing on the integrity of the diary as a whole.

Engel took up his appointment on the eve of Anschluss and in the wake of the von Blomberg and von Fritsch scandals. Indeed, his first diary entry, on the very day that German troops entered Austria and union between the two countries was proclaimed, records Heinz Guderians shock over the treatment meted out to the luckless Werner von Fritsch, who had been Commander-in-Chief of the Army for four years before he was forced to resign in early February 1938. The motivation for fabricating a homosexual affair involving von Fritsch was that Hitler saw him as an obstacle to creating a mass army imbued with National Socialism. Indeed, one of the main themes of the diaiy is Hitlers ranting against his generals. In particular, he accused them of having too little political understanding and of timidity. Much of this was because they considered that the expansion of the army was being carried out too rapidly and hence Hitlers allusion to the 100,000-man army mindset.

The Armys interests were also not served by the generals closest to Hitler, something which is reinforced by Engel. Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht OKW), popularly known as Lakaitel (lackey) a play on his name, seldom, if ever, stood up to Hitler, which, of course suited the latter. The same applied to Walter von Brauchitsch, who succeeded von Fritsch as Army C-in-C. This was not so much on account of a supine character, but more because von Brauchitsch had wanted to divorce his wife so that he could remarry, but she demanded a financial settlement beyond his means. He therefore agreed to become C-in-C in return for a sizeable sum of money, which put him in debt to Hitler. Furthermore, his second wife had a dubious background and he was well aware that von Blombergs demise had been brought about by the same situation. It was therefore unsurprising that the new C-in-C adopted an obsequious attitude towards the Fhrer.

Engel railed against both Keitel and von Brauchitsch and, like many other officers, placed his hopes in Ludwig Beck, the Army Chief of Staff. Beck was well aware that Hitlers expansionist ambitions could lead to disaster and, once Hitler turned his eyes on Czechoslovakia, addressed a memorandum to von Brauchitsch. He warned that a German invasion of that country might well bring in the other major European powers and that Germany would find itself having to fight a major war on two fronts, a problem which had traditionally dogged German strategic thinking. His memorandum was ignored, but in spite of pleas by Engel, he would not speak directly to Hitler, complaining of his demagogic attitude. Even so, Beck did persevere with von Brauchitsch and persuaded him to call a meeting of the senior commanders. The result was that von Brauchitsch finally presented Becks memorandum to Hitler who dismissed it as merely another example of military timidity. It was virtually the last straw for Beck. After a final row with von Brauchitsch over his failure to stand up to Hitler, he resigned in August 1938. His place was taken by General Franz Haider, who previously headed the OKH Operations branch. Hitler had initially despised Haider as a desk soldier, but did recognise his powers of organisation. Engel makes no comment on Becks demise, but he does record his first meeting with Haider in his new post. His previous dealings with the new Chief of Staff had been stiff, largely because Haider did not trust Engel, believing him to be a Hitler toady. When Haider now displayed a pistol on his desk and complained that he was being followed it was clear that he was suffering from a persecution complex. When Engel then told him what the Reich Chancellery were thinking, Haider said he was interested only in the political aspects; his colleagues would take care of the military aspects since he had little regard for Hitlers thoughts on the subject. The final straw in Engels eyes was the presentation by von Brauchitsch and Haider of the Armys plan for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Hitler rejected large parts of it and demanded revisions. Neither the C-in-C nor the Chief of Staff stood up to him and the final humiliation in Engels eyes was von Brauchitschs public declaration of the loyalty of the Army to the Fhrer.