Graeme Captain - Stopping Hitler an official account of how Britain planned to defend itself in The Second World War

STOPPING

HITLER

AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF HOW BRITAIN PLANNED TO DEFEND ITSELF IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

AN OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF HOW BRITAIN PLANNED TO DEFEND ITSELF IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Captain G.C. Wynne

Frontline Books

STOPPING HITLER

An Official Account of How Britain Planned to Defend Itself

in the Second World War

This edition published in 2017 by Frontline Books,

an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd,

47 Church Street, Barnsley, S. Yorkshire, S70 2AS,

Based on file reference WO 277/37 (entitled Defence Plans for the United Kingdom 1939-45 and compiled by Captain G.C. Wynne) at The National Archives, Kew, and licensed under the Open Government Licence v3.0.

Text alterations and additions Frontline Books

ISBN: 978-1-47389-552-2

eISBN: 978-1-47389-554-6

Mobi ISBN: 978-1-47389-553-9

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the publisher. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

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The purpose of this monograph is to give a general account of the plans made for Home Defence during the war period 1939-1945. It is arranged in four parts corresponding to the four different threats which developed with the changing situations of the war.

For the United Kingdom the defensive phase lasted from 1939 to 1942. It is dealt with in deals with the threats which arose after the United Kingdom had become the base for the Allied counteroffensive into Europe.

Captain G.C. Wynne
Historical Section, Cabinet

19 May 1948

As far as possible, this official history is reproduced in the form that it was originally written. Aside from correcting obvious spelling mistakes, most frequently in places names, or typographical errors, we have strived to keep our edits and alterations to the absolute minimum. A direct consequence of this policy is that there are occasional inconsistencies in the text.

Effect of the Ten Year Rule

After the conclusion of the 1914/18 War British policy was diverted to the promotion of peace and to the reduction and limitation of armaments. The signing of the Covenant of the League of Nations by the chief countries of the world in 1919 led to the hope that international disputes might be settled by arbitration, and aggressors outlawed by a system of collective security.

The prospect of another European conflict seemed, in fact, so remote that the accepted the assumption that no major war would take place for ten years. That assumption, for the purposes of the Estimates for the Defence Services, was re-affirmed in 1928. The little urgency attached to the armed strength of this country is illustrated by the fact that in 1931 the total effective expenditure on the Navy, Army, and Air Force together (88,900,000) was less than the State dole to relieve unemployment (89,222,000). Our absolute naval strength had been so diminished as to render the Fleet incapable of affording efficient protection to our trade in the event of war. The Army had been pared to the bone, and was so small that it was not capable of fulfilling our international commitments. The Air Force, which in 1918 had been among the strongest in the world, both in quality and quantity, ranked fifth in terms of first-line strength.

In 1932 the principle of collective security under the League of Nations met its first test. The attack on Shanghai on the 2nd February by Japan was a deliberate act of aggression against China, a fellow member of the League, and demanded intervention. But no concerted arrangements for the application of armed force, nor even for the enforcement of sanctions under Article XVI of the Covenant, were found practicable. As a consequence the League came to be regarded not as a super-State with an international police force but rather as an organization to prevent conflict by building up the machinery for conciliation. The Japanese incident gave the warning that international law had as yet only moral force behind it.

In 1932, too, the situation in Germany became menacing. A National-Sozialistiche (Nazi) party, with a dictator, Herr Hitler, as its leader and the crooked cross of the Swastika as its emblem, became the strongest political party in the country. The party programme, proclaimed openly in Herr Hitlers political testament, Mein Kampf, was based on the belief that Germany deserves to be master of the World; and the aim was peace established by the victorious sword of a people of overlords which can bend the world to the service of a higher culture. France and Russia were to be destroyed; France as an act of revenge and liberation, and Russia in order to gain soil and territory for an increase in the German population from 50 millions to 250 millions within the next hundred years. In October 1933 Germany withdrew from the League of Nations with the declared intention to re-arm. Re-armament and the re- establishment of munition and aircraft factories had, in fact, already taken place on a considerable scale.