Richard Overy - The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Richard Overy is Professor of History at Kings College, London. His previous books include Russias War, Interrogations and most recently The Dictators.

I would like to acknowledge the helpful assistance received in the Imperial War Museum, the Public Record Office, and above all in the Ministry of Defence, Air Historical Branch. I am particularly grateful to Sebastian Ritchie for casting an expert eye over the text at very short notice. I would like to thank Tony Mansell for sorting out figures on casualties, and Richard Simpson of the RAF Museum, Hendon, for help on some technical issues. Simon Winder at Penguin was the inspiration behind the subject and its format. Kate Parker has been a scrupulous editor. Any errors and misjudgements that remain are, as ever, my own responsibility. To Kim, Alexandra and Clementine my love and thanks.

THE HURRICANE AND THE SPITFIRE:
PRODUCTION, OPERATIONAL STRENGTH AND LOSSES

Table 1: Production per week, JuneNovember 1940

Table 2: Operational strength: number of squadrons, JulyOctober 1940

Table 3: Operational losses per week, JulyNovember 1940 (aircraft totally destroyed)

Sources:

Table 1: PRO AIR 22/293, Weekly Output of Fighters.

Table 2: PRO AIR 16/365, Fighter Command, Operational Strength of Squadrons and Order of Battle.

Table 3: PRO AIR 22/262, Daily Returns of Casualties to RAF Aircraft, 25 June29 September 1940.

SINGLE-ENGINED FIGHTER PILOT STRENGTH,
RAF AND GERMAN AIR FORCE

Table 1: Fighter Command pilot strength

Table 2: German Air Force, single-engined fighter pilot strength

Sources:

Table 1: PRO AIR 22/296, Personnel: Casualties, Strength and Establishment of the RAF.

Table 2: C. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany (4 vols, London, 1961), vol. 4, p. 501; W. Murray, Luftwaffe: Strategy for Defeat 19331945 (London, 1985), p. 54. For September, Webster and Frankland give a figure of 688 operational pilots.

includes 2 half-strength squadrons

includes 1 part-strength squadron

We have reason to believe that Germany will be ruthless and indiscriminate in her endeavour to paralyse and destroy our national effort and morale and unless immediate steps are taken to reduce the intensity of attack it is conceivable that the enemy may achieve her object.

AIR MINISTRY MEMORANDUM, APRIL 1938

For most of the 1930s Britains politicians and military leaders were haunted by nightmare visions of a massive knock-out blow from the air against which there could be little defence save the threat of retaliation. When Neville Chamberlain, Britains prime minister from 1937 to 1940, flew back to London from Germany at the height of the Czech crisis in 1938, he looked down at the sprawling suburbs of the capital and imagined bombs crashing down upon the innocent victims below him. This horrible picture inspired him to redouble his efforts for peace. A year later, on 3 September, those efforts were finally undone. Britain declared war on Germany for her refusal to withdraw invasion forces from Poland, whose sovereignty Chamberlain had guaranteed five months before.