Overy - The Battle of Britain: the myth and the reality

PENGUIN BOOKS

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Masterly packs a devastating punch. Such is Professor Overys grasp of the historical detail that he is able to puncture with pinpoint accuracy the myths that now obscure this pivotal event conveys the heat and passion of conflict a model of historical clarity John Yates, Yorkshire Post

Admirably clear, concise and level-headed makes a convincing case Tim Clayton, Daily Mail

Masterful a perfect introduction to a complicated story a worthy and highly readable account of that historic victory Richard Mullen, Contemporary Review

It is hard to imagine a sounder and more succinct account of the Battle of Britain Max Hastings, Evening Standard

My ideal history book frees the Battle of Britain of myth, making the old story fresh as paint Susannah Herbert, Daily Telegraph

Carefully argued, clearly explained and impressively documented a notable achievement Noble Frankland, The Times Literary Supplement

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Richard Overy is Professor of History at Kings College, London. His previous books include Russias War, Interrogations and most recently The Dictators.

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First published as The Battle by Penguin 2000
Reissued in 2001
Reissued under the current title 2004
5

Copyright Richard Overy, 2000
All rights reserved

The moral right of the author has been asserted

Except in the United States of America, this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, re-sold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publishers prior consent in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser

ISBN: 978-0-14-192612-4

I would like to acknowledge the helpful assistance received in the Imperial War Museum, the Public Record Office, and above all in the Ministry of Defence, Air Historical Branch. I am particularly grateful to Sebastian Ritchie for casting an expert eye over the text at very short notice. I would like to thank Tony Mansell for sorting out figures on casualties, and Richard Simpson of the RAF Museum, Hendon, for help on some technical issues. Simon Winder at Penguin was the inspiration behind the subject and its format. Kate Parker has been a scrupulous editor. Any errors and misjudgements that remain are, as ever, my own responsibility. To Kim, Alexandra and Clementine my love and thanks.

For sixty years The Battle has meant one thing to the British people: the Battle of Britain. The contest between the British and German air forces in the late summer and autumn of 1940 has become a defining moment in our recent history, as Trafalgar was for the Victorians. British forces fought other great battles in the twentieth century the Somme, Passchendaele, Normandy but only El Alamein exudes the same sweet scent of complete victory, and Egypt was not the Motherland.

In reality neither El Alamein nor the Battle of Britain was a clear-cut battle with a neat conclusion. This has not stopped historians from imposing clarity, nor has it dulled the popular perception that these were glittering milestones along the road to British military success. Both battles were really defensive triumphs: the one saved Egypt and prevented the collapse of Britains global war effort, the other saved Britain from cheap conquest. It is avoiding defeat that we have applauded; victory came long afterwards, with more powerful allies in harness.

The Battle matters because it prevented German invasion and conquest and kept Britain in the war. This achievement was worthwhile enough. Nine European states (ten, counting Danzig) had failed to prevent German occupation by the summer of 1940, with the grimmest of consequences. Nevertheless, some historians have raised serious doubts about the traditional story of the battle, which gave birth to the myth of a united nation repelling invasion, and gave iconographic status to the Spitfires and the few who flew them. There is another history to be discovered behind the popular narrative. The effort to uncover it has already challenged some of the most cherished illusions of the battle story.

Take, for example, the generally accepted view that the battle prevented German invasion of southern Britain. Documents on the German side have been used to suggest that this was not so. Invasion, it can be argued, was a bluff designed to force Britain to beg for peace; in the summer of 1940 Hitlers eyes were already gazing eastwards, where there lay real living-space. The Royal Air Force did not repel invasion for the apparently simple reason that the Germans were never coming. This interpretation has prompted some historians to suggest that Britain should have taken the chance of peace with Hitler and let the two totalitarian states bleed each other to death in eastern Europe.

Behind this argument lies still more revision. The picture of a firmly united and determined people standing shoulder to shoulder against fascism has been slowly eroded by the weight of historical evidence. The British were less united in 1940 than was once universally believed. Defeatism could be found, side by side with heroic defiance. Churchills government, so it is argued, had powerful voices urging a search for peace in the summer of 1940, just like the appeasers of the 1930s. Churchill himself has not been free of reassessment. He has become the butt of wide criticism for his conduct of the war and his style of leadership. Even his inspirational speeches, which have shaped our memory of that summer of 1940, can now be shown to have had a mixed reception among a public desperate for hard news.

It is the purpose of this short book to assess where The Battle now stands in history. There is little point in pretending that the historical narrative of the battle is the same as the popular myth. But it is not necessarily the case that the significance of the battle is diminished by recreating the historical reality, any more than the effects of Churchills leadership must be negated by acknowledging that he was human too. For a great many reasons the Battle of Britain, myth and reality, was a necessary battle. The consequences of British abdication in 1940 would have been a calamity not just for the British people but for the world as a whole.

We have reason to believe that Germany will be ruthless and indiscriminate in her endeavour to paralyse and destroy our national effort and morale and unless immediate steps are taken to reduce the intensity of attack it is conceivable that the enemy may achieve her object.

AIR MINISTRY MEMORANDUM, APRIL 1938

For most of the 1930s Britains politicians and military leaders were haunted by nightmare visions of a massive knock-out blow from the air against which there could be little defence save the threat of retaliation. When Neville Chamberlain, Britains prime minister from 1937 to 1940, flew back to London from Germany at the height of the Czech crisis in 1938, he looked down at the sprawling suburbs of the capital and imagined bombs crashing down upon the innocent victims below him. This horrible picture inspired him to redouble his efforts for peace. A year later, on 3 September, those efforts were finally undone. Britain declared war on Germany for her refusal to withdraw invasion forces from Poland, whose sovereignty Chamberlain had guaranteed five months before.