Hubert Meyer - The 12th SS: The History of the Hitler Youth Panzer Division: Volume Two

CHAPTER 5.4

Preparation of Operation TOTALIZE and Defense Against It. Fighting in the Bridgehead of Grimbosq on 7 and 8 August 1944

The actions by Aufklrungsgruppe Olboeter in the area east of the Vire at the dividing line between Panzergruppe West (from 3.8. onward Panzerarmee West, then 5. Panzerarmee) and 7. Armee offer some insight into the developments there. These had come about as a consequence of the American COBRA and the British BLUECOAT operations. Events were moving quickly toward a critical peak and demanded decisive countermeasures from the German leadership. The gravity of the situation was clearly expressed in an order of the OKW of 2 August 1944. The countermeasures, as a consequence, were accordingly severe. The text follows verbatim:

The enemy breakthrough on the western wing of the beachhead front can only be parried by a decisive counterattack of strong German Panzer forces.

Our superior tactical experience must be used to return the situation to a positive state. The combat-inexperienced and difficult-to-move Infanterie Divisions must not be brought into this torn wing, while the bulk of the Panzer units is tied down at the still coherent main line of defense in infantry defense further to the east, and remains there. Thus, the Fhrer has ordered:

The front line between the Orne and Vire rivers is to be curled inward to the north, using mainly Infanterie Divisions. If necessary, a new main line of defense, with the front line pulled back, must be established along a general line Thury-Harcourt-Vire-Fontenermont, and held.

The Panzer units in action at that front until now must be pulled out and moved to the left wing as a complete body. The attacks by these, at least four, Panzer units must destroy the enemy tank forces which have broken through to the east, southeast and south. Without any regard to the enemy breakthrough in Brittany, contact must be established with the western coast

The acting chief of the Wehrmacht operational staff, General Warlimont, carried the OKW order for the counteroffensive to Supreme Commander West on 2 August. He explained the order and its impact on Panzerarmee West at its command post during the following day. This conversation was recorded in a file note for the war diary of Panzergruppe West as follows:

Meeting with the acting chief of Wehrmacht operational staff, General der Artillerie Warlimont (Gen. W.) on 3.8.1944.

Present:Supreme Commander Panzerarmee West (S.C.)
commanding General I. SS-Panzerkorps,
Chief Panzerarmee West,
Ia Panzerarmee West,
Oberstleutnant i.G. (general staff) von Kluge,

Major i.G. Buchterkirch, staff of inspector general of the Panzer troops.

S.C. provides a briefing on the present situation at Panzerarmee West.

...

S.C.: It appears that the situation at Panzerarmee West and 7. Armee cannot be held in the long run.

Gen. W.: However, positions have been held there until now. If this can be done for another month or two, the battle of this summer has not been lost. The English people have been promised the end of the war for this year. If that does not occur, there is one more big chance for us (significant impact on morale by V 1s)!

S.C.: The situation at 7. Armee demands that an overall decision must be taken.

Gen. W.: If the Normandy front of 120 kilometers cannot be held, then it wont be possible further back at all (Seine-Marne-West-wall). There can also be no question of it since no supply system is in place there. It is necessary to pull four Pz.-Divs. out of the Panzerarmee West sector in order to push through to Avranches and cut off the Americans.

Commanding Gen. I.SS-Pz. Korps: If the SS-Divisions are pulled out south of Caen, the enemy will attack there and break through.

Gen.W.: The SS-Divisions there are not in the right spot since they are, immobile, part of the front line and the enemys point of main effort is not there.

S.C.: Advancing Infanterie Divisions must be put into action as soon as possible. However, the SS-Divisions must be put in readiness to the rear in order to prop up the front. The principal question remains how we can hold the front in the long run in view of the enemy being vastly superior in materiel.

Gen.W.: Two more SS-Brigades can be brought in from Denmark.

S.C.: Bringing up these SS-Brigades takes 810 days. That is too long. Pulling out the SS-Divisions from the present front line and action into the direction of Avranches takes at least three to four days. No-one knows what the situation there will be by then.

Gen.W.:... Within the foreseeable future, the impact of action by completely new weapons will be felt. There, too, the perpetrators of 20 July have slowed things down... The first 1,000 new fighters will enter combat during the second half of August.