Lt. Gen J.F.R. Jacob - An Odyssey In War And Peace

An Odyssey in
War and Peace

An Odyssey in
War and Peace

An Autobiography

Lt Gen. J.F.R. Jacob

J.F.R. Jacob, 2011

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may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or
by any means, without the prior permission of the publisher

First impression May 2011
Second impression August 2011

First published in India in 2011
The Lotus Collection
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Roli Books Pvt. Ltd
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Cover: Bonita Vaz-shimray
Production: Shaji Sahadevan

ISBN: 978-81-7436-840-9

CONTENTS

Dedicated to

Gen. P.P. Kumaramangalam
DSO MBE
A great soldier, human being, and friend. Had it not been for him, I
would have resigned from the Army.

Preface

It has been a tempestuous journey that is drawing to a close. There were the years of the sword from 1941 when I joined the army to August 1978 when I retired as Army Commander Eastern Command. I learnt my soldiering during the second World War, both in the deserts of the Middle East and the dense jungle-clad ridges and mangrove swamps of the Arakan in Burma. immediately after the Japanese surrender we were engaged in highly unpopular counter-insurgency operations in Sumatra, aimed at restoring Dutch rule there.

After independence, I returned to India from a gunnery staff course of instruction in England to the Artillery school in Deolali. The British were leaving and as the only other senior Indian officer there I had to take over the school from the British and also to divide the assets of the school between India and Pakistan.

This was followed by a period of peace-time soldiering.

In 1969, I was ordered to conduct operations to drive the Naxalites out of West Bengal. This was followed by counter-insurgency operations in the North-East (NE) leading to the signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975. The operations conducted in Mizoram influenced their leaders to come to Calcutta for the Calcutta Conference to discuss the modalities of peace.

The campaign in December 1971, in East Pakistan, led to the unconditional public surrender of 93,000 troops of the Pakistan Eastern Command, the only public surrender in history. To quote the Pakistan National Defence College study of the war:

The Indians planned and executed their offensive in a textbook manner. It was a classic example of through planning, minute coordination and bold execution. The credit clearly goes to General Jacob's meticulous preparations in the Indian Eastern command and to the implementation by his corps commanders.

Niazi had proposed a ceasefire and a hand-over of the government to the United Nations (UN) with guarantees of no reprisals etc. There was no mention of India. The ceasefire proposed by Niazi was rejected outright by Bhutto who vowed to fight on. The end result was an unconditional public surrender, the only one in history. The Hamood ur Rehman Commission of Enquiry asked Gen. Niazi: 'Gen. Niazi, when you had 26,400 troops in Dacca and the Indians a few thousand outside and you could have fought on for at least two more weeks. The UN was in session [Polish resolution] and had you fought on for even one more day the Indians would have had to go back: why did you accept a shameful unconditional public surrender and provide a guard of honour commanded by your ADC?' Niazi replied that he was compelled to do so by Gen. Jacob who blackmailed him into surrendering. This he has repeated in his book Betrayal of East Pakistan. After the surrender of 93,000 Pakistani troops, India emerged as a regional superpower. I have often wondered, what would have happened had I failed to convert the proposed ceasefire under the auspices of the UN into an unconditional surrender? We would have had to return the very next day.

In my book Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a Nation (1997), I had given an objective account of the operations in East Pakistan in 1971. The book has been translated into Chinese, Thai, Persian, Arabic, Hebrew, and Bengali. I had given copies both to Field Marshal Manekshaw and Lt Gen. Jagjit Aurora in 1997.There were no rejoinders from them. The book is studied in many military institutions abroad and also some universities.

The waging of war is a complex business involving almost all sections of the population. The conduct and progress of military operations is far from smooth and never wholly predictable. The successful conduct of operations depends upon imaginative planning, flexibility, and the ability to react rapidly. It is imperative that one is not overtaken by events. Mobility and manoeuvre are essential ingredients.