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Text originally published in 1993 under the same title.
Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.
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ABSTRACT
LEE BUILDS AN ARMY: FROM MALVERN HILL TO SECOND MANASSAS. By Frederick B. Hodges, MAJ, USA.
Robert E, Lee, in his first campaign as the new commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, stopped the Union offensive against Richmond in a series of engagements known as the Seven Days. Although eventually successful, Confederate operations were clumsy and erratic and often missed opportunities to secure greater success. At the end of the Seven Days Lee reorganized his forces and began preparations for his next campaign. This new campaign, which resulted in the Battle of Second Manassas just two months later, is widely considered to be one of Lee's most brilliant operations.
The purpose of this monograph is to identify the changes and improvements that occurred within Lee's army which enabled it to show this vast improvement in such a short time span. The monograph uses LTC James Dubik's model for campaign analysis which is a modification of the familiar ends, ways, and means characterization of campaign planning. It evaluates four components of a campaign: intellectual, cybernetic, psychological-physical, and harmonic as a methodology for comparative analysis.
Despite his inexperience, Lee was able to learn from his first campaign. He could recognize what needed to be done and had the patience, intelligence, and courage to do it. Each of the adjustments and modifications he made were important but not decisive by themselves. It was the synergism of wise personnel and organization changes combined with improved operational planning which proved to be the secret in transforming Lee's troops into the legendary Army of Northern Virginia.
LEE BUILDS AN ARMY: FROM MALVERN HILL TO SECOND MANASSAS
In the spring of 1862, General George McClellan, commander of the Union Army of the Potomac, conducted operations to seize Richmond, the Confederate capital, in what is known as the Peninsula Campaign. General Joseph Johnston, the Confederate commander, was wounded during the campaign, resulting in the assumption of command by General Robert E. Lee.
In his first campaign, a series of engagements known as the Seven Days, Lee managed to thwart the Union army and force its retirement. Lee was successful, although Confederate operations were clumsy and erratic and often missed opportunities to secure greater success. At the end of the Seven Days campaign Lee reorganized his forces and began preparations for his next campaign. This new campaign, which resulted in the battle at Second Manassas just two months later, is widely considered to be one of Lees most brilliant operations.
The purpose of this monograph is to determine the changes and improvements that occurred within Lees Army of Northern Virginia which enabled it to show this vast improvement in such a short time span. A comparative analysis of the two campaigns will identify the improvements in the Army of Northern. Virginia. The model for the analysis was developed by Lieutenant Colonel James Dubik, a recent graduate of the Advanced Operational Studies Fellowship at Fort Leavenworth, and will be described in detail in the next section.
The lessons of Lees efforts to train and improve his army are of paramount importance to operational commanders and planners today. Lee found the flaws and inefficiencies in his army during his first campaign and repaired them before his next onebut at the cost of thousands of casualties. The United States Army seeks to avoid the costly failures it has experienced at the start of many of its wars by eliminating most of the flaws and deficiencies before the next one.
LTC Dubik's model for campaign analysis is a modification of the familiar ends, ways, and means characterization of campaign planning. {1} The model, described under the heading What makes a campaign successful? consists of four components: intellectual, psychological-physical, cybernetic, and harmonic. This portion of the monograph will briefly describe each of the four components and the model's overall effectiveness for analysis.
The intellectual component is an analysis of the strategic aims of the campaign and of how well the plan supports achievement of those aims. It considers the coherency and clarity of the plan as well as the proper use of relevant theory and principles within the context of the particular campaign. This includes the specific political and military situation and the terrain and geography in which the campaign occurs.
The psychological-physical component is an analysis of the means necessary to execute the plan and attain the end. This component includes the following aspects of the force conducting the campaign: sufficient trained combat forces with a staff system capable of coordinating their actions; competent subordinate leadership familiar with the operational commander's thinking and method of command; suitable lines of communication and operation and an appropriate theater of operations; sufficient logistical system; and the political and societal will to see the campaign through to completion.
The cybernetic component is an analysis of the command system established in an organization. It looks at the reliability of the system, focusing on the processes the commander uses to gather and analyze information about his own unit and the enemy, how this is translated into orders or directives, and how those orders are then transmitted to subordinate commanders for execution. It also includes the process by which the commander ensures or supervises the execution of his orders, modifies them in accordance with the situation, and how well his system of command stands up to the uncertainties, confusion, and danger of war.
This component of the model also seeks to find whether or not the commanders system has credibility within the army and with his subordinate staff and commanders.
The final piece of the model is the harmonic component which analyzes the compatibility of the three components described above. In other words, is the plan clear and coherent enough for the operational force to accomplish it, given the command and control system currently in place? If any of these three components are unsatisfactory, then the commander must fix or modify one or all of them until he is able to accomplish his strategic objective.
