Norbert Bacyk - WARSAW 2: THE BATTLE FOR PRAGA: July - September 1944

D uring the late spring of 1944, the constant Soviet pressure on Ukrania and the relative passivity that prevailed on the Belarusian sector, led to the formation of two clearly separate operational areas. While the Germans and their allies had nearly been driven back to the jump off point for operation Barbarossa in the Ukraine; they nonetheless retained control over vast areas of north of the Prype Rivers wet lands. The fronts consequent appearance was both an opportunity and threat for both sides in this conflict. But the Germans viewed strategical position as essentially defensive, partly due to their numerically weaker forces. Therefore the risk of their Belarusian region being outflanked from the south increased. An effective defence of the Belarusian frontline, which measured 1,100 km from Lake Nieszczerado to the town of Werba, would have required enormous military resources which the Germans Eastern Army (Ost Heer) certainly did not possess.

At the beginning of June 1944, a lull prevailed across the entire Eastern front which gave an indication that both sides were preparing for renewed and terrible conflict. In Hitlers opinion, the greatest threat resided in the Soviet presence in Ukrania. He feared the so called galician manoeuvre. According to the Third Richs dictator, the Soviet forces didnt plan to attack Byelorussia, but rather to strike with all out strength against the province of Lublin and then draw north into the area between the Wisla and Bug Rivers, cross the Bug and Narew Rivers in order to set out in an approximate direction towards Knisberg, attacking and breaking off the contacts between the German homeland and Heeresgruppe Nord and Mitte. This inaccurate assumption concerning enemys intentions was also shared by Generalfeldmarschall Keitel, commander of the OKW, as well as Generaloberst Jodl, chief of staff at OKH command. In reality, such an ambitious plan of action lay far outside the Soviet Armys capabilities. The Galician manoeuvre would in any event have been difficult to implement given the difficult nature of the terrain, supply problems and, not least, from a purely tactical standpoint. Despite this, Hitler believed that it was a possible and ordered Heeresgruppe Nord Ukraine to concentrate a large potion of its available tank divisions for battle, east of the Bug River. As a result, during early summer, the commander of this Heeresgruppe, Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, received under his command as many as nine tank divisions and two in the main, these were assembled into the 1st and 4th Panzer-Armies. Apart from these armoured forces, the Hungarian 1st Army was put under his command. In contrast, the man entrusted with ensuring that Belorussia remained in German hands, Generalfeldmarschall Ernst Busch, had only one lone tank division and three armoured self-propelled gun divisions.

Tanks, models PzKpfw IV Ausf. G and H, from the 5th Panzer-Regiment in the vicinity of Chelm or Sokal, June 1944. (CAW)

However, the Soviet side had no intention of concentrating all their combat resources on only one operational objective. The plans for the new strategic offensive consisted, namely, in successively spreading out its operations to new frontlines. By employing this strategy it would prove impossible for the numerically outnumbered defenders to concentrate its reserves in any one place, and thereafter, the Germans were able to be defeated in a number of destructive battles. This masterly plan from STAVKA, (Stavka Vjerchnovo Glavnokommandujusjtjego the Headquarters for the Red Armys High Command) was set into action on June 9 when the Soviet Leningrad Front carried out an offensive against the Finnish Army defending the Karelian Isthmus. This was only a supporting offensive but an extremely vital one from the standpoint of Leningrads and Kronstadts security. Barely two weeks later, on June 20, the strong Soviet partisan units in Southern Belorussia launched a broad wave of sabotage actions against Heeresgruppe Mittes rearguard units. This marked the commencement of operation Bagration, in which four Soviet fronts destroyed Generalfeldmarschall Buschs Heeresgruppe.

The crew of an anti-aircraft vehicle, 2 cm Flak 38 auf Fgst Zgkw 8t Sd Kfz/1, firing at ground targets, on the Eastern Front, summer 1944. (CAW)

The Soviet assault-gun SU-76M from an unidentified unit during fighting in Belorussia, July 1944. (ASKM)

Selected to lead the actual execution of the Bagration offensive were: General Ivan Bagramians 1st Baltic front, General Ivan Tjernjakow 3rd Belarusian front, General Georgij Zacharov 2nd Belarusian Front and General Konstantij Rokossovskij 1st Belorussian Front, which later would initiate the attack only from its right, which is to say, eastern flank. Heeresgruppe Mitte which directly faced them; was composed of the 3rd Panzer-Army, the 4th Army, the 9th Army and the 2nd Army. Of these, it was only the 2nd Army that stood directly in front of the 1st Belorussian Fronts left flank, and therefore positioned outside the reach of the Soviets initial offensive.

While working on the operational details, it emerged that Stalin, with regard to Belorussia, favoured launching a powerful offensive at one single strategic point. However, General Rokossovskij, the commanding officer with most responsibility for that frontline, unexpectedly opposed the dictator and expressed his opinion that a pincer manoeuvre would be a wiser way to proceed. In his view, the first thing they should do is crush the flanks of the 3rd Panzer-Army and the 9th Army, and thereafter encircle the 4th Army. Stalin finally acceded to the generals forcefully expressed opinion, but underlined for Rokossovskij that he now, in fact, bore the entire responsibility for the operations success, or failure, on his shoulders. This was a thinly veiled threat but the commanding officer of the 1st Belorussian Front was completely sure of his opinion.

Events at the front confirmed that Rokossovskijs plan had indeed been the wisest option. Operation Bagration was launched on June 22, 1944, and led to the break up of the Germans 3rd Panzar-Army and 9th Army after only seven days.The German 4th Army, which had found itself wedged between these two, was half encircled. Due to the crumbling front, Hitler sacked Busch on June 28, and turned to Generalfeldmarschall Model to save the situation. This general, who was highly regarded by the Fhrer and politically reliable, had, at the same time, command over Heeresgruppe Nord Ukraine. Model, a former tank division commander, now became energetically engaged in the campaign but he did not succeed in saving the troops of the 4th Army. Together with the remnants of the 9th Army, they became completely encircled east of Minsk. The Soviet troops seized the Belorussian capital city on July 3, 1944. The fighting inside the encircled area ceased eight days later. The annihilation of the three armies meant in reality, that the entire Heeresgruppe Mitte had been destroyed. By the middle of July, essentially all of the divisions and some of the corps commanders within the 3rd Panzer-Army, 4th Army and 9th Army had been killed or taken prisoner. Certain of these, for example, the commander of the 18th Panzer grenadier-Division, General Zutavern, or the commander of the 134th Infanterie-Division, General Philipp, had committed suicide. Germany had lost in excess of 300,000 frontline troops. In contrast, at the same time this took place, on the other side of the front, on June 29, Rokossovskij was promoted to Marshal.