Prooijen - The psychology of conspiracy theories

Climate change is a hoax perpetrated by the Chinese. The pharmaceutical industry hides evidence that vaccines cause autism. And there is a major conspiracy to cover up the fact that Barack Obama was born in Kenya. These are conspiracy theories that were propagated during the 2016 presidential campaign of Donald Trump. Scientists, journalists, policy makers, and other critics portray these theories as nave, far-fetched, not supported by evidence, or simply ridiculous. But why then do so many people believe such conspiracy theories? The appeal of these conspiracy theories among voters was substantial enough for Trump to win the Electoral College and become the 45th US president. This suggests that conspiracy theories cannot be dismissed as harmless entertainment or as manifestations of mental illness. Conspiracy theories are common among regular citizens and determine real and impactful choices in life such as who to vote for, whether to get ones child vaccinated, whether to place effort into reducing ones carbon footprint, whether to use contraceptives, and whether to aggress against dissimilar outgroups. It is time for the social sciences to take the widespread societal phenomenon of conspiracy theories seriously.

Who believes conspiracy theories, and who disbelieves them? Under what circumstances are people particularly susceptible to conspiracy theories? What are the consequences of believing in conspiracy theories? And what can policy makers do to reduce belief in conspiracy theories? These important questions are the domain of psychology. The present book was designed to provide a short, accessible, and state-of-the-art overview of the psychology of conspiracy theories. The main thesis of this book is that contrary to views that explain conspiracy theories through pathology belief in conspiracy theories is widespread among many citizens because they are rooted in normal psychological processes. Conspiracy theories originate through the same cognitive processes that produce other types of belief (e.g., new age, spirituality), they reflect a desire to protect ones own group against a potentially hostile outgroup, and they are often grounded in strong ideologies. Conspiracy theories are a natural defensive reaction to feelings of uncertainty and fear, blaming dissimilar outgroups for the distressing circumstances that one has to deal with.

Although this is a short book, there are more people to thank than space allows. At Routledge I thank Ceri Griffiths for embarking with me on this project and Elizabeth Rankin for her help. I also thank Michael Strang, who brought the new Routledge Psychology of series to my attention and persuaded me to write this book.

I greatly appreciate the many collaborations I have with scholars and students around the world on the psychology of conspiracy theories, and many of the ideas described in this book originated through discussions or joint research with them. I would like to particularly mention Paul van Lange, Andr Krouwel, Karen Douglas, Nils Jostmann, Reinout de Vries, Mark van Vugt, Robbie Sutton, Roland Imhoff, Michele Acker, Eric van Dijk, Thomas Pollet, Clara de Inocencio, and Olivier Klein. I also thank the many scholars that I met (and currently collaborate with on the topic of conspiracy theories) through two COST Action networks that I am privileged to be part of: COST Action Social psychological dynamics of historical representations in the enlarged European Union and COST Action Comparative analysis of conspiracy theories.

In my personal life I would like to thank John Ensberg, who believes far more conspiracy theories than I do yet also is one of my best friends. Finally, I thank my wife, Claudia van Prooijen-van Remundt: Somehow she manages to increase my productivity by frequently distracting me. Thanks to her for creating some balance, and I am glad to find out every day that there really is more to life than science.

Jan-Willem van Prooijen
Amsterdam, 26 July 2017