James K. Sebenius - Kissinger the negotiator: lessons from dealmaking at the highest level

Among the tools of statecraft, strategic negotiation occupies a prime position. Over my career, I have conducted many negotiations and made numerous observations on this vital subject. I have not, however, methodically reviewed the many negotiations in which I was involved to determine the most effective strategies and tactics to address different challenges at the table. To my knowledge, none of the many books written about my foreign policy record as secretary of state and national security advisor seriously analyzes this central topic. This book, therefore, is unique. It is the first to delve deeply into my philosophy and method of negotiation. James K. Sebenius, as lead author, along with his Harvard colleagues R. Nicholas Burns and Robert H. Mnookin, has produced a superb and practical analysis of how to forge worthwhile agreements in complex situations.

This book was not my idea. Until a few years ago, I did not know Jim or Bob. And while I knew Nick well, his years of government service began after my time as secretary of state. I have no institutional connections with any of the authors. This effort originated when the three professors invited me to Harvard in 2014 as part of their ambitious project to interview all former American secretaries of state about their toughest negotiations. Thus far, they have conducted in-depth interviews with seven men and women who have occupied that office. They plan to draw on these extraordinary discussions to write a major book on the American diplomatic experience over the last forty years, to serve as the basis for a three-part public television series.

The book you now hold, however, explores a more focused question: what analysis and action consistently lead to success (or failure) in complex, high-level negotiations? Beyond platitudes and well-known principles such as the importance of credibility, I expressed skepticism during our Harvard interviews about whether robust answers to this question could be extracted from the written record. I wondered aloud whether it would be possible to come up with systematic advice given the diverse contexts, distinctive personalities, and unique features of individual negotiations.

Subsequent conversations with Jim, Nick, and Bob increasingly persuaded me that useful, nonobvious prescriptions could be identified. To do this, the authors have concisely recounted a number of episodes in which I was involved. They have brought the negotiating aspects to the foreground, with just enough historical and policy context to make their analysis accessible. Some of these cases are broadly familiar, such as the opening to China and the disengagement agreements between Egypt and Israel after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Other challenging cases, such as negotiating for black-majority rule in Rhodesia in 1976 with Britain and key African states, though widely discussed at the time, have faded into relative obscurity. Yet viewing these episodes primarily through a negotiation lens yields fresh understandings. While I disagree with some of their policy judgments, especially on the Vietnam talks, the authors have done outstanding work in researching these complex negotiations and generating actionable insights from them.

I am often struck by the ad hoc approach to vital negotiations taken by otherwise experienced public officials and private executives. For example, one courts failure by concentrating on process and tactics divorced from a strategic conception of ones fundamental interests and objectives. Another common error is to expend the bulk of ones energies getting the parties to the table, hoping that once they engage face-to-face, a deal will somehow follow. In fact, the more important challenge can be to act, often beforehand and away from the table, to shape the situation to ones advantage. This can mean putting in place strong penalties for failure to agree and arranging appealing incentives for agreement. It can mean carefully building supportive coalitions and neutralizing potential blockers. Jim, Nick, and Bob draw on my record to catalogue many other such snaresand offer useful advice on avoiding and escaping them.

This books importance does not lie mainly in telling the stories of my negotiations, however colorful or historically intriguing. Instead, readers will find its true value in its distillation of the valuable principles and practices that were largely implicit during and after my tenure, occasionally even to me. Given his familiarity with the relevant academic research plus extensive personal experience in high-stakes dealmaking, Jim, along with his coauthors, Nick and Bob, possesses a deep understanding of complex negotiations. This has enabled them to interpret my experience and to extract thoughtful generalizations from it.

In undertaking this project in the spirit of applied history, Sebenius, Burns, and Mnookin have made a major contribution to our understanding of negotiation and diplomacy at a time when the utility and promise of these activities are often overlooked. When employed with skill and thorough knowledge of the issues at stake, their analysis promises genuine improvement in diplomatic support. Every CEO, diplomat, and dealmaker facing complex negotiation challenges will benefit from reading this book.