Pradyumna P. KaranUnryu Suganuma - Japan After 3/11

Japan after 3/11

Global Perspectives on the Earthquake, Tsunami, and Fukushima Meltdown

Edited by
Pradyumna P. Karan
and
Unryu Suganuma

Cartography by Richard Gilbreath

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Copyright 2016 by The University Press of Kentucky

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Cover calligraphy by Toyoshi Satoh.

Cataloging-in-Publication data is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978-0-8131-6730-5 (hardcover : alk. paper)
ISBN 978-0-8131-6731-2 (epub)
ISBN 978-0-8131-6732-9 (pdf)

This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials.

Manufactured in the United States of America.

Pradyumna P. Karan, University of Kentucky

Unryu Suganuma, J. F. Oberlin University

Junko Oikawa, J. F. Oberlin University

Yukiko Dejima, J. F. Oberlin University

Masatomo Umitsu, Nara University

Takehiko Takano, Tohoku Gakuin University

H. Todd Stradford, University of Wisconsin-Platteville

Tomoko Yamazaki, Iwate University

Ryohei Sekine, Tohoku University

Jonathan Taylor, California State University, Fullerton

Unryu Suganuma, J. F. Oberlin University

Toshio Hatsuzawa, Fukushima University, and Takehiko Takano, Tohoku Gakuin University

Yukio Yotsumoto and Shunichi Takekawa, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University

Yukiko Dejima, J. F. Oberlin University, and Wakako Ikeda-Ohtsubo, Tohoku University

Toshikazu Seto, Ritsumeikan University, and Yuichiro Nishimura, Nara Womens University

Jun Tsuchiya, Miyagi Gakuin Womens University

Masateru Hino, Tohoku University

Kenji Yamazaki, Meiji University

James M. Hall, Iwate University, and Moto Suzuki, All Hands Volunteers

Kohei Okamoto, Nagoya University, and Kumi Sato, Kinjo Gakuin University

Yilin Hou, Syracuse University, and Unryu Suganuma, J. F. Oberlin University

Lisa Yinghong Li, J. F. Oberlin University

Christine Mary Wilby, J. F. Oberlin University

Pradyumna P. Karan, University of Kentucky

On March 11, 2011, a massive tsunami triggered by an underwater earthquake pummeled the Pacific coast of Tohoku. The aftermath was overwhelming: ships could be spotted miles inland; cars floated in the ocean; more than 16,500 died or were missing; relief organizations struggled to reach affected areas to provide aid for survivors and those evacuated from areas contaminated by nuclear meltdown. Efforts to contain radiation from the damaged nuclear power plant were not successful.

Shortly after the disaster, an international group of social and natural scientists from Japan and abroad traveled to Tohokus most devastated areas, observing and documenting the tsunamis impact. The results of their research were presented at a symposium sponsored by the Institute for International Studies at J. F. Oberlin University, Tokyo. This volume contains revised versions of those papers, which offer field-based analysis of the triple disasters environmental, economic, and social impacts as well as the response and recovery efforts. The papers incorporate all four phases of disaster management: mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Located at the intersection of geography, history, anthropology, sociology, political science, and disaster literature, the papers offer a vibrant and conceptually diverse inquiry into the rapidly evolving field of disaster study within the social sciences.

With contributions from over twenty-five scholars from the United States, Japan, Britain, and New Zealand, the volume presents a general view of mitigation, damage, recovery, and reconstruction, and it aims to advance both ongoing and emerging debates on disaster mitigation and the future of nuclear energy. By presenting a comprehensive and authoritative examination of one of the worlds major natural disasters and the resulting nuclear catastrophe, it will serve as an invaluable resource for students and scholars, and chart new agendas for research, policies, and activism.

Translated by Mihoko Inamori

Kesennuma City, Miyagi Prefecture, one of the areas most seriously impacted by the Sanriku tsunami in Japan in 2011, is my hometown. Japan has the best tsunami warning system in the world; however, the warning system did not save many lives in Kesennuma City. One of the major causes for the huge disaster on March 11 was human error. Unfortunately, the Meteorological Agency ignored correct data sent by the tsunami warning system. The governmental agency predicted that the tsunami would be between three and six meters; the local government made decisions based on the erroneous Meteorological Agency report. As a result, many residents evacuated to the rooftops of three-story buildings, which could survive a six-meter tsunami. In fact, the tsunami that struck Kesennuma was sixteen meters, which totally wiped out most buildings in the town, including my own office.

The second major error involved the interval between the tsunami warning and the arrival of the tsunami, which was about forty minutes. Many residents evacuated to the hills or high ground and mistakenly assumed either that no tsunami had materialized or that it had already reached shore. Based on the governments warning of a three- to six-meter tsunami, many residents decided to return to their houses to collect their belongings. Subsequently, a sixteen-meter tsunami struck the city. An oil tank was dislodged and caused a big fire in the town. Because of the destruction, it is no longer possible to distinguish the location of our houses or office buildings. Many survivors were isolated for a few days without any help. Because the temperature in the city around March was below the freezing point, many survivors on the rooftops of buildings froze to death. Food and blankets were necessary, but in short supply.

The scale of the March 11 tragedy and the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji earthquake was totally different. In the aftermath of the Hanshin earthquake, efforts focused on recovery of the city, but in the case of the 2011 tsunami, it is also necessary to focus on the recovery of the fishery industry, which is the major industry in Kesennuma. For over two and a half months, infrastructure was essentially nonfunctional. Fishery products could not be processed because of the lack of water. The so-called invisible recovery, such as repair of water pipes, takes much longer than the visible recovery of the citys appearance. Moreover, government red tape has made recovery difficult. For instance, the ground in Kesennuma subsided because of the earthquake; however, residents must fix this problem by themselves according to the current law. There is no way that the tsunami victims can afford the necessary landfill by themselves. Also, misuse of recovery funds has been discovered. The 19-trillion-yen budget from the recovery fund has been used to buy weapons and rebuild a football stadium in Tokyo. These projects have nothing to do with disaster recovery or the victims of the March 11 tragedy.