Prof. David C. McClelland - The Achieving Society

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Text originally published in 1961 under the same title.

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THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY

BY

DAVID C. MCCLELLAND

Harvard University

Contents

To

ROWAN GAITHER AND BERNARD BERELSON

in gratitude for their faith in the future of the behavioral sciences

This book grew out of an attempt by a psychologist, trained in behavioral science methods, to isolate certain psychological factors and to demonstrate rigorously by quantitative methods that these factors are generally important in economic development. The scope of such an enterprise turned out to be truly alarming for one whose background in the social sciences was slight to begin with. It required specialized knowledge on everything from population problems, to coal imports in England from the 16 th to the 19 th century, to methods of computing rates of economic growth, to sources of childrens books, to management practices in Russia, Italy and Mexico, to the pottery of Ancient Greece and Pre-Incan Peru. Let me confess at the outset (for it will be obvious soon enough) that I have not managed to become a real professional in many of these areas of knowledge, though I have had the advantage of much expert advice and assistance. The dilemma of the generalist trying to acquire specialized knowledge in a hurry is nicely illustrated by what happened to me when I asked a colleague, an eminent Harvard historian, to recommend a book to me that would bring me up to date on English history. I also mentioned that as a budding scientist in college, I had unfortunately managed to escape all courses in history, so that my mind was practically a tabula rasa on the subject. He simply looked at me aghast, murmured my God! and turned away. Perhaps the self-taught scholar deserves such a responseat any rate he sometimes gets itand so may this book among specialists on particular topics it had to cover in the search for the broadest possible test of the hypothesis that a particular psychological factorthe need for Achievementis responsible for economic growth and decline.

The problem of covering so much intellectual territory is actually twofold. On the one hand, there is the strong probability of simple human error. For example, in the thousands of calculations on which this book is based, it is unlikely that no mistakes have been made. Not even the mechanical equipment that produced many of the numbers used proved infallible. It coughed at least once in some thousands of computations and refused to give one correlation it should have. Possibly in some places I have used incorrect or out-of-date datae.g., on the electrical production of Pakistan or the location of 6 th -century Greek vase remains. In others I may have overlooked an obviously better statistic or used an inadequate method of data analysis. For such errors, though I have tried hard to eliminate them, I apologize in advance and hope readers more expert than I will correct them. The only excuse is the sheer scope of the undertaking.

On the other hand, and more seriously, there may be errors of conceptualization. It was hard to learn enough about so many different matters to assure a grasp of their main features. I was constantly aware of the danger of being naive about a very complex historical or economic problem. Yet I also came to feel that naivet is not wholly a disadvantage. For example, in trying to solve the problem of how to compute comparative rates of economic growth, I was not hampered by any preconceptions. In fact, I had dropped my one course in college economics because it seemed to me such an abstract, rationalistic discipline that took so little account, at least at that time, of how men actually behave economically. So, having little formal training in economics, I did not accept so easily as most economists do by habit, the long tradition of using index numbers and estimates of national income in fixed prices. This traditional method seemed to be so objectionable that I adopted a different approach, based on sampling theory and regression analysis. I do not expect economists readily to accept such an approach, even for the limited purpose of comparing rates of growth, nor am I sure that it is entirely adequate, yet I do feel that my very lack of training in economics may have made it easier for me to break with a traditional but inadequate method of measurement and to look at the problem in a different way.

But how did I get involved in covering so much territory in the first place? Why risk being superficial? The answer lies in the general methodological approach of the book, which is in the tradition of comparative history, comparative economics or a psychology interested in generalizations that apply to all or most of the human species. In other words, the book attempts to answer general questions, not specific ones; it does not probe the particulars of the Industrial Revolution in England but examines the factors underlying that revolution which were common to other such waves of rapid economic development in history.

I am well aware that the search for such generalizations is often suspect. What is the point, the argument runs, in knowing what generally happens (even if it were possible to know), when the really important fact is what happened in this case, in this country at this particular time? For after all I am by profession a clinical psychologist where such an argument is also particularly appropriate. What good is a generalization about human nature when you really want to know what makes this particular person neurotic at this time? Why not study him as an individual, rather than waste time analyzing other people in order to discover what makes people neurotic in general?

It is perhaps because I have spent time analyzing particular cases that I feel the need for generalizations and a comparative frame of reference. It is so easy to be mistaken if you analyze only a particular case. The clinical psychologist may decide, for example, that George is neurotic because his mother mistreated him. The detailed case record makes the point very clear. Yet might not the clinicians view of the case be quite different if he knew that mothers from Georges social background generally mistreated their sons and that most of those sons did not become neurotic? I have seen in writing over and over again that such and such a country, say India, cannot develop rapidly economically because it has such a high population density and/or a high net reproduction rate. The case record makes it clear: it does have a high population density, a high net reproduction rate; it is having difficulty developing. The two events would seem to be logically connected because the more mouths there are to feed, the harder it is to feed them adequately. Yet doesnt the perspective on such a case analysis change when we discover that (1) in general rates of population growth have not been connected with rates of economic growth (Chapter 1) and (2) India, as compared with nations in general, is at the present time developing rapidly despite her population problems (Chapter 3)?